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(i) 
PREFACE 
Psychiatric involvement in the criminal justice system in Australia 
is an area from which little empirical research has emanated. Concluding 
a brief examination of the numbers of psychiatric presentence reports 
requested by Victorian Judges,Bartholomew and Milte (1977rconcluded, 
11 
••• it is necessary at this time to find out which offences the 
983 psychiatric pre-sentence reports referred to in this article 
were concerned. How many were concerned with violence? How many 
reports made recommendations to the court of a specific type? If 
a specific recommendation was made in the report was it adopted 
by the court? Did courts not requesting pre-sentence psychiatric 
reports sentence in any significantly different manner to those who 
did request such reports? . 
It is with this type of question in mind that we publish this small 
piece of research in the hope that it will lead to a larger 
undertaking which may answer some of the questions posed here. 11 
Not only was my research designed to answer this sort of question, 
but it also provided the opportunity to examine other aspects of the 
criminal process such as the judicial behaviour of judges and magistrates, 
the changing role of females in the criminal process and the after 
conduct of offenders receiving psychiatric treatment. 
Tasmania is a very suitable place for criminological research. 
It is comparatively isolated, small and the records are accessible and 
relatively manageable. I hope that my findings will provide some ideas 
and impetus for further research as well as implications for present 
action. 
I must acknowledge the help of all those who have allowed me 
access to the records necessary to compile the data for this study. I 
* Bartholomew, A.A. and Milte, K.L. "Victorian Judges and the Psychiatric 
Pre-Sentence Report". The Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology, 
1977, .lQ, 121. 
(ii} 
wish to thank the Attorney-General, the Commissioner of Police, the 
Mental Health Services Commission, all the officers from the Court of 
Petty Sessions, the Supreme Court, the Police Department, Mental Health 
and the Royal Derwent Hospital who have patiently helped me extract the 
necessary information from their records. 
I must also thank all members of the judiciary and magistracy who 
co-operated and completed my questionnaire and in particular the Chief 
Justice who made valuable suggestions as to its content. 
I would very much like to thank my supervisor Professor Derek 
Roebuck who has provided me with such persistent encouragement throughout, 
and Dr. Sornarajah, also of the Faculty of Law, for his constructive 
criticisms and help. 
For their financial assistance which played a large part in making 
the research possible in the middle stages of my work I must thank the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, and in particular I would like to 
express my sincere gratitude to Dr. E. Cunningham-Dax who has devoted 
many hours helping me to design the study initially, to carry it out and 
to interpret the findings. I must also thank my family and friends for 
their tolerance and help, and add that despite such eminent assistance, 
any errors are of course mine alone. 
The subject matter of thesis, the large number of journal articles 
and monographs and the small number of cases seemed to me to demand some 
method of citation other than the standard legal method of citing journal 
articles and monographs. Perhaps arbitrarily, I chose to adopt the style 
recommended by the Publication Manual of the American Psychological 
.Association which has been accepted in Australia for psychological 
publications. This seemed to have the advantages of avoiding a vast 
number of footnotes and providing an easier method of discovering further 
details of the work referred to. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The role of the psychiatrist in the criminal process is a topic 
which arouses much controversy among lawyers, psychiatrists and the 
general public. If an offender escapes from a mental hospital there is 
a public outcry. (l) If an offender referred for psychiatric treatment 
does not receive the treatment the court expected there is an outcry. <2J 
And if an offender assessed as dangerous and in need of treatment is 
released by the court without treatment and subsequently commits 'a 
murder~ the psychiatric service feels disgruntled. <3J 
The question of criminal responsibility and the M'Naghten Rules has 
traditionally pre-occupied lawyers and psychiatrists, but in practice it 
is after conviction but before sentence that a psychiatrist is most often 
involved in the criminal process. There are fundamental differences 
between contemporary specialists in law and psychiatry as to whether or 
not psychiatric knowledge and treatment should be used by the courts in 
the disposition of offenders. Treatment oriented jurists and commentators 
support and justify the involvement of psychiatrists in the sentencing 
process as the most humane and effective way of dealing with offenders, 
many of whom are seen as mentally disturbed or ill. (E.g., Alexander.& 
Staub, 1956; Bazelon, 1974; Weihofen, 1956 ). They constantly urge the 
better use of modern psychiatric knowledge in the administration of 
criminal law and see treatment in hospital as inherently good and 
therapeutic. Some commentators, who believe in a deterrent penal policy, 
see psychiatric involvement and psychiatric treatment of offenders as 
(1) The Mercury, August 12 1976, p.3 (see Appendix C for complete text). 
(2) The Mercury, March 5 1976, p.8 (see post p.109). 
(3) R. v. Reed (unreported, December, 1974). In this case the· 
accused, who was charged with murder was found unfit to plead. He had pre-
viously been convicted of a minor offence and a presentence report dis-
closed that he was dangerous and in need of treatment. No action was taken. 
- 2 -
a threat to law abiding behaviour and respect for the law. Some, who 
give weight to a retributive aim of penal policy, view the treatment of 
offenders who are minimally responsible, as denying the community its 
right to expect that criminals be punished. (4J Others, including Hall 
(1960), Szasz (1963), and Anttila (1971) criticize psychiatric involve-
ment in sentencing on entirely different premises, and they warn of the 
grave danger an emphasis on treatment has for the freedom of the indi-
vidual. This group of cornnentators is concerned that under the guise of 
treatment or therapy, we may engage in practices which we would not 
undertake under the name of punishment. Their arguments include denying 
that psychiatric treatment is more effective with regard to preventing 
recidivism than conventional sentencing alternatives and a rejection of 
the hypothesis that all offenders are psychologically disturbed or 
men ta 11 y i 11 . 
As well as such fundamental philosophical differences, many other 
questions have been raised. Doubts are frequently expressed about the 
value and reliability of psychiatric reports. Magistrates and judges 
are thought to vary in the number of psychiatric reports they request, 
and the amount of notice they take of them. Sometimes sentencers are 
criticized for relying too heavily upon reports and for being insuffic-
iently sceptical of the recommendations and assessments in them. This 
it is said is an improper delegation of judicial functions and disreg~rds 
evidence of the unreliability of psychiatric diagnosi's and prognosis. 
Conversely, sentencers are sometimes criticized for not following 
expert advice, or for making insufficient use of psychiatric reports and 
the available treatment options. 
(4) The power to impose a sentence of imprisonment in addition to a 
hospital or guardianship order was inserted into the Mental Health Act 
at the suggestion of the Chief Justice. He argued that the element of · 
zetribution cannot be overlooked. The community still requires criminals 
to be punished if they are suffering from a mental disorder which is not 
enough to absolve them from responsibility for the crime. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
11 
I 
.I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 3 -
" 
Despite these questions, there is in Australia very little 
reported research or even statistical data on the way in which courts 
deal with "mentally abnormal" offenders. Nothing of an empirical nature 
is known about the following matters: 
(i) The proportion and type of offenders remanded for presentence 
psychiatric reports. 
(ii) the proportion of offenders diagnosed as having a mental 
disorder. 
(iii) the proportion of cases in which psychiatrists are able to 
recommend treatment. 
(iv) the proportion of cases in which their recommendations 
appear to be followed. 
(v) the degree of disparity which exists between sentencers in 
the proportion and type of cases they remand for reports, and the 
reliance they place upon the recommendations in them. 
(vi) the response of offenders to treatment and their reconviction 
rates compared with other offenders. 
(vii) the reliability of diagnosis and psychiatric predictions. 
In an attempt to discover the ways in which the Tasmanian courts 
make use of psychiatric reports and facilities in sentencing, and to 
answer some of the questions posed above, the records were examined of 
354 offenders convicted by a court of petty sessions, and 100 offenders 
convicted by the Supreme Court. f5J These offenders were all those 
referred for psychiatric examination by the Hobart court of petty sessions 
and the Supreme Court of Tasmania in the years 1969, 1970, 1974 and 1975. 
(5) Generally the Supreme Court has jurisdiction in respect of all 
indictable offences and justices orstipendiary magistrates of the courts 
of petty sessions hear sununary offences. There are some exceptions to 
this which provide certain less serious indictable offences shall or can· 
be deemed to be simple offences and can be dealt with summarily (Justices 
Act 1959, section 71). 
- 4 -
Referrals under the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act were not included. 
The earlier years of 1969 and 1970 were chosen to allow for a four year 
follow-up, and the years of 1974 and 1975 were chosen for a comparison. 
A questionnaire was designed to elicit information about the 
reasons for referring offenders for reports, the impact of recommendations 
on the sentencing decision of the court and matters as to form and 
content of psychiatric reports. All judges and half of the magistrates 
approached answered the questionnaire. The questionnaire is reproduced 
in Appendix A. 
The views of various writers on technique in report writing, and 
the conduct of psychiatric examinations were reviewed and are included. 
in Appendix B together with a summary of the questionnaire responses in 
relation to the content of reports. It was felt that these matters, 
although important, are subsidiary to the main argument of the thesis and 
would be more appropriately dealt with in an appendix. 
This study does not attempt to challenge the use of psychiatric 
reports in sentencing, but it is an attempt to understand more about 
this practice. It is not assumed that the practice of requiring 
offenders to submit to psychiatric examination and treatment is justified 
because psychiatric measures are more effective and humane than penal 
measures. Unfortunately it was not possible to test these premises 
conclusively but some trends were observed from the available data. 
It is assumed that the courts should try to make the most 
effective use of available presentence information, and that the 
administration of justice requires a measure of consistency in the way 
judges approach sentencing tasks. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
RELEVANT LEGISLATION~ PROCEDURE AND FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES 
1. The Remand 
There is a paucity of legislation in the area of remands of 
offenders for presentence psychiatric reports. Magistrates and judges 
have the power, under the Mental Health Act 1963(6 ) to make hospital 
and guardianship orders in certain cases. It is a prerequisite of such 
an order that the court be satisfied on the evidence of two doctors that 
the offender is suffering from a mental illness, psychopathic disorder 
or subnormality. This and the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968 are 
the only legislative provisions concerning presentence psychiatric 
evidence, but it is obvious from the types of offenders remanded and 
the reasons for doing so, that courts ask for psychiatric reports and 
offenders are required to submit to psychiatric examinations in cases 
where there is no possibility of orders being made under the Mental 
Health Act or the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act. The court may want 
an expert opinion on the best method of dealing with the offender, or 
perhaps it may wish to know if the psychiatrist has anything to offer 
for the rehabilitation of the offender other than the conventional 
methods. So, although psychiatric examinations are often referred to 
as ''Mental Health Act examinations", this is really a misnomer. 
Magistrates and judges have of course a general power to obtain 
presentence information. Magistrates have the power under Rule 42(4) of 
the Justices Rules 1961, to receive such evidence or statements as they 
think fit in order to inform themselves of the circumstances of tne case 
or the proper penalty to be imposed. Judges have a similar power,(?) . 
(6) Section 48(1) and section 49(1). 
(7) Criminal Code Act 1924, section 386(7). 
- 6 -
but it is also provided that it is the duty of the judge to ensure that 
the convicted person has knowledge of, and the opportunity to challenge 
the information received, unless that information was supplied by a 
medical practitioner and the judge considers it should not, in the 
interests of the convicted person, be disclosed to him. If the truth of 
any of the information is challenged, the judge may require it to be 
proved.<8J This provision as to proof provides little protection to 
the convicted person in respect of statements of opinion in psychiatric 
reports which are not susceptible to proof, assuming the report is made 
available, which it may well not be. The right to call evidence in 
rebuttal would provide a more effective protection. 
In the absence of a specific legislative power to withhold a 
psychiatric report from a defendant in summary proceedings, strictly it 
would not be permissible to do so. The general rule is that a convicted 
person has the right to be informed of presentence information regarding 
him, and if not admitted or proved, such information must be disregarded.<9J 
There are statutory exceptions to this. Section 5(2) of the 
Probation of Offenders Act 1973 (Tas.) gives the courts power to orde_r 
. that the whole or part of a presentence report prepared by a probation 
officer be not shown, or be shown only to the offender's attorney. The 
effect of section 51(3) of the Mental Health Act 1963 is to provide that 
where a medical report recommending a hospital or guardianship order is 
tendered in evidence and the person on whom it is made is not represented, 
the substance of the report shall be disclosed to him but he has no right 
to a copy of that report. 
(8) Crimina,l Code Act 1924, section 386(8) (9) and (10). 
(9) R. v. Brooks (1913) 8 Cr. App. Rep. 156 (C.C.A.). 
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There does not seem to be any reason why the general rule should 
not apply to the disclosure of other psychiatric reports, although it 
must be conceded that the contents of such reports may cause social or 
psychological damage if revealed, or may make the offender feel he has 
been ,sentenced by the psychiatrist, who may be subsequently responsible 
for treating the offender.<lOJ That psychiatric reports should always 
be made available to the convicted person is not without judicial 
support in Australia. In the course of a judgment concerning an appeal 
against sentence which alleged the judge had placed undue weight on an 
inaccurate presentence report, Bray C.J. said, 
Reports by probation officers, and psychiatric and other reports 
are becoming increasingly prominent in the deliberations of sent-
encing courts ... it is of crucial importance that nothing should 
be taken into account against a convicted defendant except what 
he admits or what is proved against him by sworn evidence which 
he has had a chance to test by cross-examination. Any report of 
the kind mentioned should always be shown to him and he should be 
asked whether he admits its contents in so far as it relates to 
matters of fact and what comment he has to make on it. If he 
disputes any matter of fact alleged in the report, then either 
that matter must be di~regarded by the court or the question must 
be resolved by the calling of evidence ... Even opinion evidence 
from experts should not be used against a convicted person if he 
objects to it without the expert being called: and opinion 
evidence based on hearsay information obtained in his absence is 
not evidence ~gainst him except by consent. (11) 
The responses to the questionnaire(12J indicate that in Tasmania 
the practice of judges and magistrates is to always make a psychiatric 
report available to counsel if the accused is represented. If unrepre-. 
sented, practices differ. Some always make reports available but some 
magistrates as well as judges sometimes read an edited version, hide 
part or occasionally withhold it completely. One judge made the 
(10) In the Canadian Case, B_:_ v. Benson & Stevenson, (1951) 100 Can. C.C. 
247, the court was of the opinion that psychiatric data provide an 
exception to the rule because such information would not warrant a heavier 
sentence. But psychiatric reports frequently contain matters which woulq 
warrant more severe penalties, for example a gloomy prognosis or 
assessment of dangerousness. 
(11) ~ v. Lucky (1974) 12 S.A.S.R. 136, 139. Supreme Court (In Banco). 
(12) Question 23 asked "Do you make the psychiatric report available to 
the defendant or his counsel?" 
- 8 -
comment that he would not act on the contents of a report so as to 
impose any penalty or treatment more onerous than he would have imposed 
in the absence of a report, unless the defendant or his counsel knew of 
its contents. 
When a decision is made to order a psychiatric report, the offender 
is remanded in custody, or on bail on the condition that he submits to a 
psychiatric examination. A request by a magistrate for a report is 
communicated to the Mental Health Services Conunission by the Clerk of 
Petty Sessions on a roneoed form. The form merely specifies the name of 
the offender, the offence, the name of the magistrate and the date by 
which the report is required: Judicial requests for reports with similar 
information are co1t111unicated to the Commission by the Crown Advocate 1 s 
Office. 
There is no mandatory procedure requiring the court to supply 
either the reasons for referral or any other information to the 
examining psychiatrist. In practice, the Police Department invariably 
supplies a police file or the Office of the Crown Advocate supplies 
papers, and if a probation officer is involved, he or she will provide 
a presentence report. Personal communication between the Bench and the 
examining psychiatrist is forbidden on the principle that anything said 
about an offender must be said or tendered in writing in open court in. 
the offender's presence. Rarely is any information from magistrates 
and judges conveyed to the examining psychiatrist, presumably because 
the principle forbids private communications and there is no local 
precedent or administrative procedure enabling matters stated in court 
to be communicated. 
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Reports ordered by the court are prepared in most cases by a 
psychiatrist from the Mental Health Services Corrmission. Occasionally, 
the defendant's counsel will arrange for a psychiatrist to prepare a 
report and this may be in addition to the report from the Commission. 
The offender is interviewed at the gaol if he is in custody or at Clare 
House, the headquarters of the Forensic Psychiatric Services, if he is 
on bail. Examination by the psychiatrist lasts approximately one hour, 
and in selected cases the offender may be sent to the forensic psychol-
og·ist for psychometric testing, or a psychiatric social worker will 
obtain background information. Occasionally a further examination is 
arranged, or the offender is referred to another psychiatrist for a 
second opinion. Sometimes the court specifically asks for two 
psychiatrists to report, and sometimes a psychologist's report is 
specified. 
Occasionally(lJ) it is made a condition of bail that the 
defendant admit himself as a voluntary patient pending the preparation of 
a report. Despite the apparent lack of any legal basis for attachi~g 
conditions to a grant of bail, it has been a recognized practice of many 
courts for a considerable time. Now, by virtue of an amendment in 
1974,(l4) magistrates 
may make orders related to bail, its commencement or termination, 
and the conduct of the defendant during the currency of bail, 
jncluding orders controlling the conduct of the defendant, 
requiring him to report at specified times, and limiting his 
movements and social intercourse. 
Failure to comply with such an order, in addition to entailing forfeiture 
of bail, is made the suuJcct of a separate offence with a penalty of 
three months imprisonment or $500. 
(13) In the court of petty sessions group, I discovered four cases in 
which this was done, and in another two the psychiatrist requested a 
period of in-patient observation before presenting his final recommendations. 
(14) Justices Act 1959, section 35. 
-10 -
The only conditions which receive statutory mention in relation 
to the power of judges to grant bail are those requiring appearance ~t 
every time and place to which during, the course of the proceedings the 
hearing may be from time to time adjourned, and a condition requiring 
sureties. (l 5J Whether it is strictly within the express or inherent 
powers of magistrates or judges to impose a condition as to hospital 
admission is not entirely clear. 
Specific power to remand an offender to hospital for a short period 
before deciding upon his ultimate disposal, may be useful in cases where 
the offender is known to be suffering from a mental disorder and needs 
inmediate treatment, or where a period of observation in hospital is 
necessary to prepare an adequate report. In the majority of cases an 
out-patient attendance is sufficient for the preparation of an adequate 
report, and when the forensic psychiatric unit at the gaol is completed 
there will be adequate facilities for examining those offenders remanded 
in custody. But there still may be cases where the use of prison 
facilities for a psychiatric examination is undesirable, for example 
when the offence is unlikely to attract a prison sentence, or it is not 
punishable by imprisonment. 
The report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders (1975)(16) 
recommended giving the courts power to make an order remanding the 
offender to hospital for compulsory treatment for a maximum of three 
months whenever inmediate care or psychiatric observation as an in-
patient was necessary for i.ile preparation of a report. Such a power was 
also recommended by Walker and McCabe (1973) on the ground that it is 
desirable that an offender, who is eventually to be committed to hospital, 
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(15) Criminal Code Act 1924, sections 304, 305 and 306. ~ 
(16) Cmnd. 6244, 1975, London H.M.S.O. 
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conviction and sentence. In Scotland there is such a power. (ll) 
When the court has sentenced the offender, the Mental Health 
Services Commission is notified of the decision, and at this stage 
communication between sentencer and psychiatrist ends. If treatment is 
ordered there is no provision for the magistrate or judge to be advised 
of the patient's progress on termination of treatment, except in so 
far as a probation officer may include this in a terminal probation report. 
2. Sentencing Powers in Relation to Mentally Disordered Offenders 
Apart from the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act provisions, 
hospital and guardianship orders are the only methods of dealing with 
mentally disordered offenders which receive legislative recognition and 
yet they will be shown to account for a decreasing proportion of the 
sentences imposed by the courts. A far greater number of offenders are 
required to submit to in-patient and out-patient treatment as a condition 
of probation. 
(i) Hospital and Guardianship Orders 
Sections 48(1) and 49(1) of the Mental Health Act 1963 give the 
Supreme Court and a court of petty sessions power to make hospital 
and guardianship orders in cases where a person is convicted of 
an offence punishable with imprisonment. 
Section 51 provides that before making such an order the court 
must be satisfied on the oral or written evidence of two practi-
tioners, (one of wnom must be approved for the purposes of the 
Act), that the person is suffering from mental illness, 
(17) Section 54 Mental Health (Scotland) Act, 1960. 
- 12 -
psychopathic disorder, severe subnormality or subnormalityf18)and that 
the disorder is of a nature or degree that warrants his detention in a 
hospital for medical treatment, or reception into guardianship as the 
case may be. The court must also be of the opinion that having regard 
to all the circumstances, including the character and antecedents of the 
person concerned and the nature of the offence and to the methods 
available for dealing with him, that it is expedient that a hospital 
or guardianship order should be made in respect of him. 
A hospital order is not to be made unless the court is satisfied 
that arrangements have been made for the offender's admission to the 
hospital to which the order authorizes him to be admitted within a 
period of 28 days beginning with the date of the making of the order, nor 
is a guardianship order to be made unless the Guardianship Board or 
person named as guardian is willing to receive him into guardianship. fl 9) 
The hospital or guardianship order must specify whether the 
offender is ~uffering from a mental illness, ps~chopathic disorder, 
severe subnormality or subnormality, and no order shall be made unless 
the offender is described by each medical practitioner as suffering from 
(18) Section 4 defines "subnormality" as "a st:ate of arrested or incom-
plete development of mind (not amounting to severe subnormality) that 
includes subnozmality of intelligence and is of such a nature or degree 
that requires or is susceptible to medical treatment or other special 
care or training of the patient"; "Severe subnormality" as a state of 
arrested or incomplete development of mind that includes subnormality of 
intelligence and is of such a nature or degree that the patient is 
incapable of .living an indc;:>"-'ndent life or of guarding himself against 
serious exploitation, or will be so incapable when of an age to do so. 
"Psychopathic disorder" is defined as "persistent disorder or disability 
of mind (whether or not including subnormality of intelligence) that 
results in abnormally aggressive o.r seriously irresponsible conduct on 
the part of the patient, and requires or is susceptible to medical 
treatment." "Mental illness" is not defined. 
(19) Section 51(3) and (4). 
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the same one of those forms of mental disorder, whether or not he is 
also described by either of them as suffering from another of those forms. (20) 
The necessary medical evidence may be received in the form of a 
report without the need for proof of signature or qualifications of 
the medical practitioner, but the court may in any case require him to 
be called to give oral evidence. Provisions exist requiring that the 
offender's legal representative be given a copy of the report, or if he 
is unrepresented that the substance of the report be disclosed to him. 
The offender or his legal representative may require the medical practi-
tioner to give oral evidence and may call any rebutting evidence. <21 J 
The Supreme Court, but not a court of petty sessions, has the 
power to make a "restriction order" in addition to a hospit~l order, 
where it appears to the court, having regard to the nature of the 
offence, the antecedents of the offender, and the risk of his committing 
further offences if he is set at _large at any time during the continuance 
of the hospital order, that it is necessary for the protection of the 
public to do so.<22J 
The Supreme Court also has the power to make a hospital or 
guardianship order in addition to a custodial sentence, a probation 
order or fine, and any other powers exercisable by it,<23J but it cann~t 
make a guardianship order and a sentence of imprisonment unless the 
sentence is suspended.<24J This power has no parallel in the English 
Mental Health Act 1959, upon which the Tasmanian Act was modelled. It 
was designed to give effect to the then Chief Justice's view that the 
(20) Section 51(5). 
(21) Section 52(3). 
(22) Section 48(2). 
(23) Section 48(1). 
(24) Section 55(5) In practice this is not seen 
as preventing the imposition of a term of imprison-
ment with a recommendation that the convicted 
person be placed under guardianship at the con-
clusion of this sentence. The certificate of the 
two doctors is sent to the Controller of Prisons 
at the time of sentence. 
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court should have concurrent power to punish convicted persons as well 
as to make hospital or guardianship orders. The Chief Justice felt that 
a mentally disturbed offender who would satisfy the requirements for a 
hospital order was nevertheless criminally responsible and the element 
of retribution should not be overlooked. Without such a power there 
would be a great incentive to get a hospital order as a 11 soft cop 11 • 
The Act provides that before making a hospital order and a 
restriction order, or a hospital order and sentence of imprisonment, 
the court must hear and take into account the oral rather than·written 
evidence of two medical practitioners.r25J 
A court of petty sessions has one power which is not available to 
the Supreme Court. It may make a hospital or guardianship order in 
respect of a person suffe~ing from mental illness or severe subnormality 
without recording a conviction. This power appears to be used very 
infrequently in Tasmania, as in the U.K., where in 1970 only 8.3% of 
hospital and guardianship orders were made without conviction. It has 
been suggested that the triviality of the case, the severity of the 
offender's mental state or the fact that the magistrate felt it 
impossible to communicate with the offender, are reasons why magistrates 
have used this power (Walker & McCabe, 1973, pp.104-107). 
The courts of petty sessions also have the power to refer cases 
to the Supreme Court if it appears that the case should be dealt with 
by that court. (26 ) 
(25) Section 51(2). 
(26) Section 49(4). 
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A hospital or guardianship order expires after one year if not 
renewed,(27; but the patient may be discharged at any time by the 
responsible medical officer or by the hospital authority. (28 ) A patient 
who is the subject of a hospital order with restriction can only be 
discharged by order of the Governor on the recommendation of the 
Mental Health Tribunal. r29J A patient who is the subject of a hospital 
order and a sentence of imprisonment, may be returned to the g~ol on 
his discharge from hospital. r3 oJ 
(ii) The Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act, 1968. 
This Act commenced on 26 November 1969, almost half way through 
the first period of the sample studied. It gave the courts certain 
powers to deal with personsconvicted of an offence punishable with 
imprisonment who committed the offence while drunk or under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs, or as a consequence of suffering from alcohol 
or drug dependency. If the court is satisfied on the evidence of a 
medical practitioner that an offender is suffering from alcohol or 
drug dependency, it may make a treatment order, specifying the period 
for which the offender is liable to be detained in a treatment centre, 
or suspend the sentence on condition that the offender is admitted 
to a treatment centre in pursuance of a personal application. 
(iii) Recognizances, Suspended Sentences or Probation with a 
Condition to Submit to Psychiatric Treatment 
There is no specific po~er comparable with section 4 of the 
English Criminal JusticP Act 1948, to make psychiatric treatment a 
condition of probation. Psychiatric probation orders were omitted from 
(27) Section 32. 
(28) Section 36. 
(29) Section 70. 
(30) Section 70 and 47(1). 
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the English Mental Health Act 1959 on the ground that r~sults of 
GrUnhut's investigation of them were being awaited~ Consequehtly, 
either intentionally or unintentionally they were not included in the 
Tasmanian Act of 1963 which closely follows the English Act. The 
results of Grunhut's research were published in 1963 supporting the 
continued use of psychiatric probation orders, but nothing has been 
done to embody them into a consistent scheme in the Tasmanian Mental 
Health Act or to give them other legislative recognition. As a conse-
quence, the power to impose psychiatric treatment as a condition of 
sentence depends upon general powers. 
Under section 7(3) of the Probation of Offenders Act 1973, courts 
of summary jurisdiction and the Supreme Court may make a probation order 
against the offender whether or not they impose a fine, a term of 
imprisonment or a work order.f3l) 
Section 6 provides that a probation order may contain such 
conditions fer securing the supervision, conduct or welfare of the 
person against whom it is made as the court may consider desirable, and 
may contain such provisions with respect to residence, abstention from 
intoxicating liquor or drugs and any other matters as the court may 
consider necessary for preventing a repetition of the same offence or 
the commission of other offences. 
The attaching of conditions to probation orders is the most 
frequently used way of ordering psychiatric treatment for offenders 
other than orders under the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act. Such 
(31) Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act 1973 provides Supreme 
Courts and courts of summary jurisdiction may sentence an offender to 
Saturday v.·ork for up to 2 5 Saturdays. This scheme has been described 
and evaluated by Rook (1975) and Varne (1975). 
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conditions may, for example, require the offender "to submit to such 
psychiatric treatment as the probation officer sees fit", or "to such 
treatment including in-patient treatment as the Mental Health Services 
Commissioner orders". 
Occasionally judges and magistrates make psychiatric treatment 
a condition of a suspended sentence, or they mingle a suspen.~ed sentence 
and a recognizance with or without a probation order and make psychiatric 
treatment a condition. Both section 386(l)(d) of the Criminal Code Act 
1924 and section 74C of the Justices Act 1959 confer a very wide 
discretion on magistrates and judges to impose such conditions of 
suspension "as they think fit". 
If offenders are admitted to hospital as in-patients pursuant 
to a condition of sentence, they are informal or voluntary patients. This 
means they are not ordinarily liable to be detained, but can be 
detained for three days if the medical practitioner in charge of treatment 
beiieves they should remain in hospital and reports to that effect. f32J 
If offenders refuse to co-operate, or leave hospital against 
medical advice, they may be brought before the court in breach of bond 
proceedings which may attract a penalty, or in proceedings to have the 
suspended sentence put into execution. 
Several comments can be made about the use of psychiatric 
probation orders. First, they may be made without any legislative 
safeguards such as psychiatric evidence which is a prerequisite for 
(32) Section 15(2) Mental Health Act. 
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orders under the Mental Health and Alcohol ·and Drug Dependency Acts. 
It is true that a psychiatric report is almost invariably sought before 
such an order is made, but sometimes treatment is ordered despite a 
recoITUTiendation to the contrary. <33J In some cases no report to the 
court is requested, but the offender is required to submit to such 
examination and treatment as the probation officer deems necessary.r34J 
This is a delegation of the sentencing function of the judge or 
magistrate and it is seriously arguable whether such wide powers should 
be given to the probation officer and psychiatrist. r35J 
Secondly, and unlike the position in England, these conditions 
may be attached without the consent of the offender. This is incon~ 
sistent with the Mental Health Act which makes treatment of uncertified 
patients voluntary. A probationer's consent to the imposition of a 
condition as to psychiatric treatment may not be a voluntary and 
informed consent, for it may be vitiated by the fear of imprisonment 
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and the hope of advantage. Nevertheless with other limitations on the ~ 
exercise of the power to make psychia·tric probation orders it wot.ild 
afford some protection. The present situation is too open to the 
possibility of abuse. It is not difficult, although perhaps melo-
dramatic to imagine a probationer being coerced by fear of the 
consequences of imprisonment, to seek admission to hospital 
as a 11 voluntary 11 patient and to undergo lobotomy or electric shock 
therapy. Such opportunities for abuse should not be available. 
(33) Evidence will be presented to support this, post. at p.77. 
(34) Evidence of this was unintentionally exposed during the course 
of the case studies. 
(35) The use of psychiatric probation orders couched in a discretionary 
way has been criticized even where there was a report recommending 
treatment. In an Edinburgh study a high proportion of such 
orders were found to fail in their purpose, for many of the 
offenders never attended hospital at all. (Woodsid~ 1971). 
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(iv) Recommendations for Transfer Directions 
By virtue of sections 59 and 60 of the Mental Health Act, the 
Attorney-General has the power to direct that a person serving a 
sentence of imprisonment be transferred to hospital with or without a 
restriction direction. In practice a restriction direction is 
automatically made unless the date of release is ilTITiinent. The legal 
status of patients transferred without restrictions on their discharge 
is that of hospital order cases, so they can be discharged at any time 
or detained for twelve months. If the Attorney-General makes a 
restriction direction, the effect is that, if the patient recovers 
before his sentence expires, the Attorney-General may insist upon his 
return to prison. <36 ) 
Sometimes magistrates and judges impose a sentence of imprisonment 
with a recommendation that the Attorney-General make a transfer and a 
restriction direction under the Mental Health Act. Woolley v. Devine<37J 
is typical of such cases. Devine, a youth of 17, had a very long record 
including 29 convictions for illegal use of a motor vehicle. In 
imposing an 18 month sentence of imprisonment for two more charges of 
illegal use and one of dangerous driving, Magistrate Wood made the 
following comments:-
The course that I intend to take with you is this: I am going 
to impose a sentence on you. and I am going to send the papers 
to the Attorney-General with the request that he consider making · 
a transfer direction under the provisions of the Mental Health Act, 
so that you can spend all or some part of the sentence in a mental 
hospital. I am not prepared to accept counsel's submission that 
I should simply make a hospital order at this stage. If I did 
that, it means that you would be received into the Royal Derwent 
Hospital and would be discharged. Now that might be a compara-
tively short period of time. In fact, experience tends to show 
that it is, and I have absolutely no confidence at all that upon 
discharge you would not immediately start to take other people's 
cars and behave as you have in the past. Consequently, while I 
am prepared to go along with the idea that you should have treatment 
if you want treatment, that is to be in the situation where you are 
(36) Section 69(1) Mental Health Act, 1963. 
(37) Unreported reasons for sentence, Bth July 1974. 
3. 
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in custody, and you will be transferred from the gaol for 
treatment and returned to the gaol afterwards. So it may be, for 
example, that you will spend three or four months of this sentence 
in the Royal Derwent Hospital. It is a matter for the doctors to 
detennine. A long sentence will not only protect the public, but 
it will enable you to learn a trade in prison and hopefully 
increase your prospects of having stable employment upon release. 
Psychiatric Facilities 
{i) The Royal Derwent Hospital 
This is the largest psychiatric hospital in Tasmania, with an 
average of almost -goo patients at any one time throughout the year. 
Offenders who are the recipients of hospital orders are invariably sent 
there. They are not necessarily confined in closed wards even if subject 
to a restriction order, although this is usually the case initially. 
There are three 11 closed wards 11 , Ward A, Ward C, and Ward 10. Ward A 
is a women's ward which mainly houses court orders and failed girls 
from Weerona and Mt. St. Canice. Ward C, the maximum security ward, is 
exclusively forensic. It has facilities for up to 20 patients, but is 
rarely filled to capacity. Its patients have either been found unfit 
to plead, not guilty on the ground of insanity, insane on arraignment 
or are offenders on hospital orders or transfer orders from the gaol. 
In addition to the usual staff, two or three of the 13 security officers 
attached to the hospital are always on duty. Ward 10, a male ward, is 
a mixed ward not exclusively forensic, and includes those who cannot be 
managed in open wards, for example the severely psychotic, absconders, 
dangerous patients and those with social behavioural disorders 
irrespective of intelligence. 
In each of these closed wards patients receive minimal treatment. 
For example, a psychiatrist visits Ward 10 half a day each week. There 
are no facilities for psychotherapy. 
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As there is no compulsion for hospital authorities to contain in 
closed wards those subject to hospital orders, even if the hospital 
order is coupled with a restriction direction, placement is a matter for 
the hospital, which puts the patients in categories. Forensic patients 
may be in category A, B or C. Category A patients cannot leave the 
ward except with an attendant, category B patients cannot leave the 
hospital grounds, and have freedom of the grounds on a five minute 
warning. Category C patients have all privileges except that they 
cannot leave the hospital grounds. 
(ii) The John Edis Hospital 
The main role of this hospital is as a day centre with associated 
in-patient and out-patient facilities. As well as the traditional range 
of psychiatric treatment methods, the use of group therapy and behaviour 
modification techniques is developing. The average daily bed occupancy 
rate is about 15.4. 
(iii) The Professorial Psychiatric Clinic, Royal Hobart Hospital 
This clinic is primarily a place for initial psychiatric contact 
for the metropolitan area of Hobart. Patients are thoroughly assessed 
to determine where they can best be treated. A small number of carefully 
selected patients remain for a longer stay to undergo special treatment 
programmes. The clinic also provides an out-patient service. Some 
hospital order patients are referred here after discharge from the 
Royal Derwent Hospital. 
(iv) Regional Clinics 
The Linday Miller Clinic in Launceston provides in-patient, out-
patient and day-patient facilities. There are in-patient facilities at 
the Spencer and Mersey hospitals, and out-patient facilities at Burnie, 
Smithton, Devonport and Ulverstone. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH STUDY 
l. Previous Studies 
Apart from two rather small surveys there appears to be no 
published Australian empirical research in this area. 
The first, a study by Guile (1965), was a study of the reports 
prepared in respect of 141 males remanded in custody by courts of petty 
sessions, general sessions and Supreme Courts in 1961. The reports were 
analysed in terms of diagnosis and recommended treatment. For the purposes 
of providing a comparison with Guile's selected court of petty sessions 
group, this was followed by a diagnostic review by Bartholomew and others 
(1967), of 70 men remanded in custody without a request for a psychiatric 
report. 
From the United Kingdom several informative studies have emanated. 
Prior to the introduction of the Mental Health Act 1959, De Berker 
(1960) looked at the type and diagnostic category of offenders 
remanded to Brixton Prison for psychiatric reports, but the study by 
Sparks (1966) into remanding policies at two London magistrates courts 
in 1961 is regarded as the pioneer inquiry. (JB) This was followed by 
Dell and Gibbens' (1977) study of women remanded to Holloway prison. 
From Scotland there have been several hospital based surveys, two by 
Binns and others (1969) and more recently Woodside (1976) reviewed 138 
offenders examined for the courts by consultants from the Royal 
Edinburgh Hospital in 1972. The most comprehensive British research 
is a recentiy published study by Gibbens Soothill and Pope (1977). This 
study was in two parts. The first was a retrospective study of all 
( 38) The results a;,d implications of this study were discussed by 
Walker and McCabe (1973), pp.54-56. 
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cases referred for medical reports in 1969 by 18 Inner London magistrates 
courts and 38 Wessex courts and the appropriate High Court in the two 
areas. The second, a prospective study reviewed psychiatric and probation 
reports and completed questionnaires about all offenders remanded for 
a medical report in Wessex only for 8 months in 1970-1971. 
Of the research from the U.S.A., two studies in particular contain 
some interesting comparative data. The earlier is a study of all 
convicted felons referred to the Kansas State Reception and Diagnostic 
Centre in 1963, 1966 and 1969 for reports by a psychiatric team (Davis, 
Hedden, Miller, and Witten 1971). The second is Bohmer's study (1976) 
of all males convicted of a sexual offence in Philadelphia over a 5 year 
period and the presentence psychiatric reports which were obtained in 
respect of about half of them. 
There are many other studies which are not based upon samples of 
offenders selected for presentence psychiatric reports, but which have 
some peripheral relevance or interest. For example the following 
studies will be referred to: the studies of probationers with orders 
for psychiatric treatment by GrUnhut (1963) and Woodside (1971); the 
important Oxford survey of hospital and guardianship orders reported 
by Walker and McCabe (1973); Rollins' study (1969) of prosecuted and 
unprosecuted mentally abnormal offenders; and the research of 
Boehringer and McCabe (1973) of discharged hospital order patients who 
subsequently reoffended. 
2. Research Design 
The subjects for this study were all males and females remanded 
by the Hobart court of petty sessions and the Supreme Court of Tasmania 
for a presentence psychiatric report in the years 1969, 1970, 1974 and 1975. 
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For most purposes the subjects were divided into groups, 
separating the courts, the periods of 1969 and 1970 from 1974 and 1975, 
and males from females. 
Each of the periods combined two years to provide a sample which 
would be manageable in terms of data collection and sufficiently large 
for analysis. Two different periods were selected to determine if any 
significant changes occurred. It was expected that the size of the 
sample would be large enough to examine such variables as type of offence, 
age, prior convi et ions and mental disorders. This was in fact not 
possible because the numbers in the tabulations were too small. Studies 
conducted elsewhere indicate that no significant correlations exist, 
apart from a relatiJ>nship between some vagrancy offences and schizophrenia 
(Lackzo, James, and Alltop, 1970; Sparks, 1966). This is not a 
surprising finding, for there is convincing evidence that apart from 
psychopathy, alcoholism and drug abuse, the incidence of mental disorder 
among offenders is no more prevalent than in the general population 
(Guze, Goodwin, and Crane, 1969). It was also planned to obtain a 
medical prognosis at the conclusion of the treatment of those offenders 
who were ordered by the courts to receive treatment in 1969 and 1970, 
but this was not available. 
Data was collected from four separate sources: the courts; the 
records of the Mental Health Services Commission; the records of the 
Royal Derwent Hospital; and records of convictions at the Police 
Department. 
In addition to the court files containing complaint or indictment, 
probation officer's report, psychiatric report and judge's comments on 
passing sentence, the daily court records of the Hobart court of petty 
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sessions, and the completed Criminal Calendars of the Supreme Court were 
examined to calculate the number and type of offences heard by each 
magistrate or judge. Each offender was counted once for each appearance 
in court in respect of which convictions were recorded, regardless of 
the number of charges against him. For example if a man was convicted 
in January 1969 of three counts of illegal use and again in April 1970 
of two co~nts of stealing, and he was remanded in each case for a 
psychiatric report, he would be included twice in the 1969-1970 remand 
/ 
group, and in different diagnostic categories if the psychiatric reports 
differed. This offender would also be included twice in the total number 
of offences for 1969 and 1970, once for illegal use and once for stealing. 
Offenders charged and convicted of more than one type of crime are 
classified under the offence which attracted the heaviest penalty, and 
attempts are classified with completed crimes of the same type. 
The data were used to look at the following:-
(1) a comparison of the use made of psychiatric reports by the 
courts of petty sessions and the Supreme Court. 
(2) the place of remand, i.e. bail or custody. 
(3) the type of offender. 
(4) female offenders. 
(5) factors influencing the decision to remand. 
(6) the content of reports. 
(7) the impact of the report on the court. 
(8) the variation in use of psychiatric reports by judges 
and magistrates. 
(9) a comparison between the after conduct of those receiving 
treatment and those not. 
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It cannot be categorically stated that all offenders remanded by 
the courts for psychiatric reports are included. The offenders 
remanded were traced from the Mental Health Services Commission, through 
which all courts' requests should be directed, but it is possible that 
others were remanded for psychiatric reports, particularly by the Supreme 
Court when sitting outside Hobart. 
In addition to the objective data, the questionnaire circulated 
to judges and magistrates elicited subjective data about attitudes to 
psychiatric reports. 
(1) COMPARATIVE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS BY COURTS OF PETTY SESSIONS 
AND SUPREME COURTS 
TABLE l: 
PROPORTION OF MALE & FEMALE OFFENDERS 
REMANDED FOR PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS 
MALES 
I 
FEMALES 
COURT OF PETTY TOTAL TOTAL 
SESSIONS CONVICTED *REMANDED %REMANDED CONVICTED REMANDED %REMANDED 
1969-70 2001 153 7.6 170 30 
1974-75 2790 145 5.1 382 26 
SUPREME COURT 
1969-70 552 40 7.2 14 2 
1974-75 635 57 9.0 34 2 
* for the court of petty sessions, parking, licensing and income tax 
offences were excluded from the total. 
The similarity in the proportion of male offenders remanded in 
17.6 
6.8 
14.3 
5·_9 
1969 and 1970 is striking. One would perhaps expect that magistrates, 
because of the greater volume of cases dealt with and the less serious 
nature of the charges, would remand a smaller proportion of cases. That 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I· 
I 
I 
I 
- 27 -
this is not the case, or at least was not for the years 1969 and 1970 
may indicate that the gravity of the offence has little bearing on the 
decision to remand for psychiatric report, or that so8e obviously 
disturbed offenders disappear from the system before being convicted by 
the Supreme Court. 
It is also interesting to note that the proportion of offenders 
remanded by the court of petty sessions has shown a downward trend, but 
the proportion remanded by the Supreme Court has shown an upward one. 
Changes in types of offences and the judges and magistrates making up 
these courts may be shown to have some bearing on this. 
How do the Tasmanian figures compare with the proportion of 
offenders remanded in other jurisdictions? Official statistics on this 
question do not appear to be kept, and comparisons with other studies 
are defective in that it is not always clear what types of offence are 
included. <39J In his study of two London magistrates courts, Sparks 
(1966) found 2.7% of all cases heard were remanded for psychiatric 
reports. Gibbins Soothill and Pope (1977) found the proportion remanded 
medically in 1969 was smaller in Wessex than London. In London 
magistrates courts between 2 and 3 per cent of the court turnover were 
remanded for psychiatric reports (one in ten for indictable offences and 
one in a hundred for non-indictable offences), but in Wessex less than 
one per cent were so remanded. They also produced some evidence indicating 
that the demand for reports in Britain began to fall after 1970 (pp.16, 
22). 
(39) If all offenders appearing before magistrates had been included in 
the data base for this study, e.g. parking, licensing and income tax 
offenders, the rate of remand for psychiatrric reports would then only 
be 1.5% of offenders in 1969-1970. 
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(2) PLACE OF REMAND 
TABLE 2 
OFFENDERS REMANDED ON BAIL AND IN CUSTODY 
BAIL CUSTODY NO INFORMATION 
MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE MALE FEMALE 
COURT OF PETTY 
SESSIONS 
1969-70 89(58%) 24(80%) 64(42%) 6(20%) - -
1974-75 77(53%) 22(85%) 68(47%) 4(15%) - -
SUPREME COURT 
1969-70 4 
- 36 2 - -
1974-75 11 2 44 - 2 -
I 
The majority of offenders remanded for psychiatric reports by the 
Hobart magistrates courts are remanded on bail, and only the Supreme 
Court remands most such offenders in custody. It would appear that 
a decision to remand an offender for a psychiatric report does not in 
any way affect the question of bail or custody. This is as it should 
be, and it is to be hoped that the position will not alter when the 
forensic unit at Risden Gaol is completed. The adverse effects of 
remands in custody, including loss of accommodation, job,reputation and 
motivation for rehabilitation, contamination by other criminals and 
family break-up have been frequently stressed. Forensic psychiatrists 
and others seem adamant that remands on bail for psychiatric reports are 
preferable and custody should only be used as a last resort (Bartholomew 
1973; Gunn 197l;and Lucas 1972). On bail the patient is seen in his 
own social context, and if the sentence is not one of imprisonment as 
little damage as possible will have been done to the patient's social 
situation. 
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In England different criteria for bail or custody apply to those 
remanded for psychiatric reports and those remanded without. Remands 
on bail for psychiatric reports are infrequent and this has provoked 
adverse comment. Indeed it is known that convicted persons are sometimes 
remanded in custody for a psychiatric report to give them a taste of 
prison. Sparks (1966) found that in two magistrates courts in London 
in 1961 only one of 494 male offenders remanded for psychiatric reports 
was remanded on bail. Boehringer and McCabe (1973), and Dell & Gibbens 
(1971) also found very few offenders were remanded on bail for psych-
iatric reports. The difficulty in the way of remands on bail seemed to 
be the administrative one of making arrangements and seeing that the 
offender appeared for examination. Results of the examinations in prison 
were received more quickly, with less effort and a higher degree of 
regularity and certainty. Gibbens, Soothill and Pope (1977) strenuously 
argue that the evidence from their study supports the view that there 
are no reasons for differentiating medical remands from others. They 
deny that it provides a period of informative observation, for in most 
cases in their experience the time is spent in cells, and the effects 
of contamination by more experienced and cynical delinquents outweigh 
any positive value. They too found that greater proportions of medical 
remands were in custody (London, 90%) although, according to certain 
specified criteria, they seemed suitable for examination on bail. 
(3) THE TYPE OF OFFENDER REMANDED 
Information about each offender was obtained to determine the 
type of offender remanded for psychiatric reports. The following 
factors were considered, the age of the offender at the date of remand; 
the type of offence; the police record; prior psychiatric treatment 
and the sex of the offender. 
- 31) -
( i) Age 
TABLE 3 
AGE OF COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS OFFENDERS REMANDED 
AGE MALES FEMALES 
1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
17-26 98(64.0) 97(66.8) 10(33.3) 14(56.0} 
27-36 25(16.3) 22( 15. 1) 7(23.3) 5(20) 
37-46 15(9.8) 15(10.3) 4(13.3) 0 (-) 
47-56 10(6.5) 8 (5.5) 7(23.3) 1 (4.0) 
57-66 4(2.6) 3 (2.0) 2 (6.6) 4(16.0) 
66 _l (.6) 
- -
_l (4.0) 
- -
153 145 30 25* 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
*no information was available for one offender in this group. ~ 
TABLE 4 I 
AC~ OF SUPREME COURT OFFENDERS REMANDED 
AGE MALES FEMALES 
1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
17-26 22 (55.(l) 33 (58.9) 2 l 
27-36 9 (22.5) 15 (26.8) - l 
37-46 3 (7.5) 5 (8.9) - -
47-56 5 (12.5) 3 (5.4) - -
57-66 1 (2.5) - - - -
66 and - (. 6) - - - -
- - - -
over 40 56* 2 2 
* no informati"on was available for one offender in this group. 
Tables 3 and 4 show ti;t: ages of the offenders remanded. As would 
be expected a high proportion of ma 1 es were aged beb1een 17 and 26. The 
proportion within the next four decades declined progressively, but 
there was a slight increase in the 1969-70 sample in the proportion of 
males remanded by the Supreme Court aged between 47 and 56. Interestingly, 
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if the court of petty sessions offenders are broken down into five 
year age groups, there was an increase for the 1969-70 period in the 
proportion of offenders in the group aged between 47 and 52. 
The average age of male offenders was 28.2 (1969-70) and 26.7 
(1974-1975) for the court of petty sessions remand groups, and 29.2 
(1969-70) and 26.l (1974-75) for the Supreme Court remand groups. 
The average age of the female offenders was higher. 
There are no statistics of the age distribution of the male and 
female offender population in Tasmania but the annual prison figures 
consistently show that 59-62% of convicted male prisoners are under 25, 
with emphasis on 18 and 19 year olds.r4oJ 
A comparison of the courts shows little difference. In contrast 
Gibbens, Soothill and Pope (1977) found that while magistrates 
concentrated their medical inquiries mainly on the younger age group, 
judges concentrated on the 30 and over age group, particularly in the 
case of females. 
(ii) Type of offence 
(40) Reports of Controller of Prisons. A Tasmanian study has shown 
that 45% of a 1968 sample of male indictable and quasi-indictable 
offenders were under 25 years (Varne, 1975). 
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TABLE 5 
TYPE OF OFFENCE, COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
TYPE MALES FEMALES 
OF 1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
OFFENCE TOTAL REM. % TOTAL REt1 % TOTAL REM. % TOTAL REM. % 
PROPERTY 738 63 8.5 840 63 7.5 123 22 17.8 260 22 8.5 
SEX 52 33 63.4 72 38 52.7 l l 100 -: - -
PERSON 241 28 11. 6 324 21 6.5 9 2 22.2 15 2 13.3 
OTHER 970 29 3.0 1554 23 l.5 37 5 13.5 107 2 l.9 
TOTAL 2001 153 7.6 2790 145 5.2 170 30 17. 6 382 26 6.8 
TABLE 6 
TYPE OF OFFENCE - SUPREME COURT 
TYPE MALES FEMALES 
OF 1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
OFFENCE TOTAL REfvla %b TOTAL REM a %b TOTAL REM. TOTAL REM 
PROPERTY 365 16 4.4 361 21 5.8 12 l 28 1 
SEX 101 17 16.8 105 22 21.9 - - 1 1 
PERSON 71 5 7.0 123 14 11. 3 2 1 3 -
OTHER 15 2 D.3 46 - - - - 2 -
TOTAL 552 40 7.2 635 57 9.0 14 2 34 2 
14. 3 5.9 
a REM .• remanded. 
b The percentages in this column represent the proportion of the 
total court turnover of ~ach type of offender remanded for 
psychiatric reports. 
~ 
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Tables 5 and 6 show that offenders against property predominated 
in the court of petty sessions remand groups as they cccounted for 41% 
of males in 1969-70, and 42% in 1974-75. However, in the Supreme Court 
sample there were marginally more sexual offenders than property 
offenders remanded, 43% sex, 38% property in 1969-70, and 38% sex and 
36.2% property in 1974-75. 
The high proportion of property offenders remanded is predictable 
in view of the comparative prevalence of these offenders. Studies 
conducted in the U.K. have shown similar proportions of property 
offenders in groups remanded for psychiatric reports. Sparks (1966) 
reported figures of 49.2% and 42.5%, Bearcroft (1965) 53% and de Berker, 
(1960) nearly half. 
In relation to the total court turnover before each court and in 
each period, a larger proportion of sex offenders than any other type of 
male offender was remanded. This is particularly apparent in the court 
of petty sessions, where more than 50% of sexual offenders were remanded. 
The Supreme Court remanded rather smaller proportions of such offenders, 
but for both courts the proportion of sex offenders remanded was 
significantly greater than any other category of offender.f4lJ. Such 
a finding is to be expected because it is likely that judges and magis-
trates are more likely to view a sex offender as an abnormal individual 
whose behaviour needs to be understood before he is sentenced. However 
it is surprising that the level of significance differed between the 
(41) Court of petty sessions - differences between sex offenders and 
offenders against the person. x2=71.17, d.f = 1, p > .001 (1969-1970); 
x 2 = 99.55, d.f = 1, p > .001 (1974-1975). Supreme Court - differences 
between sex offenders and offenders against the person; x2 = 4.6, ·• 
d.f = 1, .o5 > p > .02 (1969-1970); x 2 = 4.oa, a.f = 1, .o5 > p > .02 
(1974-1975). 
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court of petty sessions and the Supreme Court and in both periods highly to very 
highly significantly less sexual offenders were re~anded by the Supreme 
Court than the court of petty sessions. f 42J 
It is instructive to compare these figures ~ith the results of 
studies in other jurisdictions. De Berker (lg6o) stated that in his 
remand group there were 2-3 times as many sexual offenders as one would 
expect from general prison figures. Sparks (1966) found 8.6% of the 
remand group of offenders at Court A were sexual offenders and 7.4% of 
the control group, and at Court B 21.7% of the remand group and 15.1% 
of the controls were sexual offenders. In r!ew Zealand Blignault (1962) 
has reported that 10% of the charges preferred in respect of remand 
patients at Oakley hospital were sexual offences. Gilbert and Maradie 
(1961) found that in Miami 21% of offenders remanded for mental status 
examination were charged with offences considered to reflect sexual 
aberration. In Philadelphia, a study of all males convicted of a 
sexual offence over a 5 year period (1966-1970) (Bohmer, 1976) showed 
51.7% were sentenced after receipt of a psychiatric report. 
The percentage of per~ons found guilty of assault by the court of 
petty sessions and remanded for a psychiatric report is higher than 
expected. Inexplicably, significantly less were remanded in 1974-1975, f43J 
unless more were referred under the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968~ 
The trend in the Supreme Court is in the reverse direction with a larger 
proportion of offenders against the person being remanded in 1974-1975, 
but this was not statistically significant. 
(42J x2 = 7.01, d.f = 1, .01 > p > .001 (1969-1970); x2 20.92, 
d.f = 1, .01 > p > .001 (1974-1975). 
(43) x2 = 4.35, d.f = 1, .02 p < .o5. 
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The oroportion of offendersin the court of petty sessions group 
remanded for minor social cri~es and driving offences was rather less 
than reported in other jurisdictions. Sparks (1966) found 25% of the 
remand group of offenders at Court A and 30% at Court B were convicted 
of vagrancy, nuisance and other crimes; de Berker (1960) found nearly 
one third of the offences recorded against his prison remand group were public 
offences, loitering, vagrancy and similar offences. The fewer number 
of offenders in this category may well be because more of these 
offenders than any other category are referred to psychiatrists under 
the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act. 
Table 5 shows that almost all female offenders remanded, 77% in 
1969-1970 and 85% in 1974-1975, were property offenders; in 1974-1975 
more than half of these were shoplifters. 
{iii) Police Record 
TABLE 7 
POLICE RECORDS OF OFFENDERS 
MALES FF~ALES 
NO PRIOR 1 - 4 5+ TOTAL NO PRIOR 1 - 4 5+ 
CONVICTIONS CONS. CONS. C'fFENffi. CONVICTIONS CONS. CONS. 
COURT OF 
PETTY 
SESSIONS 
1969-70 39(?n%) 64(41%) 50(33%) 153 16(53.3) 10( 33r1) 4(13.3) 
1974-75 25(17%) 53{ 3f'.5) fi7 ( llfi%) 145 9(3tt.f') l 3(sn.n ) ll(l5.ll) 
SUPREME 
COURT 
1~69··7" 8(2n%) 22(55%) in(253) 4() 1 1 -
197ll-75 0 ( 16~n 26 ( Ll5. E) ! 22(1P.F) 57 1 1 -
TOTAL 
OFFENDS. 
3n 
2n 
2 
2 
~I 
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Table 7 shows th~ prio~ record of convictions of the m~le 
offenders at the date of renand. 
There are no official statistics available of t~e proportion of 
first offenders convicted annually in courts of petty sessions or the 
Supreme Court in Tasmania with which to compare the rel"land ~roups. One 
research study reported that 11 only 39% 11 of offenders in 1968 convicted of 
indictable and quasi-indictable offences were first offenders, and 25% 
had at least 6 prior convictions, (Varne, 1975). Official statistics 
show that the percentage of male prisoners with no prior convictions 
dropped from 26% in 1969 to 13% in 1~74, and the percentage of prisoners 
with three or more convictions had increased from 5f% in 19~~ to 78% 
in lg74. f 44J 
Of the female offenders remanded by the court of petty sessions 
50% of the first period and 35% of the second period were first 
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offenders and 13% and 15% had More than 5 convictions. The prison figures I 
show 50% of female prisoners were first offenders in 1969 and 35% were 
in 1974. 
The similarity between the pror)Qrtions of first offenders in the 
remand groups and in the prison figures is quite striking, and it v1ould 
be reasonable to assume that a randomly sam11led group of offenders t·muld 
have a much higher percentage of first offenders. This is supported by 
Varne's study (1975), and by Victorian statistics which show between .M) 
and 43% of adult offenders and between 7Q% and 83% of adult female 
offenders for the relevant years had no previous convictions (Victoria 
Police, Statistical Review of Crime, 197d). 
(44) The introduction of the Saturday r<.1ork Order Scheme .is a possible 
explanation for this change. 
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It \''Ould appear then that in the remancl 9rou~s the ~icture is one 
of primarily a recidivistic group of offenders, with a trend towards a 
decreasing number of first offenders being remanded. Perhans courts 
are more likely to refer offenders with prior convictions and with 
whom the traditional methods of disposal have failed. 
Most other studies show a higher proportion of first offe"nders in 
the remand groups. De Berker (1~60) reported that 35% had no record, 
Bearcroft 27.4% (19n5) and in a study of offenders referred to the 
Kansas State Reception and Diagnostic Centre two thirds had no record, 
while in a control group less than half were first offenders (Davis 
et al, 1971). This was said by the authors to indicate that the 
courts ~tere more likely to refer offenders who are less experienced and 
\'/ho have committed less serious crimes. Bohmer {1076) found no 
significant relationship between the previous record of offenders and 
the ordering of psychiatric reports. hibbens, Soothill artd Pope (1977) 
showed that medical remands tended to have many more criminal convictions 
than the general run of offender; only 28% of males and 31% of females 
had no prior adult convictions; and more details of the criminal records 
of the sample gave further indications of chronicity. 
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TABLE 8 
PRIOR TREATMENT OF OFFP!DERS 
MALES FEMALES 
TOTAL % OF TOTAL % OF m-
IN- OUT- PRIOR TOTAL RE- H!- OUT- PRIOR TAL RE-
PATIENT PATIENT TREATMENT MAND ED PATIENT PATIENT TREATMENT MAND ED 
COURT OF 
OF PETTY 
SESSIONS 
1969-70 45 16 61 39.8 5 5 10 33.3 
1974-75 29 39 68 46.9 - 5 8 13 5n.n 
SUPREME 
COURT 
1969-70 9 6 15 37.5 l l 2 100.0 
\1974-75 24 8 32 56. 1 - 1 l 50.0 
(iv) Prior Treatment 
Table 8 shows the number and proportion of offenders who had 
received psychiatric treatment at the date of remand. These figures may 
be conservative estimates. They were obtained from the Mental Health 
Services Commission's records and the court files, and it could have 
happened that some offenders had received treatment privately or 
interstate and this was coJ11TT1unicated to the court but not recorded. 
The proportion of offenders with a previous psychiatric history 
is rather high and would appear to be increasing. Similarly high 
proportions of offenders remanded for psychiatric reports with records 
of previous treatment have been reported elsewhere. Bearcroft (1~65), 
reported a figure of 55% in a group referred from courts and ~risons, 
and Dell and Gibbens (1971) found 36% of females remanded had previously 
had mental hospital treatment. Gibbens, Soothill and Pope (1977) found 
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45% of the males and 68% of the females in their prospective ~essex 
study had had contact with psychiatric hospitals. 
(4) FEMALE OFFENDERS 
In 1969 and 1970 women accounted for 30 of the 170 (or 17 .6%) of 
the psychiatric reports requested by the court of petty sessions. In 
1974-1975 26 of the 382 (or 6.8%) related to women offenders. This is 
considerably more than one might expect considering the total number of 
women offenders convicted by the courts in the relevant periods. In 
fact in 1969 and 1970 a very highly significantly greater number of 
female offenders than males were remanded for psychiatric reports r45J 
and in 1974-1975 a lar~er percentage of females than males were remanded 
but the difference was not enough to be statistically significant. 
However the drol') in the numher of females remanded \'Jas very highly 
significant(46J. 
Female offenders in the Suprene Court are in an even smaller 
minority than in the court of petty sessions, and the numbers are too 
sma 11 to ascertain \'Ji th any accuracy whether judges show or have shown 
a bias towards female offenders. 
That magistrates and judges do have such a ~ias has heen 
demonstrated elsewhere. Wastell, (lq76) showed, in a l'!latchecl riair sample 
of ?n males and ?.n females, that the fe~ale offenders had significantly 
more psychiatric reports reouested on them than the Male offenders. 
Tf1is she said showed that sentencers presuMed that hecause so few women 
get into trouble, those that do r.iust he sick. l·/astell commenterl 
(45) x2 = 20.1s, a.f = 1, p >.001. 
(46) x 2 = 13.62, a.f = 1, p >.001. 
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pungently - HThat some women need !JSychiatric treatment is not 
arguable, but to assume that a man with an identical ~ackground and 
history does not, is Psvcholoqical lunacy". In one section of Gibbens, 
Soothill and Pope's (1977) comprehensive study of the remand for 
psychiatric.report procedure in England, a significantly greater ~roportion 
of females than males were remanded. In 1969 London judges remanded 
4.1% of males but 18.87% of females convicted by magistrates and 
committed for sentence to a higher court. This was attributed by the 
authors to the opportunity to be more flexible with the smaller number 
of women of fenders and to a greater wi 11 i ngnes s to be l er. i ent with 
women offenders "who offer little threat to public safety and are less 
likely to know or be influenced hy what happens to other women offenders." 
(p.88). 
In their resnonses to the questionnaire for this study, all 
judges and magistrates denied that they were more likely to remand female 
offenders than males. r47J The differential treatment shown to women 
offenders in 1969-1970 must either be unconscious or no longer exist 
as a result of a change in attitudes. 
A tendency to refer a greater proportion of female offenders for 
psychiatric reports is not inexplicable. First, what has euphemistically 
been called "the chivalry factor", which is generally ac'<no\'1ledged to 
operate to give women offenders preferential treatment in the criminal 
justice system, may result in sentencers requesting more reports in 
respect of women offenders than males in the hope of uncovering any 
possible mitigation for the offence, or 11 help 11 for her. It must be 
pointed out that a greater willingness to use psychiatric remands and 
(47) See Appendix A, question 24. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- L!·l -
disposals for women offenders does not necessarily mean they are treated 
more leniently than their male counterparts. On the contrary in some 
cases it could lead to fairly trivial hehaviour being sanctioned by a 
hos~ital order. f 4 BJ 
Secondly, it could result from the assuMption that female offenders 
are more often psychologically abnormal than the male offenders. The 
comparative rarity of female offenders in the courts, and the wides~read 
conception of the female as basically gentle, moral and law-abiding, 
which make a delinquent woman look more unnatural than a delinquent male, 
could contribute to such an attitude. Is there any evidence that female 
offenders are more often mentally disordered than males? 
In England there has been some suggestion that the ratio for 
disturbed to non-disturbed offenders is higher for women than men. 
(Walker & McCabe, 1973, p.33). For this reason the Butler Committee 
recommended that in the case of a woman defendant the court should be 
especially vi~ilant throughout the proceedings for any sign of mental 
disorder (p.163). The Committee agreed in principle with the suggestion 
of the Governor and staff of Holloway Prison that in the case of women 
defendants the court should invariably request a social inquiry report, 
to provide amongst other things information of any possible mental 
disorder (1975, Cmnd. 6244). Walker (1968) refers to statistics which 
show that in practice women offenders have a significantly greater 
chance of being dealt with as mentally abnormal, and that in cases 
dealt with under the Mental Health Act women have a higlier proportion 
of diagnoses of mental illness than males. This does not necessarily 
(48) Paternalisn to females ~ay result in adverse treatment in other areas of 
the criminal justice system. There is some evidence that the childrens 
court system in Tasmania applies the provisions of the Child Nelfare Act in 
relation to uncontrolled and neglected children in accordance with a double 
standard of morality. For although girls form only a small proportion of 
the children appearing before childrens'courts (about 20%), they account for 
the majority of complaints proven under the Child Welfare Act. (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Tasmania, Public Justice Bulletin, l074 -1975). 
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prove that in England and Hales there is more mental disorder among 
women offenders than males. For, as Walker points out, the statistics 
depend upon the psychiatrists' diagnoses, and the possibility cannot be 
excluded that they are influenced by the presumption he is trying to 
test, namely that there is something abnormal about a woman delinquent. 
He adds -
This would not necessarily mean that psychiatrists were deceiving 
themselves for it might be that by their standards too few male 
offenders were being referred to psychiatrists, or even that a 
male offender who is referred to a psychiatrist is less likely to 
seem abnormal, either because the psychiatrist is of the same sex 
or because he has seen so many male offenders. (p.313) 
A higher rate of remand of female offenders can really only.be 
justified if it can be proved that more women offenders than men are 
mentally disordered or in need of psychiatric treatment, but as Walker 
(1968) has stated this is difficult to establish. ln the ahsence of 
such proof, an even-handed and non-discriminatory attitude should be 
adopted. The trend noted above, to remand a more equal proportion of 
both sexes for psychiatric reports may well continue. It is plausible 
to assume that a change in attitude to women offenders has occurred in 
response to the demands of wo~en to be treated equally in the law-abiding 
areas of society, and that such attitudes will continue to change as the 
status of women improves. 
Table l shows that there was a dramatic increase in the number of 
female offenders in 1974 and 1975,more than doubling the 1969-1970 
total. Statistics collected for this research provided some material 
for a brief examination of female crime in Tasmania. Women offenders 
and the rising female crime rate is a topic which has aroused some con-
siderable discussion with resultant literature in recent years (Adler, 
1975, 1977; Dalesman, Scarpitci, & Stephenson, 1973 ; Price, 1977 ; 
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Simon, 1975 Singer, 1973). Reasons for the disparity in the amount 
of male and female.crime have been suqqested. These include the lack 
of opportunity and motivation for crime which the traditional female 
role provides; differences in strength and skill; The rias of the 
criminal law against men; and the paternalistic or chivalrous attitude 
of male victims, police, juries and sentencers to women, which distorts 
the amount of female involvement in crime. A less po~ular view is 
that women have stricter moral attitudes to crime than rien and a stronger 
tendency to conform to the perceived values of society. Pollak (195n) 
adopts a contrary view denying that females are engaged in less 
criminal behaviour than men, but asserts they are less likely to be 
detected because their traditional roles provide excellent cover. 
There is convincing evidence which shows that in the United Kingd001 arrl 
America lack of opportunity and paternalism are at least ::>art of the 
e~planation for the disparity in the amount of male and female crime. In the 
United Kingdom a woman is more likely to be let off hy the po 1 ice with a 
caution than is a male offender, and has slightly less chance of being 
found guilty than a male (Halker 1~65, pp.299-300). There is also sorne 
evidence whi eh supports the widespread belief that \·1omen receive lighter 
sentences than men (Walker 1965, pp.300-3~2; Davidson et. al., 1064; 
Hoqarth, 1974). In Tasmania too, there is evidence of biased court 
attitudes to females. Simon (1975) has argued that the increase in the 
proportion of female arrests for serious crime in America, - which is 
owing almost wholly to the fact that women seem to be cornrnitting more 
property offences (mainly theft, embezzlement, fraud and forgery), 
indicates that women's participation in crime has and will increase as 
their employment opportunities expand and their role changes from a more 
traditional to a more liberated one. She predicts that fe~ale criminal 
behaviour 111ill increase as her participation in the work force and her 
- 44 -
opportunities increase and gradually the types of crime women commit 
~fill resemble much more closely those committed by men. This prediction 
is endorsed by Freda Adler (1977) wl'io relies upon statistics from 
developing countries as well as Western Europe, North America, 
Australasia and juvenile court records to support the relationship 
between increase in female criminality and the decrease in social and 
economic disparity between the sexes. 
In Tasmania and apparently in all societies, women constitute a 
small percentage of the total offender population·and this is so 
particularly for more serious offences, offences of'violence and 
sexual offences. But the numbers are converging gradually. The Criminal 
Justice statistics from 1969 to 1975 show steady increases in the 
number of female petty offences, so that from 1969 to 1975 there was an 
88% increase in the number of female convictions as against a 28% increase 
for males. Female offences which show the greatest increase are 
offences against property; for males, offences against good order show 
the largest increase. Ratner different trends emerged from the offender 
based statistics extracted for this research study.r49J The combined 
total number of female offenders convicted in 1969 and 1970 of certain 
selected offences compared ~ith the combined totals for 1974 and 1975 
showed a 112% increase. These increases were due very largely to an 
increase in the number of females convicted of drug offences and shop-
1 ifting, both of which are not specifically referred to in the official 
statistics. 
Both the official statistics and those compiled for this research 
show substantial increases in the numbers of female offenders appearing 
before the Supreme Court. These increases are almost entirely due to 
an increase in the number of property offenders. 
(49) Ante., 32. 
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The criminal statistics generally show that in Tasmania as well 
as in Britain and America the proportion of females involved in prose-
cutions for violent crime has hardly changed (Simon, 1975). This would 
seem to be quite contrary to popular impressions, although it must be 
conceded that the proportion of women convicted for minor assaults has 
increased. 
(5) THE DECISION TO REMAND 
There is, in Tasmania, no procedure compelling magistrates or 
judges to state their reasons for requesting a psychiatric report, so 
there can be no accurate quantitative assessment of the reasons for 
referral. Although such a procedure does exist in England, in a survey 
of mentally disordered recidivist offenders Boehringer and McCabe (1973) 
found the reasons prompting a request for a psychiatric report difficult 
to isolate. The most frequently expressed reason for a report was a 
known history of menta 1 disorder, and they found some other evidence that this and 
the offender's behaviour in court influenced the decision to remand. 
The type of offence with which the offender was charged, for example, 
a sexual offence, orpersistence in offending, was said by magistrates to 
influence their decision to remand, but no recorded evidence of this 
was found in the cases falling within their survey. 
If a control group of offenders sentenced without remand for a 
psychiatric report had been used in this study, some factors 
significantly related to the decision to order a report may have been 
isolated. Nevertheless the data obtained gives some information about 
the circumstances in which courts are most likely to refer offenders 
for psychiatric reports. 
- 46 -
Many ~riters and connentators hav~ listed instances where courts 
should call for psychiatric reports before sentencing an offender. Such 
suggestions have usually included all or some of the following:-
1. Mature first offenders, who after years of steady respectable 
living, commit an out of character offence. 
2. Offenders with a history of persistent anti-social behaviour 
which fails to respond to ordinary measures. 
3. Offences of a bizarre, motiveless or irrational nature, particularly 
if repetitive. 
4. Violent behaviour, especially if against his or her own family. 
5. Most sexual offenders. 
6. Prior history of mental disorder. 
7. Offenders with social problems, with wife or parents, social 
deterioration, or alcohol and drugs. 
8. Certain other offences such as stealing milk from a doorstep or 
arson. 
9. Unusual behaviour or appearance on arrest or in court. 
Questions 1-5 of the questionnaire were designed to discover 
material about the decision to remand an offender for a psychiatric 
report. Table 9 was compiled from the responses to Question 1, which 
asked magistrates and judges to state factors they considered in 
deciding who to remand, and Table 10 from the responses to Questions 
2-5.(50) 
(50) See Appendix A for the text of the questions. 
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TABLE 9 
---
REASONS FOR OBTAINING A REPORT 
-
REASONS 
Request of counsel, accused or probation officer 
Likelihood of some mental abnormality 
Known history of mental disorder 
Nature of offence 
Circumstances of offence 
Age or youth of off ender 
Demeanour of prisoner 
Lack of obvious motive 
Possibility that defendant may modify 
behaviour through psychiatric treatment 
For opinion as to recidivism 
(a) The high n of 21 is because all respondents 
gave more than one reason. 
TABLE 10 
Total 
REQUESTS FOR REPORTS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
--
Number of 
responses 
4 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
-21 (a) 
-
CIRCUMSTANCES fa) ALWAYS USUALLY SOMETIMES RARELY TOTAL RESPONSES 
Prior psychiatric treatment 1 7 1 - 9 
Sexual offence 
- 3 5 8 
Counsel's request - 5 4 9 
Probation officer's reque5 t l 4 4 9 
(a) Magistrates and Judges were asked whether they ordered reports in 
these circumstances. 
. 
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These tables show that in particular an offender's previous 
psychiatric history, the requests of probation officers and counsel are 
stated by judges and magistrates to have considerable influence upon 
the decision to remand. 
The value of presentence reports in the selection of candidates 
for psychiatric reports was recognized by the Butler Committee. In its 
report the committee suggested that social inquiry reports should be 
used as a screening process for mental disorder, alerting magistrates 
to the need to call for a report. It was proposed that social inquiry 
reports should be mandatory in all cases of grave non-sexual offences 
against the person, all sexual offences involving children below the 
age of 13 or involving violence to persons of any age, and property 
offences which involve risk to life. In other cases magistrates should 
continue to have a discretion to call for a social inquiry report and 
a medical report where they think it right to do so. As previously 
stated, in the light of evidence that the ratio of disturbed to non-
disturbed offenders is much higher for women than men, the Committee 
expressed the need for special vigilance throughout the proceedings for 
signs of mental disorder in the case of women. {1975, cmnd. 6244, 
pp.161-163). 
Just how many psychiatric reports in this study were ordered as · 
a result of a probation officer's report is difficult to ascertain 
precisely, but the following facts are instructive. An oral or written 
presentence report preceded the request for a psychiatric report in 44 
cases in the court of petty sessions 1969-1970 sample of male offenders 
and in 47 cases in the 1974-1975 sample. Of these, 17 in 1969-1970 and 
27 in 1974-1975 specifically recorrrnended a psychiatric report. Many 
others were known to have given information pointing to the wisdom of 
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obtaining a psychiatric report. (Sl) It cannot be categorically said 
in these cases that the probation officer's recommendation was the 
reason for reference, but it could well have been at least a contri-
buting factor. 
In the Supreme Court sample it was not feasible to attempt to 
discover the proportion of cases in which receipt of a probation 
officer's report preceded the request for a psychiatric report. 
GROUP 
COURT OF PETTY 
SESSIONS 
MALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
FEMALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
FEMALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
TABLE 11 
REPRESENTATION OF OFFENDERS 
REPRESENTED UNREPRESENTED NO INFORMATION 
52(34.0%) 99 2 
71(49.0) 74 
-
10(33.3) 20 
-
11(42.3) 13 2 
26(65.0) 11 3 
45(78.9) 8 4 
2(100.0) 
- -
1(50.0) - 1 
TOTAL 
153 
145 
30 
26 
40 
57 
2 
2 
Table 11 shows the number and proportion of cases in which the 
offender was represented en the occasion of the request for a psychiatric 
report. It was not possible to ascertain the cases in which a psychiatric 
report was requested by counsel, but it is known that if a report is 
requested the court will usually or sometimes accede to the request to 
(51) Evidence of this was obtained from notes on probation files. 
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protect the sentence against appeal even though the likelihood of any 
mental disturbance is remote. (S 2) Although no systematic search of the 
number of cases in which counsel requested a psychiatric report was 
possible, in the case of the 1969-1970 Supreme Court population of male 
offenders it was discovered that in 10 cases defence counsel asked 
for a psychiatric report, and the judge noted the request or commented 
upon it in his comments on passing sentence. 
It is recognized that the court may request a report even though 
none of the factors mentioned so far are present, if th.e judge or 
magistrate is at a loss to determine an appropriate sentence without 
expert help. 
Both the objective data from the remand sample, and the subjective 
data from the questionnaire suggest certain factors are related to the 
decision to remand. The responses to the questionnaire showed that an 
offender's previous psychiatric history and the requests of probation 
officers and counsel are stated by judges and magistrates to be the 
most influential factors in the decision to request a psychiatric report. 
Other less influential factors include nature of the offence, the 
circumstances of the offence and the age of the offender. 
A study of all the cases in the remand sample revealed that a 
very high proportion of offenders (44% of the total sample) had a history 
of psychiatric treatment, that a significantly greater proportion of 
sexual offencers than any other type of offender were remanded for 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
reports, and that a higher than expected number of offenders with prior I 
(52) See Table 10. This was publicly given as a reason prompting a I 
request for a psychiatric report by one of the magistrates represented 
in this study at a seminar on 15th December, 197 3. (l•Jental Health Services 
Corrunission, Tasmania, 1973, p.9). I 
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convictions were remanded. This suggests that these factors are 
related to the decision to remand. There is also some evidence from 
the remand sample that the requests of probation officers or counsel 
have a bearing upon the decision to remand. 
A comparison of the reasons given by the magistrates and judges 
with the objective data, shows that in relation to the factors of prior 
psychiatric treatment and the requests of counsel and probation officers, 
the expressed behaviour of the judiciary is to some extent borne out 
by the data from the research sample. 
Comparative findings from other studies show that prior history 
of mental disorder, prior convictions and the requests of probation 
officers influence the decisions of some English and Scottish courts to 
refer offenders for psychiatric reports. (SJ) 
Gibbens, Soothill and Pope's (1977) more detailed analysis throws 
more light upon why magistrates ask for psychiatric reports. Their data 
showed certain characteristics were systematically related by magistrates 
to the need for a medical remand, particularly older offenders, those 
with more prior convictions than average, sexual offenders, the socially 
isolated, and offenders with previous contact with psychiatric hospitals. 
In addition to the collection of objective data, the researchers also 
asked the doctors who had had offenders referred to them why in their 
view the medical remand was required by the court. The commonest 
(53) G. Boehringer: and S. McCabe (1973) and M. Woodside (1976) found the 
most frequently exp;ressea reason for ordering a psychjatr.ic report was a 
prior history of mental disorder. R.F. Sparks (1966), found some evidence 
that the type of offence, Cl prior crimLndl record, prior psychiatric 
treatment, demeanour in court and the requests or recommendations of 
probation offic'2r:s, may have influenced the decision to remand. Compare 
C. Bohmer:'s (1976) finding that reports on sexual offenders were requested 
primarily for criminal justice reasons. 
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reasons given were nature of the present offence (25 per cent men, 25 per 
cent women) and knowledge or suspicion of previous mental illness (34 
per cent men, 63 per cent women). Occasionally a medical report was 
thought to be requested for "good measure" in addition to other reports. 
(6) THE CONTENT OF PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS 
TABLE 12 
DIAGNOSIS OF COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS & SUPREME COURT SAMPLES - MALES 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS SUPREME COURT 
DIAGNOSIS 
1969-70 % 1974-75 % 1969-70 % 1974-75 
NORMAL 42 27.4 13 8.9 7 17.5 12 
PSYCHOSIS 8 5.2 5 3.4. l 2.5 3 
NEUROSIS 4 4 2 l 
ORGANIC BRAIN SYNDROME 8 7 2 2 
OTHER AND UNSPECIFIED 24 19 6 6 MENTAL DISORDER 
ALCOHOLISM 6 20 
- 3 
SUBNORML\L ITY 7 10 3 6 
TOTAL ABNORMAL 57 37.3 65 44.8 14 35.0 21 
PSYCHOPATHY 13 14 5 17 
INADEQUATE etc.* 37 52 12 7 
TOTAL PERSONALITY 50 32.7 66 45.5 17 ~0.0 24 
/ 
/ 
NO REPORT OBTAINED 4 2.6 1 .7 2/ 7.5 -
/ 
TOTAL 153 j1oc 145 100 40 noo ,J17 
* this includes inadequate and other personality disorders. 
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TABLE 13 
DIAGNOSIS OF COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS SAMPLE - FEMALES 
DIAGNOSIS 1969-70 % 1974-75 et 10 
NORMAL . 12 40.0 3 11.5 
PSYCHOSIS 2 -
NEUROSIS - 2 
ORGANIC BRAIN SYNDROME 
-
2 
OTHER & UNSPECIFIED 4 4 MENTAL DISORDER 
ALCOHOLISM - l 
SUBNORMAL !TY l l 
TOTAL ABNORMAL 7 23.3 10 38.4 
PSYCHOPATHY 4 4 
INADEQUATE ETC. 6 6 
TOTAL PERSONALITY 10 33.3 10 38.4 
NO REPORT OBTAINED l 3.4 3 22.7 
TOTAL 30 100 26 100 
{i) Diagnoses and the Incidence of Mental Disorder 
~ A comparison of the courts of petty sessions data in tables 12 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
and 13 shows that the combined abnormal and personality groups accounted 
for 70% of males and 56% of females in the 1969-70 period and 90% of 
males and 76% of females in the 1974-75 period. 
The larger proportion of females who were apparently normal is 
rather striking, and this can be related to the fact that a higher 
percentage of female offenders than male offenders were remanded for 
psychiatric reports. 
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A comparison of the court of petty sessions diagnostic groups 
in 1969-1970 and 1974-1975 reveals the number of normal offenders 
decreased very highly significantly between 1969-1970 and 1974-1975. f 54J 
At least two explanations for this can be suggested. 
First, as the majority of reports in 1969-1970 were prepared by a 
different psychiatrist from the one responsible for the majority of reports 
in 1974-1975, it may well be that different methods of diagnosis were 
used. For example, three times as many alcoholics were diagnosed in 
1974-1975 despite the fact that several hundred other offenders had 
been referred for reports specifically to detennine whether they were 
alcohol dependent. Furthermore it is appreciated that the boundary 
between personality disorders and no psychiatric diagnosis is a nebulous 
one, and psychiatrist A may have included some offenders in the latter 
category whom psychiatrist B would have classified in the former. 
Secondly, magistrates may have been more discriminating in their 
selection of candidates for reports in 1974~1975,which is supported by 
the smaller proportion of offenders remanded in 1974-1975, or they may 
have been more proficient at recognizing mental disorder than previously. 
The data in relation to the proportions of mentally disordered 
offenders from the Supreme Court group of offenders does not follow the· 
same pattern as the court of petty sessions data. The increase in the 
proportion of normal offenders remanded in 1974-1975 can be explained by 
the existence of five cases of borderline subnormal offenders in the 
normal category for this year, none having been so diagnosed in 1969-1970. 
(54) Males - x2 = 11.51, d.f. = 1, p > .001. 
Females - x2 = 21.22, d.f. = 1, p > .001. 
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Clear and precise comparisons of the incidence of mental disorder 
reported in other studies are difficult to make because of the lack of 
definition of the diagnostic categories used. Despite their shortcomings 
such comparisons are of interest. 
In the United States, in a study based on several state-wide 
surveys, Smith (1971) has found the preva1ence of mental disorder among 
offenders to be about 20%. In selected groups it is much higher than 
this. For example in Hartford, Connecticut, Gold (1969) found that of 
100 court appointed ps1chiatric examinations, 50% showed some type of 
mental illness requiring hospitalization. Guze et al. (1969) have 
determined that 79% of convicted felons in Missouri penitentiaries have 
·~definite antisocial personality disorder" and 43% have alcoholism; 
1% or less suffer from schizophrenia and other mental illnesses and 
mental deficiency. 
In Britain, Sparks (1966) found that of his total of remanded 
offenders, just over one third were said by medical officers to be 
suffering from some form of mental disorder and one fifth were described 
as having a personality disorder. This compares with an almost equal 
proportion of male offenders suffering from mental disorder and 
personality disorder in this study (nearly 40%). Dell and Gibbens (1971) 
found that 38% of all women offenders had a mental disorder and 32% 
had personality disorders. Gibbens, Soothill and Pope (1977) reported that 
the questionnaire responses in relation to the mental state of offenders 
in their prospective study showed 30% of the men and 28% of the women 
to have minor or no problems, but only 6% of the men and none of the 
women had no.problems (pp.56, 95). The researchers in the Glasgow 
studies found about 95 per cent of their offenders were mentally disordered, 
(Binns, Carlisle. Nimmo, Park and Todd, 1969, 1969a). 
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In Australia, Bartholomew and 'Others (1967) .found that in a random 
sample of convicted male offenders in ~entridge Gaol from courts of 
petty sessions in Victoria, 45% were diagnosed as suffering from some 
mental or personality disorder, personality disorders excluding alcoholics 
accounting for 14.3%. In a group remanded to Pentridge from courts of 
petty sessions for psychiatric reports, Guile (1965) found 51.5% were 
suffering from mental disorders (including borderline mental deficiency) 
and 30.3% were suffering from personality disorders. A group remanded 
from general sess i o'ns and Supreme Courts consisted of 26. 6% mental 
disorder and 42.8% personality disorder. In the petty sessions group, 
psychosis was diagnosed in over one-third (34.8%) compared with 4.0% of 
the general sessions group. 
The incidence of psychosis in the present study, 4.4% for all 
male offenders, was smaller than reported in other groups of convicted 
offenders and, as would be expected, considerably smaller in comparison 
with groups of unprosecuted offenders admitted to mental hospitals. <55J 
As there is no evidence that the incidence of psychosis is any less in 
Tasmania than elsewhere, and because the issue of fitness to plead is 
raised extremely rarely, it seems that some psychotic offenders are 
diverted from the criminal justice system before charges are heard. If 
the police are assisting to arrange for informal treatment of these 
people, this is desirable. The obvious contrast in Guile 1 s (1965) 
study between the proportion of mentally disordered and particularly 
psychotic offenders remanded by the court of petty sessions and by the 
general sessions did not appear in this study. There appeared to be no 
significant differences between the two courts in any of the data in 
Table 12. 
(55) H.R. Rollin (1965) found.schizophrenia was diagnosed in 78% of a 
group of male unprosecuted offenders admitted to Horton Hospital, 
Epsom. 
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The high incidence of personality disorder in the remanded 
population reinforces the need, expressed elsewhere, for preventive 
and treatment prograrrmes to be directed at this group. 
The proportion of normal offenders overall is small. Does this 
suggest a high incidence of psychiatric disorder in the offender 
population generally, the proficiency of the courts at recognizing those 
with mental disorder, or psychiatric opinion that most offenders are 
"sick"? 
The available empirical evidence provides convincing support -that 
it is not the case that all offenders are psychologically disturbed or 
mentally ill. In America, Guze et al. (1969) has shown that with the 
exception of sociopathy and drug abuse mental illness is no more 
prevalent in the offender population than in the population at large. The 
studies of hidden criminality, (Christie, Andenaes, and Skirbeck, 1965; 
Erickson & Empey 1966), which show in relation to juveniles at least 
that it is statistically normal to break the law but that few offenders 
are disc·overed, suggest as a consequence that it is questionable 
whether the average criminal should without exception be considered sick. 
It is interesting but predictable that the researchers in the Glasgow 
study, a group of psychiatrists, attributed the high incidence of mental 
disorder in their two samples to pre-selection by police and prosecuting 
authorities, denying that they, the reporting psychiatrists, equated crime 
with mental disorder (Binns et al. 1969, 1969a). Similarly the study 
by the psychiatrists Bartholomew et al (1967} said the disparity in the 
proportion of mentally disordered offenders in a group of prisoners 
remanded for reports and a group not remanded demonstrated the proficiency 
of the courts and prosecutors at recognizing those with mental disorder. 
- 58 -
Their findings could also be used to demonstrate that they at least 
were not of the opinion that all offenders are mentally disordered. 
But in the present study, a comparison of the proportion of normal 
petty offenders in 1969-1970 and 1974-1975 suggests that the psychiatrist 
responsible for the majority of the reports in the later period may be 
of this opinion, although from the courts point of view the purpose of 
the remand was not always to isolate the mentally disordered.<55J 
The assertion that at least some psychiatrists see a high proportion 
of offenders as sick or suffering from mental or personality disorder 
deserves some elaboration. Although they may consciously deny that 
crime can be equated with mental disorder. it is suggested that there 
are various factors which contribute to a high proportion of offenders 
remanded for psychiatric reports being diagnosed as mentally disordered. 
First, it may be that some psychiatrists have difficulty in defining 
what is 11 normal 11 , and will try to place a patient within some diagnostic 
category which falls within the psychiatric model. <57J Secondly, the 
classification of mental disorder seems to consist of an increasing 
number of categories which could be used to encompass much of any 
population. This applies particularly to criminal groups, for the 
commission of an offence may be used as evidence upon which a diagnosis 
of psychopathic personality disturbance is based. In fact it is widely 
conceded that the psychopath makes nonsense of attempts to distinguish · 
between sick and healthy delinquents. Thirdly, some psychiatrists with 
very optimistic ideas of the therapeutic potential of psychiatry, may 
wish to extend the influence of psychiatry and "treat" more and more 
offenders. A diagnosis of mental or personality disorder tends to have 
(56) Ante., 47. 
( 57) Bohmer ( 1976) c.Ia..imed this difficulty was dAmonstrated by psychiatrists 
of the Philadelphia Court Clinic who said in respect of a mere 3 offenders 
out of dpproximately 150 that there was nothing psychiatrically wrong 
with them. 
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the effect of making the possibility of psychiatric treatment, rather 
than traditional methods, both feasibl0 and proper. 
The large proportion of mentally disordered offenders and the 
differences in this respect in the two periods selected, lend some support 
to those critics who challenge the efficacy and accuracy of diagnosis. 
The value of diagnostic labels should not be overestimated by judges and 
magistrates and the dangers of labelling should be realized. 
The object of diagnosis, to convey information about the patient's 
past, present and future, is considered by many to have failed. 
Diagnosis is recognized as an uncertain guide from which to predict a 
person's future course or from which to infer a type of treatment, and 
in particular the diagnosis of psychopathy, performs no explanatory, 
prognostic, therapeutic or descriptive function. Diagnosis is 
notoriously unreliable, due to the confusion about the basis for 
assignment to particular categories of the diagnostic system, and to 
the breadth of the diagnostic categories. 
As well as being unreliable and non-functional, there are those 
who argue that diagnosis has a detrimental effect, that it is dehumanizing 
and incompatible with treatment. A diagnosis, it is said, acts as a 
barrier between patient and therapist, making interaction almost 
impossible. Some go further and see the diagnostician as mou~ding the 
behaviour of the patient to fit the diagnosis so that it becomes not an 
objective guide to predicting behaviour but a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Supporters of labelling theory argue that diagnosis and patient status 
may stabilize behaviour that would otherwise be transitory. The 
evidence in support of labelling theory is considerable and 
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persuasive. (SB) No discussion of the merits of diagnosis would be 
complete without mentioning the views of Szasz (1963). Szasz's theory 
asserts that mental illness is a harmful myth, and psychiatric labels 
are pejorative statements with aversive consequences to the person 
diagnosed including segregation, confinement, loss of civil rights, 
status and prestige. His errors must be admitted. Szasz fails to 
support his views with appropriate evidence. He ignores crucial 
evidence to the contrary and he makes egregious mistakes of logic by 
assuming that physical signs and symptoms are necessary for mental 
illness and by assuming there are no such signs or symptoms and that 
therefore there is no such thing as mental i 11 ness ( Schoenfe 1 d, 1976). 
Nevertheless his views, articulately and dramatically expressed, have 
an invaluable contribution to make. They create an acute awareness 
of the possible abuses of psychiatry and the social, legal and ethical 
issues in relation to human rights which the concept of mental illness 
and psychiatric treatment obscures. 
(ii) Treatment Recommendations 
The high proportion of offenders who were found to have a mental 
or personality disorder would appear to indicate, in theory, and at 
least for those with a mental disorder, that some form of treatment was 
potentially available. Table 14 shows that diagnosis of mental or 
personality disorder and suitability for treatment do not necessarily 
coincide and even for a few offenders with no mental or personality 
disorder treatment was recommended. 
(58) Some of the evidence is discussed by Scheff (1974). One particularly 
startling study is that reported by Rosehan (1973). For this study eight 
sane persons gained secret admittanc;:e to twelve different mental 
hospitals. In his initial interview each pseudo-patient simulated 
psychotic symptoms. Immediately upon admission to a ward each stopped 
simulating the symptoms. In all cases they had enormous difficulty 
establishing they were sane and the length of their stay in hospital 
ranged from 7 - 52 days. 
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In the 1969-1970 court of petty sessions group, 'treatment was 
offered in only 23.3X of the remanded population of males but in ·62.7% 
of the 1974-1975 group. The figures for females were remarkably 
similar. (59J In the Supreme Court sample there was an increase, but 
the trend was not as definite with 25% remanded in 1969-1970 and 38.6% 
in 1974-1975. The increases in treatment recommendations were particularly 
apparent in the personality group. 
TABLE 14 
NUMBER AND PROPORTION OF DIAGNOSTIC CATEGORY 
RECOMMENDED FOR TREATMENT 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
MALES FEMALES [)IAGNOSIS 
1969-70 1974-75 I 1969-70 1974-75 
a b T.R. / % T.R % T.R. % T.R. % 
NORMAL 2 4.9 l 7.7 - - 1 (33.3 
MENTAL DISORDER 26 i5.6 57 B6.4 6 85.7 7 70.0 
PERSONALITY 8 5.7 33 50.0 2 20.0 8 BO.O DISORDER 
TOTAL 36 - 91 - 8 - 16 -
% OF REMAND GROUP 
RECO:•t"v1ENDED FOR 23.5 62.7 26.7 61.5 
TREATMENT 
~.R. = treatment recommendations 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES 
1969-70 1974-75 
T.R % T.R. % 
- -
2 16. 7 
9 64.3 16 76.2 
l 5.9 4 16.7 
10 - 22 -
25.0 38.6 
b% = percentage of total diagnostic category (see tables 12 and 13) 
recommended for treatment. 
(59) The increase in treatment recommendations was highly significantly 
greater in 1974-1975. x2 = 23.32, d.f. = 1, p > .001. 
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Clearly, the increase in treat~ent reco1T111endations cannot be 
attributed only to a smaller proportion of normal offenders remanded, 
for two reasons. First, the decrease in normal offenders remanded in 
the court of petty sessions group of males and females was not paralleled 
by a decrease in the number of normal offenders remanded by the Supreme 
Court. Secondly, the increase in treatment recommendations exceeds the 
increase in the number of offenders with mental or personality disorders 
remanded. 
There was in the court of petty sessions population a considerable 
change in the treatment recommendations themselves. More than one third 
of the recommendations for treatment for males and females in 1969-1970 
were for hospital orders, but in 1974-1975 hospital orders accounted 
for less than one tenth. However, in this period, in 14 Ccises {all males) 
the psychiatrist specifically recommended in-patient treatment or 
assessment, and in an additional eight cases admission to hospital for 
treatment for alcoholism under the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act. In 
som'e of these cases at least, grounds for a hospital order would have 
existed. 
The Supreme Court population in contrast to the court of petty 
sessions population showed no significant changes in the type of 
treatment recommendations made. 
A cohort of offenders from the ~Jessex 
magistrates courts provides some interesting comparative data. 
Psychiatric treatment was recommended for 26% of the men, and a table 
of the relationship between mental health assessment and court sentence 
shows that some of those with mild or no problems nevertheless received 
medical sentences (Gibbens et al. 1977, p.67 and Appendix A). 
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TABLE 15 
DIAGNOSIS, NON-PSYCHIATRIC RECOMMENDATIONS AND NO ADVICE 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
MALES FEMALES 
DIAGNOSIS 
1969-70 1964-75 1969-70 
Ra %b NAc %d R % NA % R % NA % 
NORMAL 16 38. l 23 54.8 9 69.2 3 23. 1 2 16.7 10 83.3 
MENTAL 14 24.6 17 29.8 6 9.2 3 4.6 l 14. 3 DISORDER -
PERSONAL ITV 15 29.4 28 54.9 11 18.2 20 3 30.0 5 150. 0 DISORDER 
' 
TOTALS 45 
- 68 - 26 - 26 - 5 - 16 -
~{, OF REr1AND GROUI 29.4 44.4 18.6 18.6 16. 6 53.3 
aR = non-psychiatric recommendations. 
b% = percentage of diagnostic category recei~ing recommendations. 
cNA= no advice. 
d% = percentage of diagnostic category receiving no advice. 
1974-75 
R % NA % 
1 33.3 1 ~3.3 
3 130.0 -
1 1o.0 l lO.O 
5 
-
2 -
19.2 7.7 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES 
1969-70 1974-75 
R % NA % R % NA % 
-
7, no.a 3 25.0 7 58.3 
3 21.4 2 14. 2 3 14.3 2 9.5 
5 29.4 11 64.7 7 29.1 13 54. l 
8 
-
20 - 13 - 22 -
' 
20.0 50.0 22.8 38.5 
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Table 15 shows the number and proportion of cases in which recommendations 
were made as to matters other than treatment. 
TABLE 16 
TYPES OF NON-PSYCHIATRIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS SUPREME COURT 
RECOMMENDATION MALES FEMALES MALES 
1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
PRISON 3 11 l l 3 7 
PROBATION 19 4 2 l l l 
OTHER SENTENCE 11 5 l l 
-
l 
MISCELLANEOUS 12 6 l 2 4 4 
NO ADVICE 68 26 16 2 20 22 
Table 16 shows most of these recommendations related to sentence, and 
that psychiatrists did not shrink from unambiguous recommendations for 
gaol sentences in certain cases. The miscellaneous recommendations 
concerned such things a5 repatriation to country of origin, employment 
in gaol or non-psychiatric medical treatment. 
The evidence that psychiatrists do in fact make recomnendations as 
to what sentence should be imposed is interesting, for it is a matter 
upon which opinion is divided. The responses to the questionnaire indicate 
that 70 per cent of the judges and magistrates who completed the 
questionnaire do not object tn sentencing recommendations,r6oJ but one 
of the most frequently cited writers on technique in writing psychiatric 
reports, Scott (1953) has asserted that psychiatrists should not make 
(60) See Appendix A, question 10. 
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recommendations for punishment. This was rejected by Bartholomew (1962}, 
who argued that penal recommendations concern modification of behaviour 
which is within the province of a psychiatrist's expertise, as penal 
measures can be therapeutic and rehabilitative. He also argued that by 
making such recommendations a psychiatrist is not arrogating to himself 
·the functions of the court but merely voicing an opinion, a request for 
which is implicit in the initial demand for a psychiatric report. Both 
of these views have been recently commented upon by Schiffer (1976} who 
concluded that a psychiatrist's expertise in matters of psychic 
rehabilitation does not justify all recommendations he makes with regard 
to sentence, for he may do so on the basis of matters outside his 
expertise, and the result in effect makes him a sentencing judge. Schiffer 
points out this may create problems if the psychiatrist is ultimately 
responsible for treatment. He suggested that judges should not seek such 
recommendation~ citing Szasz's opinion that to do so is an attempt to 
escape responsibility and alleviate their own feelings of guilt. 
It is clear that in Tasmania psychiatrists freely make recommend-
ations for punishment or sentence, and the majority of sentencers tolerate 
and even appreciate such advice. (6l) Provided psychiatrists are not 
unrealistically viewed by judges and magistrates, and their opinions 
are critically evaluated along with all the other evidence, psychiatric 
opinion on sentencing matters, for example the negative or positive 
effects of imprisonment on a particular offender, can assist the court 
in the lonely and difficult task of sentencing. 
Table 15 shows the number and proportion of cases in which no 
specific advice was offered other than such statements as "the law 
(61) The responses to question ll(b) (See Appendix A) indicated that 
most respondents found recommendations helpful in determining an 
appropriate sentence. 
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should take its course". All groups in the 1974-1975 period show a 
smaller proportion of cases in which no advice was offered. 
Although the absence of any recommendations could be relied upon 
as indicating that the report was of little value, this may not have 
invariably been the case. A negative report, with no indication that 
psychiatric treatment nor any other sentencing alternative was deemed 
appropriate to rehabilitate the offender, may nevertheless have been of 
some value to the court. 
It was rather surprising to find that in four cases of female 
shoplifters the psychiatrist made no recommendation other than to suggest 
that no criminal intent was involved, although in fact the complaint had 
been found proved or the offender had pleaded guilty. (62) 
(iv) Intelligence 
INTELLIGENCE 
SUBNORMAL ITV 
BORDERLINE FEEBLE MINDED 
DULL NORMAL 
AVERAGE 
ABOVE AVERAGE 
TOTAL 
NO INFORMATION 
TOTAL 
TABLE 17 
INTELLIGENCE 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
MALES FEMALES 
1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 
10 15 2 l 
10 10 1 2 
33 22 3 4 
42 29 12 5 
7 4 
- -
102 80 18 12 
51 65 12 14 
153 145 30 26 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES 
1969-70 1974-75 
4 6 
- 7 
7 11 
12 11 
2 -
25 35 
15 22 
40 57 
(62) De Berker (1960) found that in roughly half of his total sample, no 
special recommendation was made; and Dell & Gibbens (1971) found that in 
38% doctors did not feel able to advise about disposal, in 5% custodial 
sentences were recommended, and in 18% probation. 
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Table 17 shows the intelligence range of the re~anded offenders in 
respect of whom information was available from various sources. Only 
about half of the reports contained any intelligence assessment. 
Psychometric tests were stated to have been performed in some of these 
cases, and occasionally the exact I.Q. specified, but more often only 
estimates were given, and the tenninology was often vague, ambiguous 
and difficult to classify. 
A substantial proportion of offenders whose reports contained an 
intelligence assessment were of below average intelligence and between 
10 to 20% were diagnosed as subnormal. These figures would probably not 
relate to the remand group as a whole, for psychiatrists may omit to 
mention intelligence where it is thought to be average. 
Responses to the questionnaire indicate that judges and magistrates 
value the inclusion of a statement of the offender's intelligence in a 
report. Most are satisfied with an estimate rather than a psychometrica1ly 
analysed assessment. (6J) Sentencers should be careful not to place too 
much reliance upon intelligence tests, for there is convincing evidence 
that I.Q. tests are not scientifically valid, and that they are socially 
and racially discriminatory {Sussman, 1974). 
(63) See Appendix A. Eight affirmative responses to the questionnaire, 
question no.15, with no negative responses indicated a preference for a 
prognosis in terms of recidivism, treatment and dangerousness. 
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TABLE 18 
PROGNOSIS IN TERMS OF RECIDIVISM 
PROGNOSES 
GROUP 
1969-1970 1974-1975 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
MALES 20 52 
FEMALES 1 8 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES 7 24 
Table 18 shows that there was a dramatic increase in the 1974-1975 
group in the number of reports in which a prediction of the offender's 
criminal behaviour was given.(64) The accuracy of the prognoses in the 
1969-1970 group will be discussed later. (6S) 
Assessments of dangerousness were sometimes made, and in the court 
of petty sessions group these were invariably in respect of male sexual 
offenders. 
(64) This was very highly significant for the court of petty sessions 
x2 = 21.24, d.f. = 1, p > .001. 
(65) Post., p.98. 
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TABLE 19: PSYCHIATRIC DISPOSITION OF OFFENDERS REMANDED FOR PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS 
-f 
:c 
GROUP HOSPITAL PROBATION TRANSFER GUARDIAN- PRISON A.D.D.A7 SUSP. SENT. RETURN TOTAL % OF REMAND : 
ORDERS & PSYCH.T? DIRECTION SHIP THEN b & IN-PAT.d TO RDHe GROUP IN WHICH ~ 
GUARDIAN. & OTHER TREATMENT ORDERED rt; 
COURT OF PETTY 
SESSIONS 
MALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
FEMALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
FEMALES: 1969-70 
1974-75 
8 
l 
6 
1 
4 
5 
l 
28 
60 
l 
11 
3 
5 
2 
3 
5 
2 
2 l l 
Probation & psych. T? = probation and psychiatric treatment; 
10 
2 l 
3 
2 
l 
42 
78 
7 
12 
10 
17 
l 
2 
guardian? = guardianship; A.D.D.A: = order under the Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act; 
Susp. sent. & in-pat? = suspended sentence with a condition as to in-patient psychiatric treatment. 
e . ROH ~Royal Derwent Hospital. 
27.4 
53.8 
23.3 
46 .1 
25.0 
29.8 
50.0 
100. 0 
-0 
z 
0 
"'TI 
-f 
:c 
n"1 
("") 
0 
c 
:::0 
-f 
O'I 
l..O 
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TABLE 20 
COURT~ RESPONSE TO TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 
HOSPITAL PROBATION & OTHER TOTAL 0/ /0 
GROUP ORDER TREATMENT TREATMENT 
Ra Fb R F R F R F 
COURT OF PETTY 
SESSIONS 
MALES: 1969-70 11 8 9 4 16 12 36 24 66.6 
1974-75 8 l 13 11 70 57 91 69 75.8 
FEMALES: 1969-70 6 6 2 1 - - 8 7 87.5 
1974-75 l 1 5 4 10 7 16 12 75.0 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES: 1969-70 4 4 1 l 5 5 10 10 100.0 
1974-75 6 5 l l 15 10 22 16 72.7 
aR = recommendation; bF = followed. 
In assessing the influence of recorrmendations on the decision of 
the courts some difficulties were encountered. 
The first was the problem inherent in this type of study: that it 
is not possible to say categorically, when the decision of the court 
corresponds with the recommendation made, that the recommendation wasfollo.-.ed. 
Where the court's decision was the same as the psychiatrist's recommendation, 
the psychiatrist may have anticipated the court's decision by making a · 
recommendation thought to be the one desired. Alternatively the 
recommendation may have had no bearing on the court's decision. The 
limitations of the data in Tables 19 and 20 are realized, and it is 
conceded that it can only be said that in a certain proportion of cases 
the recommendations appeared to be followed or were not followed. To 
obtain a more accurate result a more sophisticated research design would 
be necessary. (66 ) 
(66) See Hogarth (1971) at p.249. 
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A second difficulty was encountered in consistently representing 
in tabular form the cases in which recommendations appeared to be followed. 
Frequently the recommendations involved more than one factor, for example 
Saturday work and psychiatric treatment, and only part of the recommendation 
appeared to be followed. The following rules were adopted. If a hospital 
order was recommended and the court imposed a sentence of imprisonment with a 
recommendation for a transfer direction, this was counted as not followed. 
If probation was recommended and probation and psychiatric treatment 
ordered this was counted as a sentencing recommendation which was not 
followed. If probation and psychiatric treatment was recommended but 
probation only imposed, this was counted as a treatment recommendation -
which was not followed. If Saturday work, probation and treatment was 
recorrmended but probation and treatment imposed, this was counted as a 
treatment reconmendation which was followed. 
Table 19 shows the courts• treatment decisions, and Table 20 
the treatment recommendations and the cases in which they appear to have 
been followed. 
The decline in· the number of hospital orders made by the court 
of petty sessions in respect of males and females in 1974-1975 was 
significant. (67 ) Although there were less recommendations this was 
not statistically significant. This shows a change in attitude over 
the relevant years to a reluctance to make hospital orders and a 
preference for sentences of imprisonment with recommendations for transfer 
directions or psychiatric treatment as conditions of probation. Of the 
cases in 1969-1970 where the magistrates declined to make hospital 
orders, one offender was sentenced to imprisonment with a recommendation 
(67) x2 = s.24, d.f. = 1, .02 > P > .os. 
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for transfer, and one was released on probation with a condition as to 
psychiatric treatment. In the 1974-1975 period, of the sentences where 
magistrates declined to make hospital orders, five were sentenced to 
imprisonment ~ith recommendations for transfer and one was released on 
probatioD on the condition he seek admission to the Royal Derwent 
Hospital and remain there for one year unless released before. 
The figures for 1974 and 1975 would seem to indicate that for 
magistrates courts the hospital order is virtually redundant. The 
comments of magistrate R.C. Wood previously quoted demonstrate the 
dissatisfaction felt with hospital orders. Other magistrates share 
similar sentiments. (6B) 
The position with regard to hospital orders is not the same in 
England. There magistrates and judges almost invariably make a hospital 
order where there is medical evidence in support of one. this general 
readiness to make hospital orders was testified to the Butler Committee 
by members of the Bar Council, the Law Society and by medical witnesses~ 
Examples of the sort of case where hospital orders might not be made were 
where the judge or magistrate was not satisfied that the hospital in 
question was secure enough for a particularly dangerous offender, or where 
the doctor offering treatment held out no solid hope of treatment 
succeeding or of retaining the offender if it did, or where the offender 
challenged the medical evidence and asked for a prison sentence. 
Nevertheless the Corrmittee was also informed of the dissatisfaction felt 
by some courts at the almost immediate discharge of some offenders who 
(68) In response to question 25 of the questionnaire 1 3 magistrates replied 
"No" to the question 'Do you think hospital orders are a satisfactory means 
of dealing with mentally disordered offenders'. Only one judge and one 
magistrate replied with an unqualified "Yes". One judge replied in the 
affirma ti "·e adding 'until something better can be devised'; another judge 
said the results are far from satisfactory and a third said he had no 
opinion because he did not know the results of them. 
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would have received a punitive custodial sentence had the court not 
accepted medical recommendations in favour of a hospital order (1975. 
Cmnd. 6244, para. 13.10). Further support of the re~diness of magistrates 
to accept recorrmendations for hospital orders emerged from Gibbens' study 
(1977), which reported that in Wessex in the relevant period all but one 
of the 17 recommendations for hospital orders were accepted. 
The decline in the use of hospital orders by magistrates by no 
means reflected a decline in the ordering of in-patient psychiatric care. 
In 1974 and 1975, in addition to 10 orders under the Alcohol and Drug 
Dependency Act, and reconunending that the Attorney-General make a transfer 
direction in five cases, the court specifically ordered in-patient 
treatment as a condition of probation in seven cases, four of which were 
diagnosed as suffering from mental illness, two from personality disorders, 
and one from alcoholism. In another case a subnormal offender was 
remanded on bail on condition he enter the Royal Derwent Hospital as a 
voluntary patient. He was subsequently discharged from bail and no 
further action was taken. Another offende~ who had already entered a 
plea of guilty, was said by the psychiatrist to be unfit to plead and 
to require treatment. The matter was adjourned sine die. 
The highly significant increase in the number of cases in which 
the court of petty sessions ordered treatment in 1974 and 1975 was 
paralleled by the increase in treatment recommendations previously 
mentioned. 
In contrast to the court of petty sessions, the Supreme Court 
figures show the number of hospital orders over the two periods remained 
constant, and a greater tende,1cy than the court of petty sessions to 
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follow recommendations for them. r7oJ At least part of the explanation 
for this is the wider powers judges have in relation to hospital orders. (7lJ 
Nevertheless judges recommended transfer directions in some four cases, 
as Table 19 shows, but in only one of these had the psychiatrist 
recommended a hospital order. In two cases the psychiatrist had 
recommended gaolwith a recommendation for transfer, and in the other case 
treatment was recommended without specifying what form it should take. 
The reason why judges impose gaol sentences with recommendations 
for transfer seems difficult to explain. Transfer directions and hospital 
orders have the same prerequisites, except that the Attorney-General is 
expressly required to take 11 the public i_nterest" into account as well as 
"all the circumstances" in formulating his opinion as to the expediency 
of the order. If there are cases in which the court feels there is a risk 
of the offender committing further violent offences after being 
discharged prematurely from hospital by an optimistic or careless 
psychiatrist, then control over discharge can be retained by a hospital 
order and a restriction order. If there are cases where the necessity 
for retribution requires a custodial sentence this can be achieved by 
a hospital order coupled with a sentence of imprisonment. The position 
is rather different in England where the higher courts have no power to 
impose a sentence of imprisonment and a hospital order, and a gaol term 
With a recommendation for transfer is seen as a real alternative. In 
R. v. Morrisr72J Lord Chief Justice Parker said, 
Of course there may be cases where, although there is a substantial 
impairment of responsibility, the prisoner is shown on the 
particular facts of the case nevertheless to have some responsibility 
(70) Testing by Z.'isher' s Exact Test for both 1969-1970 and .l974-1975 there 
was no significant difference between the responses of the Supreme Court 
and the court of petty sessions. 
(71) Ante., p.13. 
(72) (1961) 45 er. App. Rep. 185. 
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for the act he has done, for which he must be punished, and in 
such a case, although, as the court reads the sentence imposed 
by the learned judge, this was not such a case, it would be proper 
to give imprisonment, allowing the Secretary of State to exercise 
his powers under Section 72 in order that any necessary mental 
treatment should be.:given. _; 
TABLE 21 
COURTS~ RESPONSE TO SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS 
GAOL SATURDAY WORK PROBATION OTHER TOTAL % FOLLOWED 
GROUP 
Ra Fb R F R F R F R F 
COURT OF PETTY 
SESSIONS 
MALES: 1969-70 3 2 l - 19 13 10 2 33 17 51.5 
1974-75 ll 9 5 3 4 3 - - 20 15 75.0 
FEMALES: 1969-70 l - - - 2 2 l 1 4 3 75.0 
1974-75 l - - - l 1 1 l 3 2 66.6 
SUPREME COURT 
MALES: 1969-70 3 3 - - 1 - - - 4 3 75.0 
1974-75 7 7 l - l l - - 9 8 88.9 
aR = recommendation; bF = followed 
Tables 20 and 21 show the relationship between psychiatric treatment 
and sentencing recommendations and the decision of the court. Subject 
to the reservations mentioned it would seem that the courts appear to follow 
recommendations in the majority of cases, and to follow treatment 
recommendations rather more than sentencing recommendations. The 
substantial proportion of cases in which the decisions did not correspond 
with the recommendations tends to refute the allegation that is sometimes 
made that courts are not sufficiently sceptical of psychiatrists and 
improperly delegate their sentencing responsibilities to them (Hakeem, 1958; 
and Suarez, 1967) . 
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Questions 11 and 12 of the questionnaire were designed to throw 
more light upon the impact of psychiatric reports. The answers to 
question 12 are reproduced below in tabular form. 
\~ 
TABLE 22 
THE NUMBER OF MAGISTRATES AND JUDGES WHO REACH A DIFFERENT 
DECISION BECAUSE OF PSYCHIATRISTS' RECOMMENDATIONS 
Always Usually Sometimes Rarely Never 
Treatment Recommendations l 4 l 1 l 
Sentencing Recommendations 3 2 2 l 
This table shows that most of the judges and magistrates responding 
to the questionnaire reach a different decision because of a recommendation 
for treatment in a psychiatric report. Their responses indicate they 
assess the influence of sentencing recommendations as of smaller impact, 
which is borne out by the objective data. 
The value of psychiatric reports is very difficult to assess 
objectively. If one assumes, in the proportion of cases in which 
recommendations were made and appeared to be followed, that the reports 
were useful, this omits from consideration other reports which were 
nevertheless perhaps useful. Such cases can be readily imagined. For 
example, a negative report (without recommendations) may enable a court 
to sentence without feeling guilt; or a report may be helpful and 
even illuminating quite apart from the recommendations. 
One rather disturbing ·matter emerged from the analysis of the 
relationship between psychiatric recommendations for treatment and the 
decision of the courts. This was the fact that in some cases psychiatric 
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treatment was made a condition of probation although the psychiatric 
report contained no recommendation for treatment. This was done only 
in cases of male offenders. 
TABLE 23 
PROBATION ORDERS AND PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT WITHOUT RECOMMENDATIONS 
GROUP NUMBER OF OFFENDERS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
1969-1970 12 
1974-1975 7 
SUPREME COURT 
1969-1970 l 
1974-1975 3 
The court's response to psychiatric recommendations can be 
compared with figures from other jurisdictions. In most of the reported 
British studies read, the courts appear to decline to follow psychiatric 
recolTlllendations in only about 10% of cases. De Berker (1960) reported 
that in 92% of the cases where "special action'' was suggested, the courts 
appeared to follow that recommendation. Sparks (1966) found the courts 
followed definite recommendations for mental treatment in 90% of the 
cases in which recommendations were made, and in just under half of the 
remainder the offender was known to have had treatment arranged informally 
for him. Gibbens and Dell (1971') found that in all but 9% magistrates 
acted upon the advice offered, and in this minority it was normally clear 
that something had prevented the advice being followed; for example, 
the offender had refused to be put on probation with medical treatment. 
Bearcroft (1965) found recommendations for admission to hospital and 
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treatment were accepted in 92% and Binns et al. (1969) found recommenda-
tions for psychiatric treatment were accepted in 28/42 cases. More 
recently Woodside (1976) has reported that treatment recommendations 
were accepted 48/66 cases in Edinburgh, and Gibbens et al. (1977) found 
that recommendations for probation with a condition of psychiatric treatment 
were accepted by Wessex magistrates in 69% of cases, but hospital orders 
were acted upon in 16/17 cases (pp.67-68). 
In the U.S. the following figures have been reported. In North 
Carolina the courts adopted recommendations of the diagnostic study group 
in 75% of 600 cases studied over 3 years (Smith, 1971). Judicial 
disposition agreed with the psychiatric recommendations of the 
Philadelphia State Maximum Security Forensic Diagnostic Hospital in 
97.7%; when they differed they favoured stricter security rather than 
leniency (Jablon et al., 1970). 
(8) COMPARATIVE USE OF PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS BY INDIVIDUAL JUDGES 
AND MAGISTRATES 
(i) The Problem of Sentencing Disparity 
11A universal criticism of sentencing is the apparent disparity of 
sentences imposed by different judges for cases which do not appear to 
be substantially different from one another. 11 (Hogarth, 1971, p.6). 
There is considerable value placed upon consistency in the way 
different judges and magistrates approach sentencing tasks. Unwarranted 
inconsistencies of sentencing arouse disrespect for the law by the public 
at large and are likely to prejudice the chances of an individual 
offender benefiting from a sentence. If an offender believes he is the 
victim of an unusually harsh sentence, a sense of hostility and disrespeet 
for the law is likely to impede attempts of the law to rehabilitate him. 
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Complete uniformity is unrealizable and problems of uniformity 
seem more apparent where great importance is attached to considering 
the interests of individual offenders. Perhaps the ideal should be, as , 
Hood (1962) suggests, "equality of consideration".r73J In roughly similar 
situations the courts ought to consider similar factors and have similar 
reasons for selecting particular forms of sentence. In the use of 
psychiatric reports as in other aspects of the sentencing process, the 
same equality of consideration is desirable. Moreover~ if there is a 
lack of uniformity in the type and amount of presentence information judges 
use, this will contribute to disparities in the ultimate sentencing 
decision. Such an ideal is difficult to achieve not only because of 
disagreement about what factors are relevant for the same aims of the 
penal process, but because of the lack of consensus about the aims of the 
penal process which means that different factors are relevant to different 
aims. 
That disparity does exist in sentencing practice has been 
demonstrated overwhelmingly in many countries.r74J That magistrates also 
differ in the extent they make use of psychiatric reports and the way 
they deal with mentally abnormal offenders has also been demonstrated 
{Sparks, 1966). As a result of a survey of recidivist mentally abnormal 
offenders, Boehringer and McCabe {1973) concluded that the system of 
criminal justice in London magistrates' courts operates like a conveyor 
belt with little flexibility or individuality. This they said applies 
to the sentencing process, the decision to remand for psychiatric reports, 
and the adequacy of reports when they are made. 
(73) The use of this term may avoid facing the implications of the belief 
that justice means like.cases should be dealt with alike. See 
Bottomley (1973) pp.130-133. . 
(74) For example, Hood (1962) found differences in imprisonment rates 
of English magistrates could not be explained by the different offenders 
appearing at each court, and E. Gr8en (1961) found sentencing disparities 
between individual judges in the Philadelphia Court of Quarter Sessions. 
In Tasmania, Daunton-Fear (1961) reported sentencing disparities between 
judges of the Supreme Court. 
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Lack of uniformity in sentencing has been shovm to be unexplained 
by differences in the kinds of cases dealt with (i.e. in the type of 
offenders and offences). By empirical research, Hogarth (1971) has 
created a "phenomenological model" of sentencing behaviour which explains 
the decision process in sentencing and which could explain over 50 per 
cent of the variation in sentencing. He showed that there are various 
elements in sentencing behaviour unrelated to the offender or the 
offence which make an independent contribution to it. These elements 
include the magistrates' penal philosophy and judicial attitudes, the 
way in which they define the operative legal and social constraints in 
their environment, and the subtlety of their thought processes in 
handling information. Variationsin these elements were shown to be 
associated with variations in judicial behaviour. In contrast, variations 
in objectively defined facts, relating to the offender and offence, were 
shown to account for only 9% of the total variation in sentencing 
practice. Other sentencing studies, comprehensively reviewed by 
Bottomley (1973) collectively show that three elements, (i) social 
background of individual magistrates and judges, (ii) the characteristics 
of the communities in which the courts are situated and (iii} the extent 
and type of information available contribute to sentencing disparity 
(pp.143-170). 
Hogarth's data also showed that magistrates interpret cases, the· 
law, cause of crime and the expectation of others in ways which 
minimize inconsistency. Enormous variation was found to exist in penal 
philosophies of magistrates, but it appeared that most individual 
magistrates had a fairly consistent and coherent set of beliefs 
supporting their personal penal philosophy. For example a positive 
relationship was found to exist between belief in reformation and the 
proportion of offenders perceived as mentally ill, and a negative 
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association between amount of mental illness perceived and belief in 
general deterrence and retribution (Hogarth, 1971, p.85). A magistrate 
who believes in reformation is more likely to believe that offenders 
are mentally ill and need treatment than one whose philosophy is oriented 
towards punishment. 
Certain relationships were found to exist between social 
characteristics and attitudes and beliefs. Magistrates with professional 
family backgrounds attached less weight to 'justice' and deterrence and 
more weight to reformation. They believe that a large proportion of 
offenders are mentally ill and they have a more positive attitude towards 
parole and other correctional methods. In contrast, magistrates from 
working class backgrounds appear to be rather more punitive in their 
attitudes and beliefs (p.212). Previous association with the prosecution 
side of the administration of justice was shown to be associated with the 
belief that fewer offenders are mentally ill, and length of experience 
on the bench tends to be associated with a greater likelihood to attach 
some value to psychiatry and psychology. Magistrates with heavy workloads 
are likely to restrict the use of psychiatric reports and to have 
negative attitudes towards psychiatrists (chap.13). 
Hogarth also produced data which showed that differences in 
information used in the process of coming to decisions are closely 
associated with penal philosophy and attitudes. He found 62/71 
magistrates would use psychiatric reports when fitness to stand trial 
was in issue; 49/71 would request reports when there was evidence of 
emotional disturbance that might require psychiatric treatment, and 
24/71 would request reports when the offence was committed in a bizarre 
or unusual way or there were other circumstances requiring an explanation. 
The data showed that those magistrates who made more frequent use of 
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psychiatric reports had a penal philosophy and attitudes showing more 
Concern for the treatment of offenders than those who restricted the 
use of reports to cases where fitness to plead was in issue (chap.14). 
This present study does not attempt to explain any disparity in 
the use of psychiatric reports by judges and magistrates. The 
complexity of the questions involved in understanding and comparing 
judicial decisions is realized, and the unsophisticated nature of the 
present study is conceded. It merely attempts to ascertain if there is 
any apparent disparity in the proportion of offenders remanded by judges 
and magistrates, in the mental health of those remanded, their· 
suitability for treatment, and in the proportion of cases in which 
reconmendations for treatment are followed. The optimum number of 
offenders for remands for psychiatric reports cannot be accurately 
ascertained, but if some judges or magistrates remand too few or too 
many offenders this could be revealed, and if some magistrates or judges 
invariably follow or disregard recommendations this too will be revealed. 
This study has concentrated on a comparison of the court1 decisions, 
and no attempt was made to examine in detail variability in the recom-
mendations made by psychiatrists. It is recognized that disparity in 
this area is one of the contributing factors to judicial var,iability. f75J 
In this study it was found that one psychiatrist in each of the two 
periods was responsible for a great majority of the reports prepared, 
but because of the time lapse their reports could not be validly 
compared in this context, nor did the data collected provide sufficient 
information to make a comparison possible within each period. 
(75) Emp.irical research in <:alifornia has showed variability in the 
recommendations made by psychiatrists and psycho.Iogists which could not 
be related to offenders' characteristics. It was attributed to differences 
among decision ma~ers in attitudes towards sentencing (Holland & Hol~, 1976). 
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I ThBLE 24. REMAND RATES DF MAGISTRATES AND IMPl',CT OF TREATr-iENT RECOMMENDATIQ:j.) ~,.:,' ~ '==::-·;DERS 1969-1970. 
-
~ . 
MAGISTRATE TOTAL CASES NO. REMANDEDa NORH-'-L MENTAL PSYCHOPATHY 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
HEARD DISORDER 
PPTY 245 20 (8%) 
SEX 13 8 (62%) 
A ASSAULT 70 6 (9~~ OTHER 271 6 {2% 
TOTAL 599 40 (6.7%) 8 (20%) 14 (35%) 2 ( 5%) 
PPTY 170 12 (7%) 
SEX 14 14 (100%) 
B ASSAULT 36 6 (17%) 
OTHER 237 10 (4%) 
TOTAL 457 42 {9%) 16 (38%) 16 (38%) 3 ( 7%) 
PPTY 130 11 (8%) 
SEX 11 4 (36%) 
c ASSAULT 68 7 (10%) 
OTHER 200 4 {2%) 
TOTAL 409 26 (6%) 8 (31%) 9 (34.6%) 3 (11:5%) 
PPTY 136 16 (12%) 
SEX 9 6 (66%} 
D ASSAULT 47 9 (19%) 
OTHER 194 8 (4%) 
TOTAL 386 39 (10%) 9 (23%) 17 (43.6%) : (12.8%) 
PPTY 57 3 (5%) 
SEX 5 l (20%) 
E ASSAULT 20 l (5%) 
(mhcellan- OTHER 68 l (4%) 
eous group) TOTAL 150 6 (4%) l (17%) l ( 17%) -
. 
TOTALS 2001 153 (7 .6%) 42 57 13 
a The percent in parenthesis relates to the proportion of offenders 
remanded by each magistrate for each type of offence. 
OTH:OR NO TREATMENT 
;:::Rso:;,;uTY DIAGNOSIS REC011MENDAT IONS 
FOLLOWED 
I 
I 5/9 
(55.5%) 
14 (35%) 2 
l 
I 6/10 
I (60%) 7 (17%) -
I 
I 4/5 {80%) 6 (23%) 
-
8/11 
(81 .8%) 
I 
(, ( 15%) 2 
I 
I 
I 
l l /1 (l 00%) 
I ~ (66%) -
I 37 4 24/36 
- 84 -
Tl\!lLE ?5: REf·tl\ND RATES OF MAGISTRATES AND IMPACT OF IREATMENT RECOMMENDATIOllS. .''.~-: :=;:~;,orns 1974-1975. 
I 
MAGISTRATE TOTJll CASES NO. REMANDEDa NORMAL MENTAL PSYCHOPATHY · 
llLO.rlD DISORDER 
PPTY 214 9 (4.2%) 
SEX 11 5 (45%} 
A ASSAULT 58 7 12%) 
OTHER 345 8 (2.3%) 
TOTAL L2o 29 (4.6%) 2 16 
PPTY 135 10 (7.4%) 
SEX 14 6 (42.8) 
B ASSAULT 41 :T (2.4%~ 
OTHER 312 1 ( .3% 
TOTAL 502 TB (3.5%) 3 8 
PPTY 84 8 (9.5%) 
SEX 6 6 {100%} 
c 'ASSAULT 32 2 (6.2%) 
OTHER 170 5 (2.9%) 
TOTAL 292 21 (7 .1%) 2 9 
PPTY 109 19 (17.4%) 
SEX 12 6 (50%) 
D ASSAULT 60 6 (10%) 
OTHER 229 5 (2.2%) 
TOTAL 4iO 36 (8.8%) 3 17 
PPTY 118 9 (7.6%} 
SEX 11 6 (54.5%) 
E ASSAULT 60 1 (1.6%) 
OTHER 182 1 ( . 5%) 
TOTAL m T7 (4.6%) 3 6 
PPTY 113 6 (5.3%) 
SEX 9 7 (77.7%) 
F ASSAULT 52 3 (5.7%) 
OTHER 179 2(1.1%) 
TOTAL 353 TB (5.0%) - 7 
PPTY 67 2 (2.9%) 
G SEX 9 2 (22.2%) 
(miscellan- ASSAULT 21 1 (4.7%) 
eous group) OTHER 137 2 ( 1.4%) 
TOTAL 234 6 {2.5%) - 2 
TOTALS 2790 145 (5.1%) 13 65 
aThe percent in parenthesis relates to the proportion of offenders 
remanded by each magistrate for each type of offence. 
' 
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10 
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7 
-
7 
-
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6 
-
-· .. 
9 • l 
2 -
52 l 
TREATMENT 
RECO~:~lENDAT ION~ 
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17/22 
(77 .3%) 
7/11 
(63.6%) 
7/11 . 
(63.6%) 
19/22 
(86.3%} 
7/11 
(63.6%) 
11/12 
(91. 7%) 
-
1/2 
(50%) 
69/91 (75.8%) 
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(ii} Magistrates 
The data from tables 24 and 25 show that there were no significant 
differences in the remand rates of the magistrates in the Hobart courts of 
petty sessions in 1969 and 1970 or 1974 and 1975. All magistrates 
remanded between 6.4 per cent and 10.l per cent in 1969-1970 and between 
3.5 per cent and 8.8 per cent in the later period. Magistrate .D remanded 
the greatest proportion in each period. Magistrate B was the only 
magistrate to remand a significantly different number of offen9~.r~;:.over 
the two periods. r76J 1 
An analysis of the type of offence committed by the offenders 
remanded by each magistrate showed a pattern of uniformity rather than 
disparity. In 1969-1970 each magistrate remanded sexual offenders, 
offenders against the person and offenders against property in descending 
proportions. In 1974 and 1975 the pattern was not quite so consistent, 
some magistrates remanding a higher proportion of property offenders 
than offenders convicted of assault. 
The numbers of offenders remanded by each magistrate in the four 
diagnostic groups are too small to ascertain if there are any significant 
differences. But it is interesting to note that magistrate D, who 
remanded a higher proportion of offenders than the others, remanded a 
smaller proportion of nonnal offenders in both periods than most, nor 
did he remand the smallest proportion of offenders who were considered by 
the reporting psychiatrist to be in need of treatment. It cannot be said 
then, that he should have adopted a more discriminating policy in his 
selection of candidates for psychiatric reports. 
(76) x2 = 12.92, d.f. = 1, p < .001. 
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Magistrates' response to treatment recommendations did not differ 
to any substantial degree, and all but one magistrate ordered treatment 
as a condition of probation although it was not recommended. Of the 
five magistrates who received recommendations for hospital o~ders, four 
decided not to make the order in at least one case, two of whom were 
known to have pointed out the drawbacks of hospital orders in certain 
cases in their comments on passing sentence. Three of the four magistrates 
responding to the questionnaire answered question 25: 1100 you think 
hospital orders are a satisfactory means of de~ling with mentally 
disordered offenders?", in the negative. 
Thus dissatisfaction with the hospital order is shared by almost all 
magistrates. 
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TABLE 26: REMAND RATES OF MAGISTRATES AND IMPACT OF TREATMENT REC1J~~"lENDATIONS. FEMALE OFFENDERS 1969-1970 
TOTAL CASES NO. REMANDEDa NORM/\L MENTAL PSYCHOPATHY OTHER NO TREATMENT 
HEARD DISORDER PE.~SOW.LITY DIAGNOSIS RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOLLOWED 
SHOPLIFTING 24 2 
OTHER PPTY 29 7 
ASSAULT 1 - 2 1 2 5 5 2/2 
OTHER 11 2 
TOTAL 65 1T (16.9%) 
SHOPLIFTING 20 5 
OTHER PPTY 11 5 
ASSAULT 2 - 6 4 1 l 1 4/5 
OTHER 11 2 
TOTAL 44 12 (27.2%) 
SHOPLIFTING 9 
- '' 
OTHER PPTY 4 1 1 l l - -ASSAULT 4 l 1/1 
OTHER 8 1 
TOTAL 25 3 (12%) 
SHOPLIFTING 14 2 
OTHER PPTY 12 1 3 l 
- - -
No treatment 
ASSAULT 2 l recormiended 
OTHER 8 
-
TOTAL 36 4 (11.1%) 
170 30 (17.6%) 12 7 4 ~ ! 6 6 7/8 (87.5%) 
I 
I 
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MAGISTRATE NO. RE~ll\NDEDa PSYCHOPATHY I -, TOTAL CASES 
TABLE 27: REMAND RATES OF MAGISTRATES AND IMPACT OF TREATMENT RECOMMENDA TIO~S. FEMALE OFFENDERS 1574-1975. I 
NORMAL MENTAL 
HEARD DISORDER 
SHOPLIFTING 64 l l 
-OTHER PPTY 19 3 
A ASSAULT 4 l 
OTHER 28 
TOTAL m 5 (4.3%) I 
SHOPLIFTING 30 4 
- ·5 OTHER PPTY 4 2 
B ASSAULT 
-
OTHER 15 
TOTAL 49 6 (12.2%) 
SHOPLIFTING 25 4 
-
1 
OTHER PPTY 8 1 
c ASSAULT 2 
OTHER 24 
TOTAL 59 5 (8.5%) 
SHOPLIFTING 21 1 
- 1 OTHER PPTY 6 1 
D ASSAULT 3 
OTHER 12 l 
TOTAL 42 3 (7 .1%) 
SHOPLIFTING 27 l 
-
2 
OTHER PPTY 10 l 
E ASSAULT l 
OTHER , 15 
'DTAL 53 2 (3.8%) 
SflOPL IFTING 21 2 1 
OTHER PPTY 5 1 
F ASSAULT 5 
OTHER 6 
TOTAL 37 2 (5.4%) 
SHOPLIFTING 17 l 
-OTHER PPTY 3 l 1 
G ASSAULT 
-
OTHER 7 l 
TOTAL 27 3 (11.1%) 
TOTALS 382 26 (6.8%) 3 10 
a - The percentage rn parenthesis md1cates the proportion of offenders 
remanded by each magistrate. 
OTHER 
••• r~~SONALITY 
2 l 
-
- -
-
3 
I 
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1 l 
I 
4 6 
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DIAGNOSIS RECOt·tf.lENDAT IONS 
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1/2 
1 1/3 
1 3/3 
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The fact that magistrates remanded significantly more females than 
males in the earlier period has already been dij:scussed. (77J Tables 26 
and 27 show that magistrate B in particular remanded high proportions 
of females, and although he remanded only half as many in 1974-1975 as he 
did in the first period, it was a considerably larger proportion than his 
male remanded offenders. Interestingly all other magistrates remanded 
fairly equal proportions of males and females in 1974-1975. Magistrate 
D, who remanded the highest proportion of males in both periods,' alone 
remanded very similar proportions of males and females in both periods. 
(77) Ante., p.39. 
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TABLE 28: REMl\ND RATES OF JUDGES AND IMPACT OF TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS. MALE: c;:-=::·.:::~s l 969-1970. 
JUDGES TOTAL CASES NO. REMANDEDa NORMAL MENTAL PSYCHOPATHY i OTHE:1' NO 
HEARD DISORDER ! PERsor:.:,uTY DIAGNOSIS 
I 
PROPERTY 65 2 (3.1%) I SEX 29 5 (17.2%) A VIOLENC~ 14 2 (14.3%) OTHER 4 l (25.0%) 
TOTAL m TO (8.9%) 2 1 2 4 l 
PROPERTY 59 6 (10.2%) 
SEX 15 l (6.7%) 
B VIOLENCE 18 l (5.5%) 
OTHER 2 -
TOTAL 94 8 (8.5%) l 5 - 2 -
PROPERTY 88 l (l.1%~ 
SEX 21 2 (9.5% 
c VIOLENCE 12 2 (16.7%) 
OTHER . 6 - 2 1 2 -
TOTAL ill 5 (3.9%) 
PROPERTY 58 3 (5.2%) 
\ SEX lO l (10.0%) D VIOLENCE 15 -
OTHER 3 l (33.3%~ 2 1 1 l l -
TOTAL 86 5 (5.8% 
PROPERTY 95 4 (4.2%) 
SEX 26 8 (30.7%) 
E VIOLENCE 12 -
OTHElt - -
TOTAL 133 12 (8.3%) 2 4 1 3 l 
TOTALS 552 40 (7.2%) 7 13 5 12 2 
a - The percentage in parenthes1s indicates the proportion of offenders 
remanded by each judge for each type of offence. · 
TREATMENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOLLOWED 
l/l 
3/3 
l/l 
2/2 
3/3 
10/10 
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TABLE 29: REMAND RATES OF JUDGES AND IMPACT OF TREATMENT RECOMMENDATIONS. !>'~LE OFi'.;;1'.)Ei=:S 1974-1975 · 
JUDGES TOTAL CASES NO. REMANDEDa NORMAL llENTAL PSYCHOPATHY -: OTHEi\ TREATMENT 
HEARD DISORDER i PERSONALITY RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWED 
PROPERTY 54 l (l. 9%) 
SEX 21 4 (19.9%) 
A VIOLENCE 12 -
OTHER 6 -
TOTAL 93 5 (5.4%) l l 2 l l/l 
PROPERTY 79 2 (2.6%) 
SEX 24 -
B VIOLENCE 24 3 (12.8%) 
OTHER 7 -
. TOTAL 134 5 (3.7%) 2 l l l -
PROPERTY 70 4 (5.8%) 
SEX 19 5 (26.8%) 
c VIOLENCE 16 2 (12.8%) 
OTHER 10 -
TOTAL ITT IT (9.6%) 5 3 2 l 3/4 
PROPERTY 71 9 (12.9%) 
SEX 22 6 (27.8%) 
D VIOLENCE 32 7 (21. 9%) 
OTHER 14 - . 
TOTAL m 22 (15.8%) 4 7 8 3 5/8 
PROPERTY 87 5 (5.~~ I I SEX 19 7 (36.8% . 
E VIOLENCE 39 2 (5.2%) 
OTHER° 9 
-
TOTAL 154 IT (9.0%) - 9 4 l 7/9 
TOTALS 635 57 (9.0%) 12 21 17 7 16/22 
a - The percentage in parenthesis indicates the proportion of offenders 
remanded by each judge for each type of offence. · 
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{iii} Judges 
The numbers of offenders in Tables 28 and 29 are too small to enable 
clear comparison between the judges. Nevertheless some obvious .facts 
emerge from the data. First, as is true of the magistrates, all judges 
remand some offenders for psychiatric reports. Of the three Judges A, 
B and C who are represented in both Tables 28 and 29, Judges A and C 
remanded a marginally greater proportion of offenders in 1974-1975, but 
Judge B remanded a smaller proportion. Judge D, a new appointment, 
remanded significantly more than Judge B,f7BJ and it is his presence 
which accounts for the overall increase in proportion of offenders 
remanded in 1974-1975. 
Although the numbers are small, an analysis of the type of offence 
co111T1itted by the offenders remanded by each judge tends to reinforce the 
view that the type of offence is significantly related to the decision to 
remand. Most judges remanded a greater proportion of sexual offenders 
than other offenders, and fewer property offenders than any other 
category. Judge E, who retired before 1974, remanded a high proportion 
of property offenders in 1969-1970, which indicates some difference in his 
attitudes in relation to the remand of offenders for psychiatric reports. 
Tables 28 and 29 show nothing noteworthy in the numbers of offenders 
in diagnostic groups, nor in the reaction of individual judges to 
psychiatric reports. Judge D, who remanded 15.8% of offenders in 1974-
1975, did not remand the highest proportion of normal offenders, nor the 
smallest proportion of offenders who received treatment recommendations. 
(78J x2 = 8.2, d.f. = 1, .01 > p > .001. 
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The decision to remand an offender for a psychiatric report is a 
matter of judicial discretion uninstructed by guidelines or the results 
of empirical research. A personal element is inevitable. Whether a 
recommendation in a report is followed is again and necessarily a matter 
for the presiding judge or magistrate. Both decisions are likely to be 
affected by differences in penal philosophy, attitudes and the magistrate's 
or judge's perception of the legal and social constraints upon his 
behaviour, as well as his cognitive complexity. In particular the degree 
to which magistrates and judges are influenced by presentence information 
depends upon the amount of confidence in the communicator of it. Some 
differences between remand rates and an individual judge or magistrate's 
reaction to reports are bound to exist, and are to some extent 
unavoidable in the present circumstances. It is pleasing that this 
research study indicates that the differences in Hobart magistrates' courts 
and in the Supreme Court are not enormous. All magistrates and judges 
rely upon the expert help a psychiatrist can offer. The results of this 
study indicate that no judge or magistrate makes too much ·use of reports 
nor follows recommendations blindly. 
Hogarth's (1971) findings that length of experience on the bench 
tends to be associated with a greater likelihood to attach some value to 
psychiatry, and that heavy workloads are likely to restrict the use of 
psychiatric reports and to create negative attitudes towards psychiatrists, 
are not supported by this study. 
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(9) FOLLOW-UP. PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY AND AFTER-CotlDUCT OF OFFENDERS 
(i) Psychiatric Treatment of Hospital Order and Transfer Direction 
Offenders and Probationers Subject to Psychiatric Treatment 
i 
TABLE 30: HOSPITAL ORDERS: DAYS IN HOSPITAL AND DURATION OF LIABILITY TO BE :O~PULSORILY DETAINED. 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 
DURATION OF 
HOSPTIAL MALES FEMALES 
ORDER 
1969-70* 1974-75 1969-70 1974-75 1969-70 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 277 47 99 365 318 
LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 18 months 3 months Died in hosp. 365 365 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 232 365 346 
LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 365 365 l8 mths. 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 291 347 629 
Died in LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 365 347 hosdital 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 41 57 
LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 5 months.died 9 months on leave 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 16 207 
LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 6 months 365 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL . 56 51 
LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 8 months 233 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 1095 
LIABLE TO BE DETAINED 3 yrs. 4 mths.I 
* Informat1on for one male in this period was unavailable. 
Table 30 shows the time actually o:pent in hospital by those 
offenders who were made subject to a hospital order. It also shows the 
time they were in hospital and on leave but liable to be detained 
pursuant to a hospital order or a renewal of such an order under Section 
32 of the Mental Health Act. 
365 
365 
I l 
; SUPREME COURT 
MLES FEMALES 
I 
1974-75 1969 
2 yrs. 393 
Still in hosp. 19 months 
393 
19 months 
273 
273 
2 yrs. 
Sti 11 in hosp. 
2 yrs . 62 da~: 
2 yrs.246 ~ 
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The average stay for the 1969-1970 group of males and females was 
241 days. Of the nineteen hospital order patients thirteen remained 
liable to be detained for the full 12 months, which is the natural 
duration of a hospital order.<79J Some patients remained in hospital 
for longer, but as informal patients who were free to leave at any time, 
so such·periods were not taken into account. Authority to detain a 
patient was extended under section 32 of the Act in the case of five 
patients in the 1969-1970 group. 
Conceding that entirely different considerations apply to determine 
the length of gaol sentences and hospital orders, it fs nevertheless 
interesting that the average length of sentence for those in the 1969-
1970 Supreme Court group of males who received a prison sentence was 
22.9 months and 6.9 months for the court of petty sessions ·group for the 
same period. (BO) 
TABLE 31 
TRANSFER DIRECTIONS: DAYS IN HOSPITAL AND LENGTH OF 
SENTENCE (MALES ONLY) 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS SUPREME COURT 
l969-70a 1974-75 1969-70b 1974-75 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 203 201. 378 172 
LENGTH OF SENTENCE 11 months 2~ years 18 months 6 years 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 763 156 117 
LENGTH OF SENTENCE i8 months 18 months 9 months 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 333 
LENGTH OF SENTENCE 9 months 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 203 
LENGTH OF SENTENCE l l months 
DAYS IN HOSPITAL 50 
LENGTH OF SENTENCE 3 months 
. . 
a in this period one offender was not transferred to hospital despite the 
magistrate's recommendation. 
b the information for one mate in this period was unavailable. 
(79) Mental Health Act, 1963 section 32. 
(80) The average length of sentence dropped in the 1974-1975 period to 
18.1 months for the Supreme Court group, but rose to 7.4 months for the 
court of petty sessions group. 
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Table 31 shows the time spent in hospital and the length of 
gaol sentence of those offenders who were transferred from gaol to 
hospital pursuant to a transfer direction. The average time spent in 
hospital for these patients for both periods was 258 days. Table 31 
also shows that in two cases the time spent compulsorily detained in 
hospital was longer than the prison sentence. 
Unfortunately the psychiatrist's prognosis on discharge of a patient 
was not recorded on the hospital files of the 1969-1'970 group of patients 
who received treatment at the Royal Derwent Hospital. 
In many of the cases in which psychiatric treatment was made a 
condition of probation, the court gave the probation officer or 
psychiatrist a discretion as to whether or not the offender should be 
required to submit to treatment. The Mental Health Service's psychiatric 
records of each probationer subject to a psychiatric treatment condition 
in 1969-1970 were examined to determine if in fact they were required 
to have treatment. In the case of the sample from the magistrates' courts 
only 11 or 39% were recorded as actually having received treatment. The 
treatment received varied between one and a dozen out-patient attendances, 
and five offenders received in-patient treatment during the period of 
probation. 
Only three Supreme Court offenders in the 1969-1970 sample were 
required to submit to psychiatric treatment as a condition of probation and 
no record could be discovered of these conditions having been enforced. 
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(ii) Subsequent Psychiatric Treatment 
TABLE 32 
SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT OF TREATED AND NON-TREATED OFFENDERS 1969-1970 
SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT NONE TOTAL 
MALES: 
TREATED OFFENDERS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 10 13 23 
SUPREME COURT 3 3 6 
- - -
TOTAL: 13 ( 44.8%) 16 (55.2%) 29 
NON-TREATED OFFENDERS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 25 105 130 
SUPREME COURT 3 31 34 
- -
-
TOTAL: 28 (17.1%) 136 (82.9%) 164 
FEMALES: 
TREATED OFFENDERS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 2 (33%) 4 (66%) 6 
NON-TREATED OFFENDERS 
CbURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 2 (8.3%) 22 (91. 7%) 24 
-
TOTAL: 4 (13.3%) 26 (86.7%) 30 
Table 32 shows those offenders who received psychiatric treatment ~ 
in the five years following the report requested in 1969-1970, or in the 
case of those offenders who were required to submit to treatment (treated 
offenders) in the five years following the termination of that treatment. 
The large proportion of treated offenders who subsequently received 
treatment reflects the well known fact that many former psychiatric patients 
subsequently require readmission to hospital, or further treatment. The 
proportion of non-treated offenders who subsequently received treatment is 
higher than one would expect in an unselected group of offenders. 
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(iii) Reconvictions 
TABLE 33 
RECONVICTIONS OF TREATED AND NON-TREATED OFFENDERS, 1969-1970 
NO RECONVICTIONS RECONVICTIONS 
MALES: 
TREATED OFFENDERS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 11 (47.8%) 12 (52.1%) 
SUPREME COURT - 4 (100%) 
TOTAL: 11 (40.7%) 16 (59.2%) 
NON-TREATED OFFENDERS 
COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS 51 (64.5%) 7.9 (60.8%) 
SUPREME COURT 11 (40.7%) 16 (59.2%) 
TOTAL: 62 (39.4%) 95 (60.5%) 
--
"DTAL TREATED AND NON- 73 111 TREATED 
TABLE 34 
RECONVICTIONS OF TREATED AND NON-TREATED OFFENDERS 
· (COURT OF PETTY SESSIONS ONLY) 
NO RECONVICTIONS RECONVICTIONS 
FEMALES: 
TREATED OFFENDERS l (16.6%) 5 (83.3%) 
NON-TREATED OFFENDERS 15 ( 62. 5%) 9 (37.5%) 
TOTAL: 
--
16 (53.3%) 14 (46.6%) 
TOTAL 
23 
4 
-
27 
130 
27 
-
157 
184 
TOTAL 
6 
24 
-
30 
The police records of those offenders who received treatment, and 
those who did not are compared in tables 33 and 34. 
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The shortcomings of reliance upon reconviction rates as an 
indicator of the success of sentencing options are conceded. They are 
obvious and well known. The offender may have benefited from his treatment 
and become more responsible, mature and socially adjusted and yet commit 
a further offence. Conversely the offender may avoid further court 
convictions and yet deteriorate in other respects. This difficulty is 
even more apparent in assessing the success of psychiatric treatment by 
looking at reconviction rates. An offender may respond well to psychiatric 
treatment and yet re-offend. This could frequently occur in cases where 
there is no relationship between the mental disorder and the criminal 
behaviour. 
For this study no other means of evaluation was feasible. A four 
year follow up period was used, that is four years from the end of the 
prison sentence, period of in-patient hospital treatment, or probationary 
period. It was necessary to omit nine offenders from the Supreme Court 
group because they were not at risk for the requisite four year period, 
either because they were in hospital or gaol for a long time. 
Tables 33 and 34 show those treated and non treated offenders who 
were convicted of further offences and those who were not. The proportion 
of males in each group who were reconvicted is strikingly similar, and 
for female offenders the reconviction rate of the treated offenders was 
far worse than the non-treated offenders. 
(iv} Prognoses 
As mentioned earlier(82J a prognosis in terms of recidivism was made-
in only a very few cases, about 13% of the 1969-1970 remanded offender 
(82) Ante., p. 68. 
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sample. In 19 of 28, or 68% of cases, the prognosis was correct over 
the four year follow-up period. That psychiatrists are unreliable in their 
predictions of future behaviour has considerable empirical support. In 
particular, the evidence that in predicting dangerous behaviour they are 
more often wrong than right is overwhelming; it seems they always err 
by overpredicting (Diamond, 1974; Ennis, 1972; Morris, 1968; and Price, 1970). 
(v) Other Follow-up Studies 
Although the number of treated offenders followed up was small, 
the implications of my findings provide support for the assertion of 
Rollin (1969), that there is a 'revolving door' phenomenon between 
psychiatric hospitals and pri·sons and that psychiatric treatment and 
particularly in-patient treatment does not prevent criminality. Rollin 
found that within a short two year follow-up of convicted mentally 
abnormal offenders who received treatment, 61% were re-admitted to 
hospital, were discovered to have cormnitted further offences or both. He 
relied upon this result and other similar findings as indices of the 
failure of psychiatric treatment of abnormal offenders. He said, "It is 
my opinion that the tools of psychiatry are blunt and primitive and in 
fact are largely ineffectual when used upon the general body of 
abnormal offenders we are called upon to treat" (p.121). 
The follow-up of the Oxford survey of offender patients showed 
similarly discouraging results. Of those offenders who were discharged 
within the first year of the making of the hospital order 40% re-offended, 
46% were known to have been admitted to hospitals and only 39% avoided 
both reconviction and rehospitalization (Walker & McCabe, 1973). 
Unsatisfactory results have also emerged from follow-up studies of 
psychiatric probation order patients in Britain. GrUnhut (l963)reported 
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the outcome of treatment in a sample of 636 cases from England and 
Wales in 1953. Although 70 % were described on termination of 
treatment as "condition improved" or "some benefit", 28.4% of all 
offenders were re-convicted within one year of the termination of the 
probation order, and almost 20% of those who received benefit or improved 
re-offended within one year. GrUnhut deduced that the outcome of probation 
for section 4 offenders does not differ much from the after effects of 
probation in general. 
In a later hospital based survey, Woodside (1971) followed up 52 
psychiatric probation order patients one year from the date of their 
probation order. <93J Only 16 of the 52 pattents satisfactorily completed 
probation, and 33 were unsatisfactory, 17 of whom had again appeared in 
court. The author suggested that the "unsatisfactory and disquieting 
situation" revealed that the psychiatric service was not geared to the 
needs of the offenders treated. She suggested that better facilities 
for observation would improve selection of offenders for psychiatric 
probation orders,and closer liaison between medical staff and probation 
Department would improve the results. 
Despite a paucity of data comparing the outcome of psychiatric 
treatment with the outcome of penal measures, it is implicit from the 
results of this survey and the reported English studies, that the treatment 
of mentally disordered offenders cannot be justified on the basis of 
comparative effectiveness. Such gloomy results suggest the need for 
constructive changes in the management and treatment of offender patients. 
In this context some of the recommendations of Walker and McCabe (1973) 
arising from their experience with the Oxford survey cohort, are relevant. 
(83) All offenders in the study were recommended for treatment at the Royal 
Edinburgh Hospital during the three years from 1966 to 1968. 
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In particular, the need in some cases for a procedure for in-patient 
assessment prior to recorrmending treatment, the power to refer hospital 
order patients back to court if found to be unco-operative or unsuitable 
subjects for treatment, and the importance of after-care of discharged 
patients, particularly for those in the high risk groups. fB 4J 
(10) SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The major findings which emerged from an analysis of the data for 
this survey can be quite briefly summarized. 
Contrary to the results anticipated no increase was found in the 
number or proportion of offenders remanded for psychiatric reports by 
courts of petty sessions in 1974-1975 compared with 1969-1970, and for 
female offenders the number remanded declined significantly. In the. 
earlier period a significantly greater proportion of females than males were 
remanded. In the Supreme Court there was an increase in the proportion of 
offenders remanded, attributable to the existence of a new judge who 
remanded significantly more offenders than the others. Most petty 
offenders were seen by the examining psychiatrists on bail~ and most 
Supreme Court offenders were seen in custody. 
Both courts remanded significantly more sexual offenders than any 
other category of male offender, and the data suggested that the courts 
were more likely to remand offenders with prior convictions than first 
offenders. Both the objective data from the remand samples and the 
inverview responses of the judges and magistrates indicated that previous 
psychiatric history, the requests of probation officers and counsel for 
psychiatric reports also influenced the decision to remand. 
(84) From the data obtained for the survey, Walker and McCabe (1973) devised 
a simple method of predicting reconvictions and selecting high risk groups of 
patients for especially intensive efforts {pp.189-193). 
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The number of offenders with no psychiatric diagnosis was small, 
and significantly less in the 1974-1975 group of petty offenders. A 
substantial number of reports in the earlier period made no positive 
recorrmendations, but in the 1974-1975 period there were more treatment 
reconmendations and there was a decrease for the petty sessions group in 
the number of cases in which no recornnendations were made. It was found 
that psychiatrists frequently made explicit recommendations as to punishment 
contrary to the opinion of some of the experts in forensic psychiatry, 
who deem it improper. 
The courts• decisions showed that for petty offenders at least, 
treatment was ordered for a substantial proportion of the remand group 
in 1974-1975, significantly more than in 1969-1970. There was a significant 
decline in the number of hospital orders made by the courts of petty sessions, 
but the numbers for the Supreme Court remained the same. 
The results of the objective data and interview responses suggested 
that psychiatric reports have considerable impact upon the courts' decisions, 
particularly in relation to treatment. The courts appear to follow 
treatment recommendations in about 75% of cases and sentencing recommendations 
in about 64% of cases. The evidence from the questionnaire responses and 
the recommendations made and acted upon shows that the role of the 
psychiatrist is not merely to detect and treat mentally ill offenders, but 
extends to the assessment and explanation of selected offenders behaviour 
and to advising the court of the best way to deal with them. 
Comparisons between individual magistrates and judges revealed a 
picture of uniformity rather than disparity. There were no significant 
differences in the remand rates of magistrates within each of the relevant 
periods, nor in the current offence of the offenders remanded, their mental 
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health, nor in the response to treatment recommendations. In the Supreme 
Court only one judge remanded significantly more offenders than the others, 
and the data suggests that the fact that the current offence was sexual 
did not influence the decision to remand of another judge. 
Of those offenders who were required to submit to treatment in 1969-
1970, a large proportion subsequently required further treatment, and the 
majority re-offended. Prognoses in relation to recidivism were often 
inaccurate. For petty offenders, hospital orders or transfer 
directions probably resulted in periods of involuntary in:arceration for 
much longer than they would have been obliged to endure if gaoled. 
Probationers with a condition as to psychiatric treatment received 
treatment in only a minority of cases. 
It happened that the data collected provided some interesting 
information about women petty offenders. In the earlier period a high 
proportion of female offenders were remanded for psychiatric reports 
but in the second period the number of women petty offenders had increased 
dramatically and the proportion remanded for psychiatric reports declined 
significantly. 
These findings and their implications are of importance to those who 
wish to study all aspects of the sentencing process and particularly those 
who seek to justify psychiatric intervention in the criminal process on 
the basis of effectiveness and humanity and those who would oust psychiatry 
from the criminal process on the grounds that it is fraught with insuperable 
difficulties and terrible dangers to the liberty of the individual. 
There are findings from this study which support both the zealots 
and the sceptics. The sceptics could argue that there is evidence that 
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diagnostic criteria and the perception of mental health of offenders 
generally differed between psychiatrists so that persons remanded for 
psychiatric examinations by some psychiatrists stand little chance of being 
found completely normal. The data also suggest that psychiatrists were 
not very reliable in their predictions of criminal behaviour and that 
despite often lengthy periods of hospitalization, psychiatric treatment 
was not very effective in reducing recidivism. On the other hand, the 
zealots could argue, with some empirical support, that the decision to 
remand an offender for a psychiatric report in the courts studied was not 
a purely haphazard decision and there is substantial uniformity between 
judges and magistrates in their use of psychiatric reports. The principle 
that like cases should be treated alike is in this context more than just 
an empty platitude. (BS) Moreover there is evidence that the courts did 
not rely too much upon recommendations contained in reports, and the 
general supposition that the use of psychiatric reports is increasing 
rapidly is not supported by the evidence, although a greater proportion 
of offenders are receiving treatment. 
It is respectfully suggested that to dispense with psychiatric 
reports and treatment of offenders is too radical, melodramatic and 
inadvisable. Nevertheless the warnings of the sceptics and critics of 
psychiatric involvement in the criminal pr.ocess should be heeded. Psychiatric 
power should be limited to prevent abuses and to protect offenders from 
excessive rehabilitation. The issues in relation to the treatment of 
offenders, its justification and the rights of the offender and the 
community are difficult to resolve, and this study does not attempt to 
evaluate either psychiatric reports or treatment. Unfortunately it was 
not possible to isolate the factors which make a report useful, nor to 
determine the type of report which would be best in the interests of 
(85) This would appear to differ from the situation in Canada as revealed by 
a survey of recent Canadian decisions (Schiffer, 1976). 
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criminal justice. Even so, the empirical evidence collected and analysed 
and the observation and study of the legal and administrative provisions 
which regulate the use of psychiatric reports have revealed certain 
deficiencies. The following recommendations, some of which require 
implementation by legislation and othe~ by changes in administrative 
practice, are measures which could help to alleviate these deficiencies. 
(i) There should be a specific statutory power in Tasmania to 
remand an offender for a psychiatric examination for the purposes of a 
presentence report. The matter of disclosure ~of the report to the offender 
or his counsel and the right to call evidence in rebuttal should be 
embodied in a unifonn provision applicable to both the courts of petty 
sessions and the Supreme Court, replacing the existing provisions in the 
Criminal Code and the Mental Health Act. 
(ii) The power to order in-patient or out-patient psychiatric 
treatment as a condition of probation should be embodied in a specific 
statutory provision. That this is necessary is indicated by the 
evidence that courts impose such conditions without reco1T111endations and 
even, it appears, without requesting reports. Whether or not to refer 
an offender under such an order should not be left to the discretion of 
the probation officer. Such a power should be contingent upon the 
following matters:-
(a) a request to a psychiatrist for a report based upon an 
examination of the offender, with reasons for the request and 
copies or a summary of relevant material relating to the offender 
and the offence. 
(b) a report recommending treatment. 
(c) the offender's consent to treatment; 
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Hospital orders are clearly inappropriate for many of the cases 
where in-patient treatment could fulfil a rehabilitative function. They 
were designed to deal with the acutely disturbed offender who lacks 
insight and often denies he needs treatment. Many disorders require 
co-operation rather than compulsion, and can be treated by techniques 
and drugs which were not freely available when the hospital order was 
devised. In many cases offenders requiring psychiatric treatment can be 
adequately treated as out-patients or day-patients. 
(iii) Enlarging upon (a) above, whenever a psychiatric report is 
ordered, the psychiatrist should be made aware of the reasons for requesting 
it and the issues he is required to discuss. He shouJd also be supplied 
with as much of the relevant information about the offender and the 
offence as is possible. 
There is precedent in other jurisdictions for such practices. In 
the United Kingdom, courts are required by statutory rules to make 
available all the relevant reasons prompting a request for a presentence 
psychiatric report. (86) Courts are also required to supply certain 
information to the examining doctor, including previously known mediaal 
history, prior convictions, circumstances of the offence and home 
circumstances. (87) 
An alternative way of ensuring dialogue between the reporting 
psychiatrist and the judge has been developed in the juvenile courts 
in South Australia. Extempore remarks are made by the judge in court 
concerning the reasons for referral and directing the psychiatrist's 
attention to the relevant issues. These are recorded, typed and sent 
to the psychiatrist. Upon receipt of the report there may be a further 
(86} Magistrates Courts Rules 1968, rule 23. 
(87) See the form produced in Appendix D. 
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request for a supplementary report to elucidate certain matters and corrment 
upon others. There is some judicial support in favour of extending this 
system to the adult courts in South Australia. (88) 
The need to inform the examining psychiatrist of the reasons for 
requesting a psychiatric report, and to set out any specific questions 
to be answered, has been expressed by two eminent forensic psychiatrists 
Bartholomew (1962) and ~ucas (1972). However, despite the apparent 
advantages of allowing the psychiatrist to direct his examination and 
report to the issues defined by the court, it has little judicial support. 
Only one each of the judges and magistrates responding to the questionnaire 
were in favour of communicating their reasons to the psychiatrist 
concerned. (89) 
(iv) There are no general guidelines as to the scope of psychiatric 
examinations, or as to the contents of reports. Vagueness as to what is an 
adequate examination could contribute to some of the scepticism which 
surrounds psychiatric opinion. in legal cases. An agreed outline should 
be prepared and circulated among psychiatrists covering observational and 
historical aspects of routine evaluations for psychiatric reports. 
Similarly, if agreement could be reached as to what matters a report should 
contain, reports would be easier to prepare and be more satisfactory for 
the bench. The responses to the questionnaire relating to content of 
reports show that most judges and magistrates are in agreement about the 
issues they like'to see covered by presentence psychiatric reports. f 90J 
(v) The Courts should keep records of psychiatric reports 
requested. Quite apart from facilitating research, this would certainly 
(88) This system was described by Wilson J. in an unpubl.ished paper delivered 
in 1974, 'The Courts and Mental Health Services'. 
(89) Questionnaire, question 7. 
(90) See Appendix B. 
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expedite matters in those cases where the magistrate or judge would be 
satisfied with an existing and recent report. 
(vi) There should be a legislative power, subject to adequate 
safeguards, enabling judges and magistrates to remand certain offenders 
to a psychiatric hospital for observation. In some cases at least, 
extensive interviewing and investigations, as well as in-patient 
observation would be useful. Some experts say that four to six hours 
of intensive psychiatric interviewing are necessary before the dynamics of 
an individual offender can begin to be understood (Smith, 1971). At least 
it can be said with certainty that the opportunities that are available 
for a comprehensive diagnostic study of an offender while on bail or on 
remand in prison are inadequate in some cases. This problem, and others 
associated with keeping offenders in mental hospitals will be overcome 
to some degree when the new forensic psychiatric unit at Risdon gaol is 
completed. Even so, there may be cases in which the use of prison 
facilities would be undesirable. 
(vii) Magistrates and Judges should be informed of treatment 
details. Information about the length and type of treatment and its 
results would increase their understanding of the psychiatric treatment 
available, and be invaluable as giving indicators of the type of offenders 
who respond to specific rehabilitation programmes. An example of the type 
of misunderstanding which can arise is illustrated by the following 
comments of a magistrate reported in a daily newspaper. 
11 What is the good of sending people to the John Edis Hospital when 
all they do is sit in a group and say I have been a naughty boy? 11 
asks the Magistrate Mr. D.A. Burton, in the Hobart Court. 
He had just been told a man ordered to undergo treatment at the 
hospital had received only group therapy. 
The man was before him charged with exceeding .08 and driving 
while disqualified for a similar offence . 
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William Harvey Evans (33}, of Deloraine, pleaded guilty to three 
charges involving driving an unregistered car with a blood 
alcohol reading of .19 on November 11 last year while disqualified. 
The Court was told Evans had been responding to treatment he was 
receiving at the John Edis Hospital following the previous offence. 
However, when told the treatment had taken the form of group 
therapy, Mr. Burton said he was very surprised. 
Questioning an officer from the hospital about Evans, Mr. Burton 
was told he had not received any form of aversion therapy. 
11 1 am surprised alcoholics are not being given drug treatment", 
he said. 11 No wonder we are not getting results 11 • (Mercury, 
March 5, 1976}. 
(viii) Close co-operation between probation officer and the psychiatric 
services should improve the management of psychiatric probation order 
patients. The Mental Health Services forensic psychiatry section should be' 
informed by the court of offenders with psychiatric probation orders and 
liaison with the probation service should be established immediately. The 
follow up of such patients in this study, although on a very small scale, 
would seem to reinforce findings reached elsewhere of psychiatric probation 
order patients receiving no treatment at all or not persisting with treatment 
and fading away unnoticed from out-patient treatment or being discharged 
without the responsible probcttion officer receiving any notification. If 
breaches of probation have been committed by non-attendance or absconding, 
it is important that the probation officer be advised. 
(ix) The hospital or psychiatrist in charge of the treatment of 
hospital order patients should be able to refer patients back to court if 
unco-operative or unsuitable for treatment. This recollDllendation is one 
made by Walker and McCabe (1973). The present study indicates that 
magistrates are dissatisfied with hospital orders in their present form, 
and this recommendation may remove some of their fears of premature 
discharge particularly in the case of offenders whose response to 
treatment is not certain. 
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIR~ 
THE USE OF PRE-SENTENCE PSYCHIATRIC REPORTS 
l. In deciding who to remand for a psychiatric 
report prior to sentencing what factors do 
you consider in order of importance? 
2. If the defendant has previously received 
psychiatric treatment do you order a report? 
l. ( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
2. Always 
Usually .............. . 
Sometimes •...•...•...• 
Ra rely . ............... . 
3. If the offence is of a sexual nature do you 3. 
order a report? 
Al ways .•...•.......•.. 
Usua 1 ly .............. . 
4. If defendant's counsel requests a 
psychiatric report, do you order a report? 
5. If the probation officer suggests a report 
is necessary do you order a report? 
6. Do you communicate your reasons for 
referral to the examining psychiatrist? 
7. Do you think your reasons for referral 
should be communicated to the examining 
psychiatrist? 
8. Do you find the quality and form of 
psychiatric reports, as between 
psychiatrists, varies? 
9. Do you find the quality of the reports 
prepared by an individual psychiatrist 
varies? 
10. Do you object to psychiatrists making 
recommendations as to sentencing matters 
other than psychiatric treatment? 
Sometimes •••.•...••••• 
Rarely ................ . 
4. Al ways ......•.•••••••. 
Usually .•...•....•..••. 
Sometimes •.....•...•.• 
Ra rely ..•.•......••... 
5. Al ways .•..........•..• 
Usually .••.•..•..••..• 
Sometimes .•••..•••.•.. 
Rarely ..••••••.•.••.•. 
6. Al ways •..•...•...•.... 
Usua 11 y .•..•....•...•. 
Sometimes .....•....•.. 
Ra rely ............... . 
7 . Yes •.•.......••......• 
No •.........•....•• , •. 
8. Frequently ........... . 
Sometimes ............ . 
Ra rely ..........•....• 
9. Frequently ........... . 
Sometimes •............ 
Ra rely ............... . 
10. Yes .................. . 
No ................... ·. 
• 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
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Do you find the recommendations in 
psychiatric reports helpful -
(a) in determining whether treatment lla 
should be ordered? 
(b) in determining an appropriate llb 
sentence (other than psychiatric 
treatment)? 
Do psychiatrists' recommendations influence 
your decisions (i.e. cause you to reach a 
different decision than was first 
contemplated): 
{a) recommendations as to treatment? 12a 
(b) reconmendations as to sentence? 12b 
A 1 ways ............... . 
Usually .••.•.......... 
Sometimes ............ . 
Rarely ............... . 
Always ..............•. 
Usually ...•••......... 
Sometimes ..•.......... 
Ra rely ......•......•.• 
Al ways ......•......... 
Usually .••••••.•.•.•.. 
Sometimes ...••.....•.. 
Rarely .•.•..••••.•.•.• 
Always ............... . 
Usually ..•••..••.•.... 
Sometimes .•....•...••. 
Rarely •..•.....••....• 
Do you rely on the psychiatrist's 
assessment of the possibility of 
recidivism? 
13. A 1 ways ....•.•..•...•.. 
Do you like the psychiatrist to make 
~ classical diagnosis if possible -
(a) with explanation? 
(b) without explanation? 
Do you like the report to contain an 
intelligence assessment? 
Do you like the report to contain a 
social history of the defendant/accused? 
Usually .•........•.... 
Sometimes ............ . 
Ra rely ............... . 
14a Yes .................. . 
No ..•..•..••...•.•..•. 
14b Yes .••.......•........ 
No ...•......•..•.•.... 
15. Psychometric ......... . 
Estimate .•.....•.....• 
Unnecessary .•......... 
16. Full ................•. 
Brief ................ . 
Minimal .......•....... 
17. Do you like the psychiatr"l~t to state 17. Yes .................. . 
18. 
whether he believes there to be a direct No •...........•....... 
relationship between the mental condition 
of the offender and the offence? 
If treatment is recommended, do you like 
details as to -
(a) type of treatment? 18a Yes 
No 
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18. (b) estimated length? 
19. Do you expect the psychiatrist to 
make, if possible, a prognosis -
(a) in terms of recidivism? 
(b) in terms of success of treatment? 
(c) in terms of dangerousness? 
20. Do you like a report to specify any of 
the following sources of information, 
which may have been used in the 
preparation of the report -
(a) length and number of interviews? 
(b) psychometric testing? 
(c) mental health visitor's report?. 
(d) prior psychiatric reports and 
records? 
(e) pre-sentence report? 
(f) police file? 
(g) other? 
21. What form of report do you favour -
(a) structured report? 
(b) narrative report? 
22. Do reports contain te~~inology which 
is outside your knowledge? 
23. Do you make the report available to the 
defendant/accused or his counsel? 
l8b Yes .............. . 
No .••..••.•.....•. 
l9a Yes 
No ..•.•....••••.•. 
l9b Yes .............. . 
No •...••.••.•...•• 
19c Yes ••....•...•..•• 
No .....••.••••..•• 
20a Yes .•...•••..•..•• 
No ••.••••.•••••••• 
20b Yes .............. . 
No ••.••••.••••.••• 
20c Yes ..•.•.••..••..• 
No ••..••.••.•.•••. 
20d Yes .•.•..•.••.•••. 
No ••..•••..••••••. 
20e Yes ••.....••.••.•. 
No ••••••••.••••••• 
20f Yes •.••••...•.•••. 
No •••••••••••••••• 
20g Yes ...•••••.•••••. 
. No ••••••.•.••••••• 
2la Yes .•.............• 
No ••.••.•••••••••• 
2lb Yes .•.••..•••.•.•. 
No ••••..••...•••.• 
22. Frequently ..••.... 
Sometimes ........ . 
Ra rely ........... . 
23. Always ........... . 
Usually .......... . 
Sometimes ••....... 
Ra re 1 y •...•....... 
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24. Are you more likely to request a 
psychiatric report on a female that 
a male? 
25. Do you think hospital orders are a 
satisfactory means of dealing with 
mentally disordered offenders? 
24. Yes ............. . 
No ••••.•••••••••• 
.. 25. Yes ............. . 
No .............•. 
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APPENDIX B 
1. TECHNIQUE IN REPORT WRITING 
In one of the most comprehensive discussions of the technique which 
should be used in writing psychiatric reports for courts, Peter D. Scott 
(1953) made the following suggestions and corrunents. Language, he said, 
should be simple and technicalities avoided. Indefinite words such as 
'unstable' or 'irrmature' which mean little or nothing should be avoided. 
Some highly charged words and intimate details should be avoided 
especially if the report is to be read in open court. 
The source of information, the names of the people interviewed, and 
the length of the interview with the offender should be stated in the 
report. 
Facts should be separated from opinion and inferences. There is a 
tendency for laymen to overemphasize the importance of the intelligence 
quotient which sometimes does not reflect real ability because of mood, 
hostile negativism or lack of confidence. In cases of any doubt, I.Q. is 
better omitted or qualified with a brief assessment of its reliability. 
The type of inteliigence test used should be mentioned, so that an 
alternative test can be used later if necessary. 
Scott was firmly of the opinion that diagnosis is an unimportant 
part of the court report. 
Unless the diagnosis has also a legal definition (e.g. mental 
deficiency) it is usually better to omit it. For instance~ the 
diagnosis of epilepsy does not of itself imply anything definite as 
to responsibility or disposal, and more or less publicly affixes a 
I 
I 
~ 
• 
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label which it may be difficult to detach. It may be in this sense 
that Mullins (1944d) quotes the advice said to have been given to 
a newly appointed judge by a colleague of much experience: 'Never 
give your reasons. Your decisions will probably be right. Your 
reasons will probably be wrong.' In general the diagnosis should be 
reserved for the case notes and for the letter which accompanies a 
patient to hospital or clinic. A further point is that if the diag-
nosis becomes familiar to the offender, it may be a source of anxiety 
to him or may provide him with an attractive and useful shibboleth. 
Lastly, even in those cases selected for psychiatric report a classical 
diagnosis cannot be made in more than 20 per cent. In the other 80 
per cent it is impossible to attach a label any more accurate than 
'personality disorder' or 'social mal-adjustment'. Such omnibus 
terms would not stand up well to cross-examination. Yet this 80 per 
cent is likely to respond to treatment as well as, or better than, 
those with a classical psychiatric diagnosis. There is the risk, 
especially where a given court does not often use psychiatric services, 
that the magistrate may begin to base his decisions on the diagnosis 
rather than on the recommendation; further, certain diagnoses may 
come to be regarded as demanding admission to hospital, which might 
be undesirable. The cut and dried diagnosis is very popular, and lay 
people look for it and value it altogether more than they should, 
just as they tend to do with the I.Q. There is too great a tendency, 
having heard the diagnosis,to pigeon-hole a case in accordance with 
the classical treatment of the disease rather than in accordance 
with the needs of the individual. Conversely there is the danger 
that those to whom a simple or classical diagnosis cannot be attached 
may be presumed beyond the need or reach of help (p.93). 
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Scott said reports should include a prognosis because courts want 
to know if the disorder or abnormal behaviour can be cured, and if so, 
how long this will take. As to recommendations he said -
The recorrmendation should appear to follow logically upon the 
preceding part of the report. In framing it one should consider 
first and foremost the best interests of the offender but also try 
to visualize what particular problems this case offers to the bench. 
Why did the magistrate decide to refer it for psychiatric opinion? 
What probable alternative disposals might already have been in his 
mind? Did the offender's looks or demeanour at his original court 
appearance suggest that he was perhaps mentally unbalanced or 
defective? Should he be in hospital rather than in prison? Is there 
any good reason why he should not be 'sent down• for six months? 
Will punishment make him better or worse? 
Scott thought it inadvisable to recommend psychiatric treatment 
unless there is a reasonable chance of it being successful. This is 
certainly sensible; a contrary approach would soon lead to a disinclination 
by sentencers to follow treatment recommendations. But as to the form 
reccnmendations should take Scott appeared to favour subtle suggestion 
rather than firm recommendation. He felt it is sometimes better to say 
that certain treatment may be helpful, rather than it is recommended or 
advised, because some magistrates and judges are opposed to explicit 
recommendations. Positive recommendations for punishment should not be 
made, for this is a matter for the magistrate. But he thought the 
probable effects of punishment can properly be mentioned. He said ideal 
reconmendations, if realistic and well founded, could and should be 
included and can be qualified by a more practical recommendation. 
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As to the actual plan of the report, Scott approved of Sir 
Norwood East's advice given in 1927 -
Each medical man will draw up such report in his own way, but 
it should be as precise, concise and accurate as possible. My 
own practice was to subdivide it under five heads. A short 
preamble gave the general steps adopted to arrive at an opinion, 
stated when the accused first came under observation, the number 
of interviews held with him, and from whom information concerning 
him had been received. Then followed the family history 
relevant to mental disease, also stating from whom the information 
had been obtained. The personal history came next, and any 
corroboration of material points was noted. Then an account was 
given of the physical and mental condition of the accused, the 
progress of the case, and the indications of insanity or mental 
deficiency, if present. 
'And', added Scott, 'finally the opinion'. (pp.96-97). In summary he 
concluded 
The psychiatrist's report to the court should be clearly 
understandable, accurate, logical, modest, and appearing to 
be made by a physician and therefore by one who is impartial 
and genuinely concerned with the welfare of the offender. 
(p.97). 
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An eminent forensic psychiatrist in Australia, Bartholomew (1962) 
has also contributed his opinions on what psychiatric reports should 
contain. 
He suggests that reports should be prepared in the "multifactorial 
manner" with a dynamic or multifactorial diagnosis. Diagnostic labels 
can be included, but do not constitute an end in themselves. Bartholomew 
clearly indicate"s a preference for the multiple factor theory approach 
to crime which recognizes that no one 'cause' is sufficient to explain 
behaviour but that it arises from a multiplicity or variety of usually 
interacting influences. He accepts that this approach replaced the 
typological or biotypological school which accepted one casual factor 
that was responsible for all or the majority of criminal conduct. So 
reports should not contain phrases such as 'This man is an epileptic' 
or, 'This man is a psychopathic personality' set out as representing 
an analysis and understanding of the particular piece of behaviour 
that is the subject of the conviction. But this approach, Bartholomew 
said, with its simplicity of presenteation has the support of many 
courts. He cites medical and legal authorities in support of dynamic 
diagnosis, including the American case of Carter v. U.S. 252 F.2d 608, 
where the court stated: 
Unexplained medical labels - schizophrenia, paranoia, psychosis, 
neurosis, psychopathy - are not enough. Description and explanation 
of the origin, development, and manifestations of the alleged 
disease are the chief functions of the expert witness. The chief 
value of an expert's testimony in this field, as in all other 
fields, rests upon the material from which his opinion is 
- 120 -
fashioned and the reasoning by which he progresses from his 
material to his conclusions; in the explanation of the 
disease and its dynamics, that is how it occurred, developed, 
and affected the mental and emotional processes of the 
defendant; it does not lie in his mere expressi·on of conclusion. 
The ultimate inference vel non of relationship, of cause and 
effect, are for the triers of the facts. 
Bartholomew is of the opinion that clear recommendations as to 
the disposal of the prisoner should be made in all possible cases. He 
questions Scott's statement that the psychiatrist should not make 
recormiendations for punishment in the following words -
This is a statement that is a little difficult to interpret as it 
is not clear what is meant by the word 'punishment' but it would 
seen that it should be construed as being synonymous with imprisonment, 
or, at any rate, with measures that are penal rather than rehabili-
tative. The personnel connected with the penal aspects of criminology 
are all concerned with the modification of behaviour and it would 
seem that behaviour and its study is [sic] within the province of the 
psychiatrist. An order under section 4, Criminal Justice Act 1948, 
a conditional discharge or a period of imprisonment are all 
sanctions imposed by the court aimed at influencing future 
behaviour. Thus there would seem to be no good reason for the 
psychiatrist feeling permitted to recommend probation with, maybe, 
various conditions, but not permitted to recommend a period of 
imprisonment, perhaps with the opportunity of receiving psychiatric 
treatment. It is sometimes stated that for the psychiatrist to 
recorrrnend imprisonment is to arrogate the functions of the court 
to himself. 
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This is not so as at any time he is voicing an opinion - often one 
of many for the information of the Bench. Again, it is said that it 
is not a suitable task for a doctor to be involved in recormiending 
'punishment'. This is equally foolish; many psychiatrists, and 
other doctors, advise parents in bringing up children and recommend 
in certain cases a punitive regime at appropriate times. Finally, 
it must be realised that imprisonment is not simply what is left 
over when all other sanctions have been tried and found to fail or 
have been rejected in the first place. Imprisonment can be thera-
peutic and rehabilitative in a number of cases, particularly when 
the cases are carefully selected and properly classified. {pp.24-25). 
All reconmendations, Bartholomew said, should be explicit despite 
suggestions which have been made to the contrary. Implicit recommendations 
can be confusing and may be misinterpreted by the court. 
An American forensic psychiatrist, Dante {1973) in an article 
entitled 'Writing Psychiatric Reports for the Court', gives concrete 
examples of how to write reports in a manner helpful to attorneys and 
the court. He gives two illustrations of effective reporting of 
psychiatric evaluations -
The following is section of a report on a drug addicted 19 year 
old man who robbed a cleaning establishment by walking in with his 
hand in his coat pocket, simulating that he had a gun. 
'Diagnostically, he is a sociopathic personality. He is both 
antisocial as well as drug-addicted. Although his condition is 
moderately severe, his prognosis is better than his history might 
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indicate. I feel that he is a candidate for out-patient therapy, 
both individual and group. He needs to relate to a male therapist 
to achieve a reasonable male image with whom to identify. The 
therapist must assist him in dealing with his depression and self-
doubts.- Group therapy would offer him peer support to control his 
addiction as well as a 'collective conscience• to control his 
antisocial acting out and his general impulsiveness. A methadone 
programme for withdrawal from heroin as well as comfortable maintenance, 
will provide physical relief and make it unnecessary for him to commit 
crimes in order to satisfy his heroin habit. Placement at a Synanon 
House progranme would provide contact with other controlled persons 
who have and are trying to 'make it', giving him appropriate social 
contacts. I do not feel that he poses a danger to the community but 
he does constitute a suicidal risk and he needs intensive psychiatric 
and social rehabilitative assistance, and therefore he should be 
placed into a highly supervised and structured probation setting 
such as I have outlined.' 
The psychiatrist can point out to the court constructive and 
beneficial alternatives to imprisonment and so make it aware of the 
-
therapeutic possibilities open to courts in making a disposition, 
outlining specific goals and concrete plans by means of which these 
goals might be realised. 
The responsible psychiatrist, however, must also honestly appraise 
those defendants whose histories and behavior show them to be 
dangerous to the community. The following is from a report on a 
16 year old boy who tied a girl to a tree, raped her and left her 
to die in the woods. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 123 -
'I would consider his condition to be severe; hence he is dangerous. 
He weakly indicates how much he feels he conmitted a wrong deed. Yet 
he shows no genuine emotion about what he has done. Accompanying 
poor insight, there is also a significant degree of imp~red judgement. 
For example, he rationalized killing the girl in order to avoid 
prosecution for rape. Tragically, he presents the profile of a 
person looking for an accident. There appears to be no organic 
brain syndrome such as temporal lobe epilepsy. His moves have been 
calculated and he was aware of each step along the way toward rape 
and murder. He knew the difference between right and wrong and 
was not impelled by any overwhelming massive impulse. Prior to the 
murder he carried a knife, which he had used on a boy in a gang 
fight. He is possessed of a great fear of women and displays much 
doubt about his own potency, self-concept and masculinity. To him, 
being powerful toward women is to force them into submission. Such 
a perspective is dangerous. His wish to be placed in a Training Unit 
is unrealistic. He is not motivated for school, but thinks what he 
tr.ies to say will impress others. There is little indication of 
self-discipline, nor of being able to work in a responsible manner; 
he has been consistently rebellious towards authority. 
It would appear to me from a psychiatric standpoint, that he should 
be placed in a well structured setting like a minor security prison, 
a mental hospital, or a rehabilitation setting. I would feel he 
needs such outside sources of control before any psychotherapy is 
attempted. Group therapy would be better than individual psychotherapy 
since his peers may be able to penetrate more effectively his 
defensive armour. Prognosis is guarded. I feel that he could kill 
again. Therefore he should not be placed on probation or for out-
patient therapy. He will require an institutional setting for many 
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years and should be granted freedom only as.his ability to accept 
responsibility for his actions increases.' 
The above segment of a report makes clear the possibilities 
for disposition and the court is made aware of the limits of 
psychiatric treatment as well as of the poor rehabilitation potential 
Gf the defendant. 
These reports discuss clearly the prognosis, the rehabilitation 
Potential of the offender and the therapeutic alternatives. They give 
reasons for the recommended course of action, with details of the type 
of treatment which would be offered. This makes it far easier for the 
courts to evaluate the sentencing alternatives than would a bald statement 
recorrmending in-patient or out-patient treatment without reasons or 
details. 
Dante also warns against the inclusion of mystical words and concepts, 
which instead of impressing the reader may be rejected as •a bunch of 
garbage. 1 
A South Australian judge, His Honour Judge A.B.C. Wilson, at a 
seminar in April 1974, also used Dr. Danto's illustrations of effective 
and ineffective reporting and strongly criticised psychiatrists for 
attempting to be impressive by using incomprehensible psychiatric jargon. 
You use words like 'autistic', 'psychotic', 'schizophrenic', 
'psychopathic' and 'sociopathic'. No educated man likes to admit 
that he does not understand words addressed to him by another 
educated man. I suggest that the judge and jury do not understand 
many words used in the courtroom by psychiatrists but hesitate to 
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question you about them lest they seem naive or ignorant (or, as 
is sometimes the case, lest they receive an equally incomprehensible 
answer). 
You psychiatrists and other behavioural scientists talk in public 
as if you all agreed about basic principles and about the meaning of 
your jargon. Of course you don't! I think you ought to discard all 
of your "obscurantist, pejorative designations". 
Another forensic psychiatrist, Gittleson (1972) has reiterated 
Scott's warning that reports which view the situation entirely from the 
accused's strivings and wishes are unlikely to be helpful to the court in 
deciding an appropriate disposal of the problem. The prime duty of the 
court is to protect society by trying to ensure the offence will not be 
repeated. 
Brancale, the director of the New Jersey State Diagnostic Centre, 
wrote in 1958, 
clinicians can provide the court with relevant data which may 
include any or all of the following points: 
1. A clinical evaluation of the seriousness of the offense. 
2. The psychological matrix from which this offense arose and the 
underlying psychological significance of the act. 
3. The diagnostic category into which the defendant falls. 
4. The chronicity of the process, with evidence of repetitive, 
compulsive element if any. 
5. The insight the defendant has obtained into the true nature of 
his crime, if any, including the amount of guilt, sense of 
remorse, etc. 
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6. The motivations and responsiveness he has for a treatment plan, 
should one be necessary i.e., how plastic is an individual to 
remedial efforts, both general and specific? 
7. The degree of hazard he poses for others in the community; the 
prospects of a dangerous episode repeating itself. 
8. The overall prognosis. 
9. Recommendation: a. quarantine {institutionalization); 
b. probation; or 
c. any special ancillary measures which may 
specifically lessen or remove causal factors 
toward crime or contribute to reducing stresses 
which lead to crime, such as referral to 
Alcoholics Anonymous, medical treatment, or 
psychotherapy, either individual or group. 
Such a rough framework of data should be useful to the court. It may 
also have some value to the agencies which may be called upon to 
supervise the defendant, either in the institution or on probation. 
In preparing such reports for the court, it is quite essential that 
the psychiatric data be expressed in a simple language and this 
need not invalidate the scientific findings. Dogmatism should be 
avoided. and speculation should be clearly described as such. One 
must guard against the danger of becoming overly exonerative in 
attitude. It is important for the clinician to avoid injecting his 
own personal philosophy into his reports. A psychiatrist who happens 
personally to feel that prisons do harm to a defendant may be 
reluctant to recommend incarceration. The judge may, consequently, 
classify this 'expert' as one who would exonerate all offenders. 
Another psychiatrist, impressed with the psychopathology of a given 
crime, may too enthusi asti ea lly prescribe ambulatory care, without 
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sufficiently weighing the seriousness of the offense or the threat 
of recurrence. In short, an adequate clinical report to the court 
should have the virtues of simplicity, validity, and adaptiveness. 
Another American psychiatrist, Roberts (1965), says the psychiatrist 
should, in addition to a clinical diagnosis in accordance with standard 
psychiatric nomenclature, fonnulate a psychodynamic diagnosis. This 
'includes a description of the personality factors in the individual 
which operate in daily living including thoughts and impulses and their 
attached emotions.' In conclusion the psychiatrist should state his 
medico-legal opinion. -This must be lucid, concise, and contain minimal 
technical language. Such technical terms as may be used should be 
fully defined. 
Lucas (1972), a consultant forensic psychiatrist working in New South 
Wales, says a psychiatric report must detail the psychiatrist 1 s contact 
with the prisoner, his sources of information, and then, in a descriptive 
section, consider his background, health and so on and relate this where 
possible to the offence. The psychiatrist should include diagnosis, 
prognosis and personality assessment and he should make clear reconmendations 
to the court 'in appropriate language•. Dr. Lucas says that this in no 
way means he is trying to usurp the sentencing functions of the court 
as at times has been suggested. Clear recommendations indicate what 
conclusions the psychiatrist has drawn from his examination and suggest 
what weight he places on psychiatric and therapeutic considerations in 
the particular case. The court is free to draw on the descriptive 
section of the report and the general findings and reject the 
recommendations without implying the whole exercise was a waste of time. 
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In his influer.tial text, Sentencing as a Human Process John Hogarth 
(1971) makes some pertinent comments about the quality of presentence 
information. 
to be of practical value to a court, presentence information shou1d 
pass four tests: namely, reliability, validity, relevance, and 
efficiency. Information ought to be reliable in the sense of being 
reproducible by different people over different periods of time, valid 
in the sense of representing what it purports to represent, relevant 
to the objectives of the court and the alternatives available in law, 
and efficient in the sense of not duplicating the contribution of 
other information already received. The thought was expressed 
that if research was conducted as to the quality of information commonly 
presented to the courts through the medium of pre-sentence and 
psychiatric reports, a number of profound and terrible truths would 
be revealed, but the point was not pressed (p.303). 
A lot of what has been said in this review of some of the relevant 
literature is eminently sensible. In particular the reasons for the 
following points seem convincing. 
1. The report should refer to the sources of information used 
and to the length of interviews so that the court is in a better position 
to assess the accuracy of the report and the offender can challenge any 
matter if necessary. 
2. Diagnosis, if it is to be included, should not be overemphasized 
nor stated as if it is an explanation of the criminal behaviour. The 
origin development and manifestations of the disease should be briefly 
explained. 
3. Prognosis in terms of treatment should be included. 
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4. Any social history which is relevant to the offence or motivation 
for treatment should be included. 
5. Technical language should be explained. 
6. Treatment recommendations should be made only if there is a 
reasonable chance of success. 
7. Recommendations should be clearly and unambiguously stated, 
including recommendations for imprisonment or other penal measures. This 
should not be regarded by magistrates and judges as usurping the functions 
of the court, but as an expert opinion which the court should consider 
with all the other relevant material. Provided this approach is adopted, 
and courts do not have unrealistic expectations of psychiatry and retain 
a healthy scepticism and carefully scrutinize psychiatric opinions, fears 
of invasion of the judicial province by psychiatry and of the growth of 
it as a social power should be allayed. 
8. An intelligence assessment should be included in the report. 
If the offender has been recently tested, I.Q. should be stated and it 
should be further explained by stating whether the offender is mentally 
defective, of dul1 normal, average or about average intelligence. If 
there is any doubt about the accuracy of the test or estimated 
intelligence, it should be omitted or the doubts mentioned. 
Although there is much subjective opinion about desirable techniques 
in report writing, little is known about what reports should contain. 
What type of report would help the courts reach the best decision? If 
we knew the answer to this question psychiatrists could be trained to 
write such reports and perhctps even judges to use them. 
Some things do have empirical support and should be carefully 
considered in this context. It seems that courts should not know all 
about the offender. There is considerable research evidence suggesting 
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that in decision making the capacity of individuals to use information 
effectively is limited to the use of not more than five or six items of 
information. Reports which are too long result in an 'information 
overload' and hinder the effective use of relevant information (Hogarth, 
1971, pp.302-303). With regard to diagnosis and prognosis, there is 
evidence which suggests that a diagnosis is an inaccurate and even a 
dangerous label, and that psychiatrists' prognoses are frequently 
inaccura~e. As to the helpfulness of psychiatric reports, ·there is a 
research study which indicates that those parts of the report said by 
judges in the study to be most useful did not appear to influence the 
sentence significantly. (Bohmer, 1976) 
2. QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE CONTENT OF REPORTS 
Questionnaire responses relating to the contents of psychiatric 
reports were obtained to help find out what type of report the courts found 
most helpful. Of course the subjective responses do not necessarily 
reflect the actual helpfulness of the report in the sentencing decisions 
nor do they help detennine the type of report which would assist the court 
to reach the best decision. 
A majority of judges and magistrates responding to the questionnaire 
said they iiked the report to specify the number and length of the 
interviews with the offender (5 Yes, 2 No), and the following sources of· 
information if the psychiatrist had access to them:-
(i) mental health visitor's report (5 Yes, 2 No). 
(ii) prior psychiatric reports and records (5 Yes, 2 No). 
(iii) presentence report (6 Yes, 1 No). 
(iv) police file (5 Yes, l No). 
(v) ·other (3 Yes, 2 No). 
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One judge answered this question by stating that it was ordinarily a 
matter for the psychiatrist's judgement. 
None of those answering the questionnaire wished to see diagnosis 
omitted from the report, and with one exception they preferred that it be 
explained. A majority indicated that they like reports to contain an 
intelligence assessment (6), one third of which specified psychometric 
testing and the remaining two thirds indicated an estimated assessment 
was sufficient. 
Five respondents stated a brief social history was all that was 
required; one judge said it was not required because usually he obtains 
it from the presentence report. Another judge stated that it depended 
on what counsel and perhaps a probation officer tell him. This is an 
understandable comment, for an unnecessary repetition of information is 
to be avoided. It underlines the importance of supplying the psychiatri5t 
with a copy of the probation officer's report in good time, but one 
wonders how the psychiatrist is to know what counsel will say in 
mitigation of sentence. The most that could be done is to advise the 
psychiatrist whether the offender is to be represented or not. 
All nine respondents stated that they like the report to contain 
an opinion, if the psychiatrist is able to form one, as to the relationship 
between the offence and the mental condition of the offender. Current 
psychiatric thinking on the causes of criminal behaviour makes this often 
very difficult. 
Eight affirmative responses (with no negative responses) indicated 
a preference for a prognosis in terms of recidivism, treatment and 
dangerousness; one judge said he did not expect it but it might be 
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useful. As to how much th~y rely upon the psychiatrist's assessment of 
the possibility of recidivism, one said he always did, three said usually, 
and four said sometimes. One judge merely said he certainly gave it 
weight. 
If treatment is recommended, it was said with only one exception 
that reports should specify the type and length of treatment. In reply 
to question 21, 1 Do you object to psychiatrists making recommendations 
as to sentencing matters other than treatment?', seven answered a simple 
1 No 1 ; one judge indicated he would object if the recommendation was a 
firm and direct recommendation; another judge indicated he would also 
take exception to a clear recommendation, for example, of a gaol sentence. 
He said, 
The answer to this has to be qualified. It depends on the meaning 
of 11 sentencing matters 11 • For example, the psychiatrist may say that 
he can see no psychiatric reason why the defendant should hot be 
su~ect to the normal sentencing processes of the law, or he may say 
that if the defendant is to be imprisoned a period of probation or 
psychiatric treatment or guidance or the like may be useful after 
the end of the imprisonment. I imagine such matters are sentencing 
matters, and I value these indications. They do not trespass on the 
judicial function and I have not known of a case where a psychiatrist 
has made any reconmendation which I thought did. They are sensible 
enough to know where to draw the line. 
As to the form of the report, of the six who answered question 21, 4 
favoured a narrative style report, one a structured report and one judge 
said it was a matter for the psychiatrist's judgment. 
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Finally question 22 asked, 'Do reports contain terminology which 
is outside your knowledge?' The answers were Frequently l; Sometimes 5; 
and Rarely 3. 
On the evidence of the questionnaire answers, the courts like a 
rather detailed but precise report. They appear to want diagnostic 
labels and arithmetic prognostication. Generally they want clear 
recommendations even as to sentence. 
3. THE PSYCHIATRIC EXAMINATION 
It is not proposed to examine this subject in detail, for much 
depends upon the facilities and personnel available for pre-sentence 
psychiatric evaluation. For example, where there a~e forensic psychiatric 
clinics on the scale of Herstedvester in Denmark, a psychiatric 
investigation is done in an in-patient setting and takes a minimum of 
6 to 8 weeks. 
In Australia, Bartholomew (1962) envisages an adequate investigation 
encompassing individual examination of the prisoner, contact with 
relatives for further information and corroboration of the history 
obtained from the prisoner, visits by psychiatric social workers and, 
more rarely, special medical investigations such as x-rays and 
electroencephalography. 
The American psychiatrist, Roberts (1965) describes the framework for 
a psychiatric evaluation of a client referred by a lawyer. His first point 
is that there must be sufficient time. The examination may in certain 
cases consist of a single interview, though in most cases a more intensive 
evaluation is desirable. In complex cases the evaluation time may extend 
to several days or weeks in an in-patient institutional setting. A 
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detailed history must be obtained from the client. This should be 
supplemented by information from outside sources to broaden the scope 
of his inquiry during interviews with the client and to corroborate 
statements made by the client. 
The evaluation should also include a mental status examination. 
This includes 
assessment of intelligence, competence of organic brain functioning, 
symptoms of mental disorder, patterns of coping with stressful 
situations and levels o.f anxiety and depression. The determination 
of ability to respond to treatment required detailed knowledge of 
the specific person, his mental disorder, motivation for therapy, 
responsivity of the particular disorder to known treatment techniques 
and available treatment resources. With alleged sex offenders, the 
detailed history of prior sexual activity, relationship of sexual 
problems to the alleged offense and assessment of danger to past 
victims are all important. (p.252} 
Roberts suggested a physical examination should be made whenever organic 
brain functioning is in question. Psychological testing, he said, provides 
useful data to corroborate the findings of the psychiatrist and to extend 
the scope of his inquiry with the client. The examination should be 
conducted in private, and the offender should not be restrained by hand-· 
cuffs. The psychiatrist should at the outset of the examination state 
the reasons for the interview and reveal the absence of confidentiality 
in the relationship. 
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APPENDIX C 
"ESCAPE SPARKS CRITICISM 
Circumstances connected with the escape of three prisoners from the 
Royal Derwent Hospital at New Norfolk on Monday were strongly criticised 
yesterday by Mr. Pitt, M.H.A. 
Speaking at Launceston, Mr. Pitt said the escape should never have 
taken place. 
11 If a prisoner could be just transferred by a stroke of a pen, 
then escape and put the public at risk, the position needs reviewing", 
he said. 
Dangerous criminals should not be transferred to the Royal Derwent 
Hospital. 
"The trial judge had stated emphatically in the case of Peter 
Apted that the crime called for a prison sentence and not committal to 
an institution, but his recommendations had obviously been ignored", 
Mr. Pitt said. 
"Over the past week or so, three senior detectives involved in the 
Apted case became so concerned that they had individually and at different 
times, both at Launceston police headquarters and at other places, 
personally expressed the fear that certain prisoners, especially Apted, 
could escape from the Royal Derwent Hospital. 
"Their judgment, and that of the judge, has now been vindicated. 
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"It seems to me that too little notice is taken of police opinion. 
"A thorough and proper explanation as to how this escape occurred 
must come from the Government immediately", he said. 
In Hobart yesterday, the Attorney-General, Mr. Miller, said the 
three escapees had been sent to the Royal Derwent Hospital from Risdon 
Jail 11 to get proper medical help". 
The transfer had been made "in strict accordance with the law", he 
said, responding to criticism that three men described by police as 
"extremely dangerous" had been held at Royal Derwent. 
Mr. Miller said it was a ''fundamental principle of the Mental 
Health Act that a prisoner who needed treatment for a mental disorder 
should be treated by experts, and that treatment should be under 
acceptable conditions and surroundings". 
The three prisoners concerned had been examined by two psychiatrists, 
who certified that each man was suffering from a mental disorder 
warranting his transfer to a mental hospital for treatment. 
Mr. Miller said that because of this he was obliged to have them 
transfered to the Royal Derwent Hospital. 
Ultimately, a psychiatric unit would be built near Risdon Jail to 
accommodate prisoners suffering from mental disorders .. 
The Opposition spokesman on law, Mr. Baker, M.H.A., said yesterday 
the "latest serious breach of security" again pointed up the need for a 
formal and open inquiry into the State prison system. 
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The Warden of New Norfolk, Mr. C. Fitzgerald, last night expressed 
concern that dangerous criminals were being held in the Royal Derwent 
Hospital. 
Mr. Fitzgerald, an endorsed Liberal candidate for Wilmot, said 
many people had contacted him yesterday to lodge protests over the 
matter. 
He said it was part of the Liberal Party's policy that 11 Court-
referred offenders 11 - those people convicted but recommended for 
treatment by the judiciary - should be held in a proper psychiatric 
wing inside Risden Jail. 
"Nobody would deny treatment that is recommended for convicted 
offenders, but I do not agree with that treatment being given in a hospital 
such as Royal Derwent'~, Mr. Fitzgerald said. 
He said wives of shift workers in the New Norfolk area had suffered 
considerably over the years when escapes were made from the hospital. 
11 No family should be subjected to this type of tension", he said. 
Mr. Fitzgerald said it was unreasonable that a hospital should 
have the onerous job of running a jail within its grounds. 
"Escapes such as the one this week unfairly bring discredit to the 
hos pita 1 , whi eh is doing a good job caring for the mentally i 11 11 • 11 
'The Mercury', August 12, 1976, _p.3. 
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APPENDIX D 
Magistrates' Court Rules, 1968 
Appendix I - Precedents 
Precedent 200. Statement of reasons for medical enquiry 
(M.C. Rules 1968, r.23; H.O. circular 113/73) 
REMAND FOR MEDICAL REPORT 
Remands in custody under s.14(3) or s.26, Magistrates' 
Courts Act 1952 
Statement of reasons for medical enquiry (Rule 23) 
Name 
Court 
of defendant ................................................ . 
Date ......... . 
Offence •••••••••••• 0 • Iii' ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Section under which remand is ordered ....•.....••...••.......... 
................................................................. 
Dear Sir, 
This defendant has been remanded for a medical report. To assist 
the Medical Officer I give below the information available. 
l. Type of report (e.g. on physical or mental condition or suita-
bility for particular treatment). 
2. Reasons which led the Court to request the report. 
3. Previous medical history of offender and family history, so far 
as known.* 
4. Particulars of circumstances of offence (including, if the offender 
is of no fixed abode, the place where it was committed, if known).* 
5. Previous conduct, including previous convictions if known.* 
6. Address and home circumstances of offender.* 
7. Name and station of police officer concerned with case. 
8. Name and telephone number of any probation officer appointed to 
or having knowledge of the case. 
The Governor, 
H.M. Prison, 
...................... 
Yours faithfully, 
Clerk to the Justices 
*Where the required information can best be conveyed by attaching a copy 
of a report or statement in the court's possession, all that need be 
entered here is 11 See attached ................. 11 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
_I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 139 -
REFERENCES 
BOOKS AND ARTICLES 
Adler, F. 11 The Rise of the Female Crook 11 • Psychology Today, 1975, 
i (6), 42. 
Adler, F. 11 The Interaction between Women's Emancipation and Female 
Criminality: A Cross-cultural Perspective". International Journal of 
Criminology and Penology, 1977, .§_, 101. 
Alexander, F. and Staub, J. The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public: 
A Psychological Analysis. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press and the 
Falcon's Wing Press, 1956. 
Anttila, I. 11 Conservative and Radical Criminal Policy in the Nordic 
Countries". Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, 1971, l, 9. 
Bartholomew, A.A. 11 Some Problems of the Psychiatrist in Relation to 
Sentencing". Criminal Law Quarterly, 1973, 1§_, 325. 
Bartholomew, A.A., Brain, L.A., Douglas, A.S., & Reynolds, W.S. 11 A 
Medico-Psychiatric Diagnostic Review of Remanded (without a request for 
a psychiatric report) Male Minor Offenders 11 • Medical Journal of 
Australia, 1967, 54, 267. 
Bazelon, D.L. "The Perils of Wizardry 11 • American Journal of Psychiatry, 
1974, 131(12), 1317. 
Bearcroft, J.S. 11 Psychiatric Referrals from Courts and Prisons 11 • 
British Medical Journal, 1965, _g_, 1519. 
Binns, J.K., Carlisle, J.M., Nimmo, D.H., Park, R.H. and Todd, N.A. 
"Remanded in Hospital for Psychiatric Examination". British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 1969, 115, 1125. 
Blignault, W.J. 11 An Analysis of Remand Patients Admitted to Oakley 
Hos pi ta 111 • New Zea 1 and Medi ea 1 Journa 1 , 1962, §.!_, 598. 
Boehringer, G. and McCabe, S. The Hospital Order in London Magistrates 
Courts. Oxford~ Blackwell, 1973. 
- 140 -
Bohmer, C.E. "Bad or Mad: the psychiatrist in the sentencing process". 
Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 1976, .1._, 23. 
Bottomley, A.K., Decisions in the Penal Process. London: Martin 
Robertson, 197 3. 
Brancal e, R. "Di agnostic Aids in Sentencing". Law & Contemporary 
Problems, 1958, 23, 442. 
Christie, N., Andenaes, J. and Skirbekk, S. "A Study of Self-reported 
Crime". _?candanavian Studies in Criminology, 1965, l· 86. 
Dalesman, S.K., Scarpitti, F.R. and Stephenson, R.M. "Female 
Delinquency: An Application of Self and Opportunity Theories". 
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 1975, 11_(2), 107. 
Danto, B.L. "Writing Psychiatric Reports for the Courts". International 
Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, ~973, ]1_, 123. 
Daunton-Fear, M. The Correctional Agencies of Tasmania. Unpublished 
Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1967. 
Davis, V.A. Hedden J.M., Miller, S.R. and Witten, K.E. "The Kansas 
State Reception and Diagnostic Center: An Empirical Study" •. University 
of Kansas Law Review, 1971, .!2_, 821. 
De Berker, P. "State of Mind Reports". British Journal of Criminology, 
1960, l· 6. 
Dell, S. and Gibbens, T.C.N. "Remands of Women Offenders for Medical 
Reports". Medicine, Science and Law, 1971, ]l, 117. 
Diamond, B. L. "The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness". 
Pennsy1vania Law Review, 1974, 123, 439. 
Empey, L.T. and Erickson, M.L. "Hidden delinquency and social status". 
Social Forces, 1966, 44, 546. 
Ennis, B.J. Prisoners of Psychiatry. Mental Patients, Psychiatrist~ 
and the Law. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1972. 
Gibbens, T.C.N., Sooth~l. K.L. and Pope, P.J. Medical Remands in the 
Criminal Court. Oxford: O.U.P., 1977. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1-
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 141 -
Gilbert, M.M. and Maradie, L.J. "The Incidence of Psychopathy in a 
Group of Prisoners referred for Psychiatric Evaluation". Archives of 
Criminal Psychodynamics, 1961, 480. 
Gittleson, M.L. "The Psychiatric Report in the Magistrates Court". 
The Criminologist, 1972, 3. 
Gold, L.J. "Statistical Review of Court-appointed Psychiatric -
Examinations". Journal of Forensic Sciences, 1969, .:!_!, 294. 
Green, E. Judicial Attitudes in Sentencing. London: Macmillan, 1961. 
GrUnhut, M. Probation and Mental Treatment. London: Tavistock, 1963. 
Guile, L.A. "Psychiatric Reports for the Courts: A diagnostic review". 
Medical Journal of Australia, 1965, _£, 157. 
Gunn, J. "Sentencing as seen by a Psychiatrist". Medicine Science and 
Law, 1971, 11_, 95. 
Guze, S.B., Goodwin, D.W. and Crane, J.B. "Criminality and Psychiatric 
Disorders". Archives Gen. Psychiat. 1969, 20, 583. 
Hakeem, M. "A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and 
Correction". Law and Contemporary Problems, 1958, ~' 650. 
Hall, J. General Principles of Criminal Law. (Second Edition, Revised). 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Mernill, 1960. 
Hogarth, J. Sentencing as a Human Process. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1971. 
Hood, R. Sentencing in Magistrates' Courts. London: Stevens, 1962. 
Jablon, N.C., Sadoff, R.L., and Heller, M.S. "A Unique Forensic 
Diagnostic Hospital". American Journal of Psychiatry, 1970, 126, 1663. 
Lackzo, A.L., James, J.F. and Alltop, L.B. "A Study of Four 'Hundred 
and Thirty-Five Court-referred Cases". Journal of Forensic Sciences, 
1970, 1.§_(3). 15. 
Lucas, W. E. "The Psychiatrist and the Pena 1 System". Proceed·i ngs of 
the Institute of Criminology, 1972, l· 7. 
' I" 
- 142 -
McDonald, J.M. Psychiatry and the Criminal. (2nd ed.) Springfield, 
Illinois. Charles, C., Thomas, 
Morris, N. "Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal". Southern 
Californian Law Review. 1968, .11· 514. 
Pollak, 0. The Criminality of Women. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1950. 
Price, R.R. "Psychiatry Criminal Law Reform and the Mythophilic Impulse". 
Ottawa law Review, 1970, 4, l. 
Price, R.R. "The Forgotten Female Offender". Crime and Delinquency, 
1977' 23' l 01. 
Roberts, L. M. 11 Some Observations on the Problems of the Forensic 
Psychiatrist". Wisconsin Law Review, 1965, 240. 
Rollin, H.R. The Mentally Abnormal Offender and the Law. Oxford: 
Pergamon Press, 1969. 
Rook, C. The Saturday Work Order Scheme in Tasmania. Paper read at 
1976 A.N.Z.A.A.S. Congress. 
Rosehan, D.L. 
Scheff, T.J. 
"On Being Sane in Insane Places". Science, 1973, 179, 250. 
"The Labelling Theory of Mental Illness". American 
Sociological Review, 1974, 39, 444. 
Schiffer, M.E. "The Sentencing of Mentally Disordered Offenders"· 
Osgoode Ha 11 Law Journal , 1976, J...i, 307. 
Schoenfeld, C.G. "An Analysis of the Views of Thomas S. Szasz". 
Journal of Psychiatry and Law, 1976, 1:_, 245. 
Scott, P.O. 11 Psychiatric Reports for Magistrates Courts". British · 
Journal of Deling~ency, 1953, 1:_, 82. 
Simon, R.J. Women and Crime. Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co~ 1975. 
Singer, L.R. 11 ~Jomen and the Correctional Process". American Criminal 
Law Review, 1973, ~. 295. 
Smith, C.E. "Recognizing and Sentencing the Exceptional and Dangerous 
Offender". Federa 1 Probation, 1971, 35, 3. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
- 143 -
Sparks, R.F. "The Decision to Remand for Medical Examination". 
British Journal of Criminology, 1966, .§_, 6. 
Suarez, J. "The Role of the Psychiatrist as an Expert". Journal 
of Forensic Sciences, 1967, }_g_, 172. 
Sussman, A. "Psychological Testing and Juvenile Justice: An Invalid 
Judicial Function". Criminal Law Bulletin, 1974, lQ, 117. 
Szasz, T.S. Law Liberty and Psychiatry. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 
Varne, S. Sentencing Patterns and Recidivism in Tasmania. Unpublished 
Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1975. 
Varne, S. "Saturday Work: A Real Alternative". Australian & New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology, 1976, 2_, 95. 
Walker, N. Crime and Punishment in Britain. Edinburgh: University 
Press, 1968. 
Walker, N. and McCabe S. Crime and Insanity in England. Edinburgh: 
University Press, 1973. 
Wastell, F.J. Discrimination against Men in Criminal Statute and 
Sentencing. Unpubl'ished Thesis, University of Tasmania, 1976. 
Weihofen, J. The Urge to Punish. New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Cudahy, 1956. 
Wilson, A.B.C. The Courts and Mental Health Services. Unpublished 
paper> Adelaide, 1974. 
Woodside, H. "Probation and Psychiatric Treatment in Edinburgh". 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 1972, 118, 561. 
Woodside, H. "Psychiatric Referrals from Edinburgh Courts 11 • British 
Journal of Criminology, 1976, J_.§_, 20. 
CASES 
Carter v. U.S. 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
R. v. Benson and Stevenson {1951) 100 Can. C.C. 247. 
- 144 -
R. v. Brooks {1913) 8 Cr. ,App. Rep. 156. 
R. v. Lucky (1974) 12 S.A.S.R. 136. 
R. v. Morris (1961) 45 Cr. App. Rep. 185. 
Woolley v. Devine. Unreported Tasmanian decision of Hood S.M., 8th July, 
1974. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Tasmanian 
Alcohol and Drug Dependency Act 1968. 
Child Welfare Act 1960. 
Criminal Code 1924. 
Justices Act 1959. 
Justices Rules 1959. 
Mental Health Act 1963. 
Probation of Offend~rs Act 1973. 
United Kingdom 
Criminal Justice Act, 1948. 
Magistrates' Courts Rules, 1968. 
Mental Health Act, 1959. 
Mental Health (Scotland) Acti 1960. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
